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Abstract
The Saudi Arabian economy experienced two major stages in the period
1965-97, the first of which, was the oil export boom from 1965 to 1981, white the
second was the oil slump from 1982 onwards. This study firstly analyses the
impact of the oil revenue fluctuations on the Saudi Arabian based on the Dutch
disease theory, and secondly discusses the government response used to
mitigate the negative effects of such fluctuations. The main empirical findings
indicate that the Saudi Arabian economy was subject to a unique case of the
Dutch disease during the boom. Some of the symptoms of the disease, notably
the rise in relative prices, appreciation in the real exchange rate and expansion
of the supply of nontraded goods, were applicable, while, in contrast to the
theory, the supply of tradable goods expanded, but far below that of nontraded
goods, due to the influence of subsidies, the influx of foreign labour and the
world price effect. During the slump period, the domestic economy was subject
to a decline in relative prices, depreciation of the Saudi currency, and a
contraction in the supply of nontraded goods. The supply of traded goods was
affected as the theory predicts. This was possibly because of the continuation of
subsidies. The policies associated with the oil slump focussed mainly on a
reduction of government spending, drawing from foreign reserves and borrowing
from local and international financial agencies. In general, the study suggests
that the developing oil-exporting countries can build up foreign assets as a
policy of stabilising expenditure. This approach tends to reduce the oil export
instability through accumulating foreign reserves to be used to counter any
downward movements in the future. In addition, the study suggests that the
necessity to diversify the sources of income by improving non-oil sectors'
production, particularly, the services and some tradable goods.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Identification of the Problem
Saudi Arabia can be categorised as a developing country. Nevertheless,
it differs from the majority of the developing countries, which have low income,
high populations to land ratios, high shares of agriculture in GDP, and high
foreign debts. The Saudi Arabian economy is characterised by: (I) the
dominance of the public sector due to the fact that the state owns the oil fields;
(ii) a high dependence on international trade. It is the largest oil exporter in the
world, and it possesses about 26% of the world proven reserves, with 261
billion barrels compared with world reserves accounted for 1036 billion barrels.
It is also the largest importing country in the Arab world; (iii) there is a high
reliance on foreign labourer. According to the last Saudi census, non-Saudis
were one third of the total population.
The oil sector plays a crucial role in the economic activity, and the Saudi
Arabian economy can be characterised as an oil-dependent economy due to
the high proportion of the oil exports in the country's total exports and of the oil
share in the overall GDP. The oil windfall, which accrued to the government in
the aftermath of the Arab-embargo of oil in 1973, led the country to spend
heavily in order to accelerate the economic development.
An oil export boom (if oil revenues are monetised) might be expected to
lead to an improvement in national income, disposable income, and produce a
surplus in the balance of payments. Despite the welfare achieved and
associated with the energy boom, an energy-producing economy can suffer
from negative side-effects emanating from a boom, such as the deterioration in
manufacturing and agricultural sectors because of an appreciation of the real
exchange rate and an expansion of the nontraded goods sector This was first
identified following the discovery of the Slochtern gas field in the Netherlands in
the 1960s, which caused an appreciation of the Dutch Guilder.
Similarly, the Saudi Arabian economy experienced an oil export boom
during the 1970s and early 1980s due to the unexpected sharp increase of oil
price and production resulting, amongst other factors, from Arab-Israeli war and
Iranian revolution. Therefore, the national income rose and the balance of
payments went into surplus. Such an outcome would have been normally
considered as a blessing. Nevertheless, adverse side-effects may occur,
notably an asymmetrical effect on resource reallocation and on income
distribution. This can be evident from: (i) the rise in the relative price of non-
traded goods sector with respect to the traded goods sector; (ii) the
appreciation in the Saudi real exchange rate (iii) a deterioration, in the traditional
non-oil traded goods sector, which may cause a de-industrialisation or/and de-
agriculturalisation and an expansion in the non-traded goods sector at the
expense of the traditional traded goods sector. The negative side-effects of the
export boom is recongised in the economic literature as the 'Dutch disease
phenomenon', 'Oil-Syndrom' or 'de-industrialisation'. It is worth mentioning that
in Saudi Arabia the traditional traded goods sector in the lean years was
confined to livestock raising, production of small tools by craftsmen and
primitive agriculture. Therefore, the Dutch diesease in this thesis is carried out
with the assumption that Saudi Arabia may suffer from a decline of the
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traditional traded goods sector, while the manufacturing base is likely to evolve
in the futrue as a diversification target of not highly reliance on the oil as the
major source of national income.
The boom which has been enjoyed was followed by gradual and then
dramatic decline in oil revenues. This occurred especially after the mid-1980s
when Saudi Arabia stopped practising the role of a "swing producer" in OPEC in
order to maintain the price of oil. It has been adversely affected by OPEC
members, and independent oil producers when they increased their quotas at
the expense of Saudi quota. Accordingly, the production of Saudi Arabia
declined from five to less than three million barrells in the mid 1980s.
Consequently, it might be expected that there would be a reverse
consequences of the boom due to the decline in oil price and production.
Fluctuations in oil revenues over time may reflect and affect the Saudi small
and open economy positively and/or negatively through both the oil export
boom and the oil export slump.
1.2 Purpose and Importance of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to examine empirically the
consequences of the oil boom (oil slump) on the Saudi Arabian economy during
the period from 1965 to 1981 (Stage I) and from 1982 to 1997 (Stage II). An
examination is made of the impact of the oil revenue fluctuations on the Saudi
Arabian economy during the sample periods in order to answer the following
questions:
. Has the oil boom (slump) represented by oil revenue, oil price and the
spending effects, positively affected the relative price of the nontraded
3
goods sector relative to the traded goods sector? If so, to what extent
has the oil boom (slump) affected relative prices?
. Has the real exchange rate appreciated (depreciated) in response to
the oil revenue, oil price and spending effects? If so, to what extent
has the appreciation (depreciation) of the real exchange rate been
affected?
. Has the traded goods sector been squeezed (expanded) as a result of
the oil boom (slump)? If so, to what extent has it been affected and
what have been the causes of such an outcome?
. Has the oil boom (slump) brought about an expansion (contraction) of
the nontraded goods sector? If so, how and to what extent has it done
so?
The answers to these questions may not be adequate unless the policy
response to the boom and slump is discussed. Therefore, the secondary
purpose of this study is to discuss the government policy responses both within
the context of the analysis and also separately.
This study has to be seen in the context of the previous studies conducted
with respect to the impact of natural resources export boom (slump) on the
domestic economy in different countries experiencing the same situation. These
studies can be categorised as follows:
1. The studies concerned with developed countries, which rest mainly on
assumptions, which are consistent with the structure of these economies.
These assumptions may not be relevant to oil-exporting developing countries,
as they include full-employment, highly developed financial markets, and a
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large scale manufacturing sectors, a substantial role for the private sector, a
flexible exchange rate and sound macroeconomic management. Corden and
Neary (1982), Eastwood and Venables (1982), Buiter and Purvis (1983), and
Forsyth and Kay (1980) among others are samples of these studies.
2. Studies dealing with fixed exchange rates put emphasis on changes in oil
prices rather than in production or oil revenues. The oil price may not be the
only factor that determines oil revenues, but oil production may be raised to
offset the fall in oil prices. Some examples of such studies are Harberger (1983)
and Edwards and Aoki (1983) among others.
3. Some studies assume explicitly or implicitly that oil revenues accrues to the
private sector, whereas in most developing countries, particularly in OPEC
countries, the oil revenues accrue directly to their governments. This implies
that oil revenue fluctuations may have different impact on the economy through
the role of government control over the economy. All studies, which are
conducted in some Western countries (Britain, Holland, and Norway), in relation
to the Dutch disease, are examples of this category.
4. Some studies conducted in developing countries mainly deal with the impact
of a primary agricultural product boom on the economy. The agricultural sector
has forward and backward linkages, whereas the oil sector is mainly known as
an enclave sector with few linkages with other sectors in the economy.
Examples of these studies are Kamas (1986), Edwards (1986), Musond and
Luvanda (1991). The first two studies focus on the effect of the coffee export
boom on the Colombian economy, whereas the latter explain the effect of
coffee export boom on the Tanzanian economy.
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5. With regard to the Saudi Arabian economy, most studies related to the Dutch
disease concentrate mainly either on the positive effects of the boom rather
than the adverse side-effect, resulting from external shock or dealing with an
export boom rather than the export slump. Taher (1987) and Al-Gaeed (1991),
are samples of this tendency.
6. Studies conducted with respect to oil revenue declines include those by Al-
Yousuf (1990), Ibrahim (1987), Mabro (1985). They covered the period prior to
1990, before the Saudi Arabian economy had been severely affected during
and after the invasion and liberation of Kuwait in 1990-1991.
The Dutch disease theory does not merely refer to the problem of de-
industrialisation, but also to the decline of the tradable sectors in total GDP, or
slower than normal growth in response to exogenous windfalls resulting
particularly from oil export ( Roemer, 1984, Braker and Brailovsky, 1981). This
thesis, unlike the core Dutch disease model applying this disease to the oil
exporting countries, highlights the uniqueness of the Saudi oil economy taking
into consideration assumptions that are relevant to this economy, such as the
dominance of the government sector, undeveloped manufacturing and
agricultural sectors, the limited role of the private sector and low economic
absorptive capacity. In addition, the study attempts to quantify the negative and
positive effects of both export boom and slump. One can conclude that this
thesis is the first of its kind that comprehensively examines the topic in the
context of Saudi Arabia over more than three decades. This thesis depicts how
oil revenue fluctuations may affect the relative prices, real exchange -rates and
sectoral shifts in the economic history of Saudi Arabia providing required
analysis of policies used •
 by industrialising economies benefiting from
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favourable exogenous shocks. This study highlights the main limitation aspects
of the Dutch disease model in analysing the experience of oil revenue
fluctuations, especially when it is implemented to industrialising economies.
These limitations, unlike the Core Dutch disease model, do not depend upon
the structure of prices as the only variable to examine the impact of oil revenue
fluctuations, but they include challenging of the theory's assumptions based
upon full-employment, developed financial market, a significant role of the
private sector, fixed labour supply and flexible exchange rate. Furthermore, this
study challenges the two mechanisms of the resource movement and spending
effects used by the Core mode to examine the boom effect on changing relative
prices. This is discussed in more details in chapter 4.
1.3 Methodology
A sectoral model of an open economy, based on the Dutch theory is
used to analyse the impact of the oil price, oil revenues and the proxy for the
spending effect (i.e., the government spending and the money supply) on the
real exchange rate and the relative prices of nontraded goods versus traded
goods. Furthermore, the sectoral model depicts how the oil boom and slump
affect the allocation of resources through the impact of the proxy for the
spending effect, the price of oil, oil revenues, the estimated real exchange rate,
the relative prices and the world price index.
In addition to the analysis of these effects, the government policy
responses to moderate the impact of the boom and slump are discussed, both
in the context of the study and separately. These policies include the
government subsidies, income-generating measures, and the adjustment of
government expenditure. However, recruitment of foreign labour has played a
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considerable role, especially during the oil boom, to mitigate the negative
effects of the oil boom. The foreign labour through remitting incomes home,
consuming imported goods and shifting some service industries to the tradable
sector, could dampen the spending effect and hence limit real exchange rate
appreciation, as well as the rise in the relative price of nontraded goods.
Consequently, two stages will be suggested to achieve the main objectives
of the study. These stages will be divided as follows:
Stage I - This is devoted to an investigation of the impact of the oil export
boom on the economy during the period from 1965 to the end of the oil price
increase in 1981. It is worth mentioning that the pre-boom period (e.g., 1965 to
1972) did not witness any dramatic economic changes, but it is included in the
sample period for the sake of econometric needs and shortages of monthly and
quarterly data availability. The main purpose of adding the pre-boom years is to
increase the degrees of freedom since one cannot include more years after
1981 as the last year of the boom. The main task of the study is to examine the
existence of the adverse side-effect of the oil export boom in the national
economy during and after the Arab-Israel war in 1973 and in 1979 when Iraq-
Iran war took place. The impact of the oil export boom will be examined through
changes in the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods, the
appreciation of the real exchange rate, and thus the structural changes in
output of the traded and non-traded good sectors. In addition, the government's
policy response to this boom including subsidies and importing foreign labour
will be examined in order to see if it succeeded in mitigating the negative
effects of the external shocks.
Stage II - This is intended as an analysis of the impact of world oil prices
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deterioration on the national economy during the period from 1982 to the last
published data in 1997. This will also be examined through changes in the
relative prices, depreciation in the real exchange rate and the output of traded
and nontraded goods resulting from the slump in the price of oil and production
and thus oil revenues. The emphasis is on how the government response
affected the economy. In other words, whether the government succeeded to
diversify the economy and lessen reliance on oil by reallocation of resources
towards industrialisation of agriculture.
1.4 Organisation of the Study
Chapter two provides a review of the theoretical literature on Dutch
disease in developing and developed countries. Moreover, empirical studies of
the export boom in developing countries are covered.
Chapter three highlights the characteristics and the structure of the
Saudi Arabian economy. It examines the role of the oil sector and its
connection with the world oil market in general. and in OPEC in particular. The
role of the non-oil sector including manufacturing, agricultural, services and
construction is assessed. Other sectors such as the public sector (its
components of the budget and the government revenues and expenditures)
and the external sector containing exports, imports and the balance of
payments are covered as well.
Chapter four is devoted to an examination of the adverse-side effects of
the Dutch disease. This is conducted within a static theoretical macroeconomic
framework where natural resource export's fluctuations impact on the domestic
economy. This is followed by constructing a model relevant to the Saudi case,
9
and based on the Dutch disease model. To give a clear picture of the
government reaction to such changes, policy responses are provided.
Chapter five is concerned with the description of data. The aim of this
chapter is to give a clear definition of selected endogenous and exogenous
variables employed in the empirical study. This is based on the need to explain
observed differences in traded goods, non-traded goods, the relative price of
nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods and the real exchange rate
indicators.
Chapter six is reporting and discussing in detail the empirical study's
results with respect to the oil export boom. In this stage (i.e., 1965-1981), the
prediction of the adverse-side effect of reallocation of resources is examined
through changes in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods and in turn
changes in the real exchange rate.
Chapter seven deals with the empirical study results concerning the
deterioration in the oil export foreign exchange earnings. During this period
(i.e., 1982-1 997), the reverse natural resource boom predictions are examined.
Changes in the relative prices and the real exchange rate appear crucial in
reallocating domestic resources.
Finally, chapter eight is devoted to the summary and conclusion of the
study. Recommendations are made based on the empirical results of the study.
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Chapter Two
The Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
There is an abundant literature on the economic consequences of the
impact of natural resource exports in general and oil export boom in particular
on the domestic economy. Most of the theoretical and empirical literature is
related to the economic changes in the economies of developed countries. The
developing countries have had relatively less attention given to them in
comparison. On the other hand, there are a few contributions conducted to
analyse the economic consequences of the collapse of oil prices, particularly for
oil-exporting developing countries with low absorptive oil-exporting countries
such as Saudi Arabia. This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 2.2 is
devoted to literature on the natural resource exports instability and its impact on
an economy. In section 2.3, a theoretical survey of the predictions of the natural
resource exports boom on the economy is reviewed. These predictions are
termed as the 'Dutch disease'. Some empirical studies of the Dutch disease in
developed and developing countries are reviewed in section 2.4, while the
literature on the slump of the natural resource is reviewed in section 2.5. In
section 2.6, a summary is provided.
2.2 Literature on the Natural Resource Export Instability.
Many economists, particularly, the neo-classical figures, would not have
believed that the production of natural resources would come to play a major
role in the activity of an open economy. They had imagined that instead, man-
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made resources, technology and synthetic materials would increasingly replace
and have more influence than natural resources (Morley 1989). Such a
conclusion would have seemed relatively acceptable prior to the 1960s.
However, the 1973 oil price increase, and its aftermath, proved that the natural
resources, notably oil, played a vital role not only in the domestic oil producing
economies but also in the entire world economy. A surge in oil revenues
resulting from dramatic changes in the world oil market has drawn more
attention to natural resource economics. Since most of the less developed
countries (LDCs) concentrate on the production of primary agricultural and
mineral commodities, they heavily rely on these for foreign exchange earnings
(Dick et al. 1983). Hence, export receipts accrue, either to the owner of factors
of production as income, and/or to the government as taxes and royalties.
Consequently, any changes in export earnings may affect both of these and be
reflected in their economic behaviours.
The fluctuations in export price and earnings may be attributed to the
inelasticity of demand and supply curves of primary products and to
unpredictable demand and supply shocks (Kindleberger and Lindert, 1978).
Inelasticities of demand and supply imply that any changes in quantity
demanded or supplied would reflect sharply on the price and thus the revenue
of the primary commodities. On the demand side, if the demand for a primary
commodity declines slightly, the price and thus the revenue will decline sharply
and vice versa. On the supply side, any fall in a primary commodity's production
may be accompanied by a sharp increase in its price. One can ask about
causes leading to disturbances in supply and demand of primary commodities.
To answer this question, one should consider causes on the supply side, which
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can include harvest problems or political events, whereas, on the demand side,
these would include business cycles or inventory speculation.
According to Dornbusch and Helmers (1989), the largest single source of
export instability in LDCs has been the business cycles in industrial countries.
Such cycles lead to fluctuations in export earnings and thus to a variation in the
terms of trade. It is agreed that changes in terms of trade in LDCs are larger
than in developed countries (DCs), and some studies suggest that mineral
exporters may be subject to wider fluctuations in export prices than other LDCs
(Geib, et al. 1988).
Nevertheless, It is worth noting that in the oil market, it is necessary to
take into account the changes in oil market rather than just levels of sales and
prices. This is due to the fact that market fluctuations have been poorly
predicted. Although the market had been tightened in previous years, the first
oil price increase was not widely expected, and many economists disagree
about its causes. Many theories emerged with different implications for the
future pattern of prices (Geib, et al. 1988). Four of them will be summarised as
follows:
a - The property right theory attributes the price increases in 1973 to the
transfer of the ownership of crude oil from the multinational companies to the
producing countries (Johani, 1986). The establishment of OPEC in 1960
threatened the position of the foreign companies in an oil-dominated market.
Consequently, the companies increased the oil production before losing their
control. They tried to maximise their discount rate and in turn to minimise the
producing countries' discount rate. As a result, the governments of OPEC
members decided to shift the power of determining the production volumes
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away from the multinational companies. This transfer of ownership into host
countries caused the oil price to rise in 1973, (Johani, 1986).
b - The target revenue theory attributes the production reduction in 1973
and afterwards to the limited absorptive capacity of the oil producing countries
which prevented them from absorbing the huge earnings from exports at that
time. They then had to reduce production, which led to an increase in oil price.
The studies of Salehi-Isfahani (1987), and Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980)
showed that OPEC members' policy rests on reducing production when oil
prices rise to avoid the consequence of a high rate of inflation due to their low
absorptive capacity (Al-Yousef, 1994).
c - The cartelisation theory attributes the rise in oil price to the OPEC
consensus to set a determined price in order to raise the price of oil. Pindyck
(1978) and Adelman (1982) developed models to explain the OPEC price
behaviour. They concluded that the oil market is dominated by the oil cartel to
maximise their profits through setting prices with no competition among OPEC
members.
d - The market theory argues that the gradual evolution of demand and
supply conditions in the oil market since the 1 960s has led to the rise of the oil
prices (Gelb et al. 1988).
However, empirical studies have not yet arrived at a full consensus on
whether export instability can influence economic activity. Studies, for example
those by McBean (1966) and Coppock (1962), have found little evidence that
export instability had harmful effects on investment and growth. While Maizels
(1968), Massel et al. (1972) and Lim (1976), in contrast, have shown a
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significant positive relationship between export earnings and national income
instability. Their assumption is based on the fact that export earnings instability
is the only contributor to national income instability (Dick, et al. 1983).
On the other hand, the study by Rangarajan and Sundararajan (1976)
aimed at isolating the contribution to the national income made by export
earnings instability from that of other factors. These factors include
consumption, investment, imports and GNP. Rangarajan and Sundararajan
concluded that a reduction in export instability leads to a reduction in income
instability. Their model distinguishes only macro aggregates and precludes
them from obtaining insights into the sectoral and economy-wide effects of
instability originating in individual commodity markets.
Dick, et al. (1983) developed a model to examine the short-run effects of
commodity price instability on economic activities in three countries: Colombia
(coffee), Ivory Coast (coffee and cocoa), and Kenya (tea). They concluded that
there are two options in relation to the export instability in terms of price and
earnings. The first one is the domestic stabilisation option. This option implies
that the relevant commodity production sector can successfully be isolated from
the effects of the price and earnings shock if (i) these governments have a
large amounts of foreign reserves and (ii) they pursue a fixed domestic
absorption policy in the face of the price instability. Such an option seems more
appropriate in a case where the world commodity price movements represent
genuine fluctuations in the trend rather than a shift in the trend.
The second option reflects the exchange rate changes required to
maintain the balance of trade equilibrium as a result of the price shock. Such
changes affect the sectoral output due to the reallocation of resources among
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the sectors in each domestic economy. This option would seem to be rational
only when the price shock could be considered as representing a shift in the
price trend (Dick et al. 1983).
The instability of commodity prices raises the question of whether the
export prices can be stabilised. Stabilisation is in the interest of producers
because it reduces the fluctuations in their export incomes and also reduces
instability in their macroeconomies (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994). Price
stabilisation was experienced by the International Wheat Agreement among the
wheat-exporting and wheat-importing countries before the 1970s, using a
programme called a 'buffer stock'.
This stabilisation programme implies that the governments involved
determine a ceiling price for the commodity concerned and then buy the
commodity when the price is below that and sell when the price is above the
ceiling price. Such a programme faces many problems: The first problem is the
cost that these governments have to pay in order to stabilise the price. These
extra costs can be storage, labour, insurance, and transportation costs. The
second problem is the availability of funds needed to absorb the commodity
surplus in the market, and the third one is how can they predict and determine
the future prices and the quantity to be purchased or to be sold to absorb the
excess supply or demand. Any failure can lead to more instability in prices and
revenues. Moreover, difficulties arise in negotiation over which government will
bear which shares of the total cost of the buffer stock scheme.
To avoid such problems, import-substituting industrialisation can be
taken as an alternative means to moderate fluctuations in primary export price
and revenue. So, it is argued that since industrialisation is a force contributing
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to overall economic improvement, developing countries must cut their reliance
on exporting primary products and adopt policies allowing industries to grow at
the expense of the agricultural and mining sectors. This outcome emerges from
the view that raw materials prices are bound to decline in the long run relative
to the prices of industrial goods. Moreover, even though industrialisation might
run counter to comparative advantage, two facts have to be taken into account.
First, comparative advantage has to be considered in a dynamic perspective.
Given enough time and experience, LDCs could achieve efficiency in these
sectors and thus ultimately justify initial protection. Second, while perhaps
costly in terms of resource allocation, protection policy may have a major
stabilisation influence by reducing dependence on single commodity in the
world economy, (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994)
Finally, one can say that the instability of export price and revenue is the
reason why LDC5 try to diversify their production and exports as a goal of
policy. To the extent that production and trade are diversified among different
primary commodities and between commodities and manufactures, there is
more stability of total export revenue. Disruption in the market in this case has a
smaller effect on total exports.
2.3 Theoretical Survey of the Literature on the Dutch Disease
The sizeable growth of the natural resource industry has triggered a
large and growing literature focusing on the impact of such growth on the rest
of the economy. The exports boom sector may affect the other sectors
negatively and/or positively. It creates some macroeconomic changes through
changes in the exchange rate and relative prices.
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The balance of payments of the economy may be affected as well. Such
adverse effects resulting from the boom are termed the 'Dutch disease'. This
'disease' was diagnosed after the discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands'
economy in the sixties. The Netherlands' economy experienced some sectoral
structural changes. These changes were in the form of a contraction in the non-
natural resource traded sector (de-industrialisation) and an expansion in the
services sector. The exchange-rate appreciation of the local currency (guilder)
combined with a modest increase in domestic money wages and the increasing
cost of the social security system caused these outcomes (ElIman, 1981).
However, the analytical studies of the impacts of natural resource
discoveries on other sectors first started with John Cairnes (1857). He studied
the effects of the 1851 Australian gold discoveries on other sectors of the
Australian economy. The extensive theoretical literature that followed has been
surveyed by other economists such as Corden (1982), Corden and Neary
(1982), Wijnbergen (1984), Eastwood and Venables (1982) and others.
Accordingly, one should demonstrate selected theoretical studies, dealt with the
impact of price and production increase of one commodity on the other sectors
in the economy.
Salter (1959) presented the two-sector framework for the macroeconomic
model. He introduced a simple diagram to illustrate the features of the
relationship between price and expenditure effects. To reconcile the full-
employment policy and the balance of payments, he divides the commodities
market into two single categories: traded goods and non-traded goods: Traded
goods consist of exportables and importables with perfect substitution. Their
prices are determined exogenously. On the other hand, non-traded goods are
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consumed and produced domestically so their prices are determined in
response to the domestic demand and supply interactions.
Salter highlighted the three means by which one of them might cause an
external and internal disequilibrium. These means can be illuminated as
follows:
• Excess demand: The rise in income will bring about excess demand for both
categories of goods and thus causing the expenditure to rise. Changes in
relative prices will appear if the expenditure effect persists leading to a rise in
price of non-traded relative to traded goods. Such an outcome resulting from
the price effect, will cause the slope of the income and expenditure lines to
be steeper. The magnitude of reactions in supply and demand for both
categories of goods depends upon the elasticities of substitution. However,
the excess demand will lead to a balance of payments deficit. To restore
simultaneous internal and external balance, one can adjust the relative
prices by lowering home costs and prices relative to those of overseas. Such
an adjustment can be made by deflation or devaluation associated with an
additional cut in expenditure.
• A rise in world prices: Since the price of traded goods is determined
exogenously, any increase in the price of domestic traded goods will follow.
Consequently, on the supply side, the production of traded goods will expand
at the expense of non-traded goods. On the demand side, as the world price
increases, the impact of the expenditure effect will depend upon the
behaviour of consumers' domestic income. If the money expenditure is
constant, the real expenditure declines, causing a fall in the quantity
demanded. Unemployment may take place particularly when the elasticity of
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demand is larger than one. This implies that the real expenditure effect is
more than the price effect that may reduce the relative prices. The remedy
for that is the appreciation of the exchange rate. On the other hand, if the
money expenditure rises, the money income rises as well causing over-
employment and a balance of payments surplus. Elimination of such an
outcome can be done through an exchange appreciation coupled with other
measures to reduce money expenditure.
Overseas capital inflows: Such an inflow will increase the expenditure
shifting its line upwards and creating over-employment. Extra expenditure
will reflect on excess demand for non-traded goods and br a rise in
investment bringing about an increase in relative prices. The imports may
rise as a result of extra expenditure if the internal balance exists (i.e. no
changes in production and prices of non-traded goods) leading to structural
changes. The remedy will transfer the extra expenditure to the balance of
payments enabling domestic balance to reconcile with capital inflow.
The preceding analysis is associated with the assumption that the terms of
trade remain fixed, but the overseas price changes may affect the terms of
trade regarding exportables and importables. Hence, the terms of trade
determine the shape and position of the transformation and indifference curves.
Hence, a fall in exportable prices may lead to an adverse movement of the
terms of trade, and therefore national income will fall when it is measured in
terms of importables and rise in terms of exportables.
To restore internal and external balances, devaluation is more likely in the
case of a fall in exportables' price to increase non-traded goods prices and
raise demand for traded goods, and in turn, an appreciation takes place in
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event of an increase in importables price causing non-traded goods to be
cheaper and traded goods to be more expensive. Such remedies can be
considered when the domestic policies cause secondary terms of trade, which
results from the reaction by other countries to domestic devaluation,
appreciation and expenditures cut.
Salter has highlighted the impacts of import restrictions designed to prevent
a drain on foreign funds. That action may lead to an increase in demand for
non-traded goods causing internal imbalance. To avoid an excess demand
being transferred to non-traded goods, a temporary cut in expenditure is
needed until changes in the relative price take place to restore equilibrium. This
cure can be effective under some conditions such as: (i) the effectiveness of
home costs and prices to shift the resources towards tradables; (ii) when the
expenditure does not result from excess full-employment levels and (iii) when
the balance of payments is not subject to long -run disequilibrium.
The preceding analysis is concerned with long-run changes. Such analysis
postulates the mobility of the factors of production. In reality, the proportion in
which traded and non-traded goods may be produced is more or less
determined by the short-run current structure of production, rather than long-run
prediction. Consequently, reactions to changes in relative prices are initially on
the demand side, while reactions on the supply side contribute little in the short-
run either to external or internal equilibrium. The full burden of the short-run
adjustment has been placed on the expenditure effect. However, the remedy
cannot be through devaluation or deflation because of the likely severe results
on production, but it can be through adjustment in relative prices. This outcome
will sacrifice the balance of payments for the sake of fullemployment (Salter,
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1959). Finally Salter's analysis incorporates export-traded goods and other
traded goods in one sector rather than separating them. Such a division would
help to examine the effect of changes in export sales or price on other traded
goods as well as on the non-traded goods sectors.
Gregoty (1976) developed a partial equilibrium model to test the impact of the
Australian tariffs and the discovery of mineral resources on the sectoral
structure of the economy. As a result of the new discovery, the surplus in the
balance of payments has affected the exports and import-competing industries
through the exchange rates and the relative rates of inflation in Australia and
overseas.
His empirical analysis shows that the effects of the mineral resource
exports is equivalent to a doubling of the tariff on the traditional export sector,
while the rapid growth of mineral resources export, from the viewpoint of import-
competing sector, is equivalent to the removal of the tariff. The effects of the
new discovery of mineral resources on the sectors have been equivalent to a
25% of general reduction of tariffs. He tested only the impact of the spending
effect resulting from the mineral new discoveries. The adjustments required to
restore equilibrium depend on the extent of the mineral discoveries, the price
elasticities of supply and demand of mineral exports and the price elasticity of
demand and supply of imports and traditional exports. He ignored the effects of
the income and the costs of import-competing and traditional exports industries.
Gregory's two mechanisms to bring about the negative side-effects of the boom
have been improved and extended by Snape (1977), Corden and Neary (1982),
Long (1983) among others.
Snape (1977) developed a general theoretical equilibrium model resting on
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Gregory's assumptions. He aimed to examine the effect of the mineral
discoveries on the rents of factors specific to minerals, income, and on the
costs of import-competing and traditional exports industries. In addition, he
examined the impact on price elasticities of supply and demand for mineral
exports, imports and traditional exports. His results regarding the impact of
spending and resource effects can be summarised as follows:
• Output of some non-mineral goods may rise, in spite of anticipated decline in
its production.
• Social benefits can be gained even if outputs of non-mineral goods do not
change.
The production of non-traded goods can fall or increase even if its price is
expected to rise.
• An increase in the rents of factors specific to minerals and a decline in the
rents of factors specific to other traded goods can be expressed.
Eastwood and Venables (1982) developed a theoretical macroeconomic model
to test the impacts of a discovery of oil on an open economy, assuming that oil
is perfectly tradable and its revenue is independent of oil depletion policy. That
implies a zero oil extraction cost. The economy is assumed to have full-
employment, zero inflation, and capital and current accounts balanced. Since
they assume perfect international capital mobility, rational expectations of
exchange rate and slow price adjustment of domestic goods prices (i.e.,
uninstantaneous market clearing), their assumptions are based closely on
Dornbusch's (1976) approach, using five equations: money market equilibrium,
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foreign exchange equilibrium, domestic non-oil demand, output and Phillips
curve.
They concluded that anticipated oil revenues, lead to unemployment and
price deflation if spending is not adjusted immediately after the oil discovery.
They tested the impacts of oil revenue wealth on the spending effect only,
ignoring such an effect on money demand. According to Neary and Wijnbergen
(1984) this omission is hard to justify and a situation in which an oil discovery
would raise spending and leave money demand permanently unchanged would
be inconceivable. Neary and Wijnbergen justified their view on liquidity grounds.
The oil revenues as a transfer will affect the money demand either directly
through the private sector or indirectly through the government. Hence, the
wealth of the private sector should rise through the anticipated reduction in
future tax liabilities.
To bridge this gap, Neary and Wijnbergen used Eastwood and Venables'
model incorporating the wealth effect on asset markets. Assuming a strictly
positive wealth elasticity of money demand, the higher wealth resulting from oil
discovery would induce excess demand for money. To accommodate this
situation, a rise in real money stock has to take place, hence, a greater
appreciation of the exchange rate and a lower post-shock price level than those
of Eastwood and Venables case. Neary and Wijnbergen come to a conclusion
that higher oil revenue may lead to a recession even without a spending lag.
They justify such an outcome by arguing that a rise in wealth will increase the
demand for money, causing a contractionary shock (with given nominal money
supply). The effect of the contractionary shock may offset the direct
expansionary effect of the oil discovery on domestic spending. The adoption of
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a monetary policy is required as a means to avoid recession without inflationary
pressure. It is a worth noting that Eastwood and Venables examined the impact
of oil discovery on the economy through the spending effect only.
Corden and Neaiy (1982) developed a theoretical Dutch disease framework
introducing, spending and the resource movement effects resulting from a
booming sector in a small open economy. They aimed to analyse the impact of
the booming sector on the resource allocation, the factoral income distribution,
and the real exchange rate. The assumptions of the model, limited by the
absence of international capital mobility, are that there are real variables rather
than nominal ones, there is full-employment, and that the returns of factors of
production are spent by the owners directly (private sectors).
To examine the impacts of the boom, Corden and Neary use three
models: the first one is a short-run model based on the assumptions of fixed
capital and labour mobility between the three sectors. Hence, de-
industrialisation may occur in three cases: (i) a fall in manufacturing output and
employment with deterioration in the balance of trade in manufacturing; (ii) a fal'
in real returns to the factors specific to the manufacturing sector; (iii) a real
appreciation in the exchange rate although some economists blame real
appreciation as an independent cause of de-industrialisation. In the second
model, the assumption is based on the mobility of capital between
manufacturing and services while labour is mobile between the three sectors.
They conclude that the boom would affect real wages in terms of traded
goods and rental on capital used in manufacturing and services. The outcomes
depend mainly on the intensity of capital in each sector. If the manufacturing
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sector is capital-intensive and the boom takes place, the resource-movement
effect will lead to a rise in output of manufacturing and a fall in services. In the
third model when capital is mobile between the three sectors, the boom may
cause de-industrialisation through the resource movement effect. That effect
will reduce the output of the manufacturing sector due to the rise in returns of
the factor used intensively by the energy sector relative to the manufacturing
sector. On the other hand, the impact of the spending effect of a boom always
tends to raise the output of services, but the effect on output of manufacturing
depends on relative factor intensities. Such an analysis can be considered as
an extension of Snape's (1977) study.
In reality, particularly in the oil-exporting developing countries where a
large part of the rent accrues to the specific sector in the booming sector which
is typically paid in taxes, so that revenues are spent by the government to
determine the magnitude and the direction of the spending effect.
Long (1983) developed a theoretical model to explain the impact of an export
boom industry via spending and resource-movement effects on the rest of the
economy. His assumptions are very similar to those in the Dutch disease
theoretical static framework. He incorporated the assumption of relative factor
intensities and a mobility of two factors. He assumed too that there are three
factors of production: a globally mobile factor, a factor which is specific to the
non-traded goods industry and a factor which is mobile only within the two
traded goods industries (mining and other traded). He focuses on changes in
relative prices (prices of non-traded to traded goods) and output of each
industry. Such changes will occur through shifts in the demand curve and
mainly on the supply curve. The results of this analysis to some extent might be
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contrary to the predictions of the Dutch disease. Long formulated the following
predictions:
The price of non-traded goods may fall relative to the price of non-mining
traded goods.
The non-mining traded goods industry may expand even when its price falls
relative to the price of non-traded goods.
The expansion in the non-mining traded goods industry may be
accompanied by a contraction of output of the booming mining industry
relative to its pre-boom equilibrium output (Long, 1983).
Long's results are illuminated in Figure 2.1 where the relative prices of
non-traded goods to traded goods is denoted Pn/Pt and represented on the
vertical axis, whereas the output of the non-traded goods industry is denoted
Qn and represented on the horizontal axis. Point A is the pre-boom equilibrium
point where the demand curve intersects the economy's supply curve of the
non-traded goods. On the demand curve, If the price of the booming industry
(PB) rises, the level of utility will be higher. As a result, the demand curve will
shift upwards to intersect with the supply curve at I causing relative prices and
output of non-traded goods to increase. On the supply curve, If PB rises, the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts the following:
An expansion in the booming industry will take place as long as it uses the
globally mobile factor more intensively, and in turn there will be a contraction
in the other sectors. Such an outcome will shift the supply curve upward to
point 2 or 3 causing Pn/Pt to rise. If the non-traded goods sector uses the
globally mobile factor more intensively, there will be an expansion in the
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traded goods industry and a contraction in the remaining industries. This will
lead the supply curve to shift downwards to points 4 and 5 causing an
increase in output of non-traded goods and a fall in relative prices.
Pu/Pt
1- I
0
Qn
Figure 2.1 The Relationship between the Relative Prices
and the Supply of the Nontraded Goods Sector
.
If the non-mining traded sector uses the globally mobile factor more
intensively, there will be an expansion in that industry and a contraction in
the booming and non-traded goods industries. This result can be justified by
the impact of the Rybczynski effect. This effect does not exist in Snape's
(1977) and Corden and Neary's (1980) models which predict the movement
of the supply curve upwards only at points 2 and 3.
Enders and Herberg ( 1983) have analysed the macroeconomic effects of a
resource boom on a small open economy via changes in prices, real income,
employment and sectoral structure in the short and long-run. Their analysis is
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based on a rather simple model assuming fixed exchange rate, short-run
immobility of labour between traded and non-traded sectors, an absorption
function as in the monetary approach to the balance of payments and a
sectoral structure as in the Scandinavian model. They concluded that a
resource boom is a mixed blessing for the country experiencing it. On the one
hand, the country benefits from it as nominal and real income are raised. On
the other hand, it suffers from negative side-effects resulting from typical Dutch
disease, where the prices of non-tradables and wages rise and employment
and output of tradables fall. They suggested seven cures: demand policy to
offset a fall in the manufacturing sector, wage freezing, devaluation, subsidies,
import tariff on the manufacturing sector, improvement in labour mobility and
investment of part of the higher resource revenues in foreign-bearing assets.
They analysed the impact of just the spending effect only on an open economy.
Wj/nbergen (1984) illustrated that the short-run macroeconomic impacts of the
higher oil prices, which arise from oil revenues increases in oil exporting
countries. His analysis of the Dutch disease departs from the Salter-Swan-
Meade model of an open economy. He concluded that higher transfers from
abroad may lead to excess demand for non-traded goods. A real exchange rate
appreciation associated with the resource movement out of the traded goods
sector into the non-traded sector would induce a decline in the traded sector.
He dealt also with employment changes and inflation resulting from such a
boom. Since excess demand for non-traded goods exists, their prices relative
to traded goods prices would increase. Hence, wages will follow the Consumers
Price Index (CPI). If the CPI has a large traded goods component (as in the
Gulf countries, where most of the traded goods are imported) a rise in the real
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wage in terms of traded goods allows for a large drop in the real wage in terms
of non-traded goods. This will result in repressed inflation (excess demand for
labour and non-traded goods).
In contrast, if the share of traded goods consumption is low (as in Latin
America, where the volume of imported goods is relatively small), an increase
in real wage in terms of traded goods, given CPI indexation, will not allow for a
large decrease in real wage in terms of non-traded goods. So, the non-traded
goods sector will not absorb all workers made redundant by the traded goods
sector. Consequently, a classical unemployment situation arises (classical
unemployment occurs when there is excess demand for goods associated with
lack of demand for labour due to high wages)
Corden (1984) surveyed and consolidated the literature on the booming sector
economics and the Dutch disease. He developed an analytical model to
examine the impacts of the spending and resource-movement effects resulting
from a boom on the economy. A boom can have one of three sources: a once-
and-for-all exogenous technical improvement in the booming sector which
would shift the production possibility curve upwards; a sizeable discovery of
new resources causing an increase in the supply of the specific factor; and an
exogenous rise in the price of the booming products which are sold only in the
world market. The first source was given more attention in his analysis. As part
of his analysis has already been covered in one way or another within the
context of the chapter, and to avoid repetition, we will consider only these
issues which need to be included, such as the migration effect and the dynamic
model resulting from a boom.
Corden concluded that international and domestic migration would be
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induced by a rise in real wage (the gold rush effect) and by the Alberta effect.
The Alberta effect may occur when the boom revenue goes primarily to the
government, and then the government redistributes it to the rest of the
population in the form of tax reduction, improved public facilities, social benefits
and so on. This may attract migrants in the non-traded goods and traded goods
sectors to share in the sectors' rents. As a result, the output of the traded goods
sector could recover (as the rent of the traded goods sector rises), and in turn,
appreciation of the real exchange rate could be moderated or even avoided
(Corden, 1984). The second issue concerns the dynamic model, where the rise
in the value of output, the income of the booming sector, and the real
appreciation, have not all happened at the same time. However, the
consequences of the boom may follow a particular time path. The time paths
differ with the source of the boom and the expectations about it. The general
picture can be depicted as follows:
Period I (the announcement period). Spending may rise to a new, higher level
owing to the expectation of a boom. There will be a current account deficit due
to decumulation of financial assets. There will be a once-and-for-all real
appreciation of exchange rate owing to the spending effect. The price rise is
expected, so consumption will rise. Domestic investment increases as the price
rise as expected adds to the spending effect and hence to the real appreciation
and the current account deficit owing to decumulation of foreign financial
assets. One might expect that there would be domestic de-investment in period
1, reducing the current account deficit. But the lead-time consideration
suggests otherwise: the expectation of the boom may lead to such a portfolio-
balancing investment beginning in period 1, all which is very relevant for public
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investment in period I and 2. GeIb (1981) concluded that in response to the two
oil price rises, there were big increases in the Indonesian, Nigerian and
Venezuelan public sectors and hence public investment, leading to a large
increase in the demand for nontradables (Services and Construction). At the
very least, there was over-shooting in public spending, leading eventually to
budget deficits.
Period 2 (the boom period.) Output or its value in foreign currencies may rise,
surpassing the new spending level. There will be a current account surplus due
to the accumulation of financial assets. There will be further appreciation
attributed to the resource movement effect. The price actually rises. So
consumption will rise. The precise pattern of consumption over time, depends
on the world interest rate and inter temporal time preferences along Fischerian
lines. The spending effect may take place with a lag, and may vary with
expectations about future price patterns. Mistakes can be made and one can
imagine over-shooting tendencies while the learning is still going on (Mexico
and other countries experienced this in 1981-82 when the boom was
anticipated by extra public spending, which increased consumption and hence
reduced foreign reserves and by wage increases obtained by the unions).
There will be extra domestic investment to maintain a portfolio balance
(investment in a world capital market); the spending effect will be higher and the
current account surplus less.
Period 3 (the decline in boom). Output may fall as the boom is temporary while
the spending may continue. There will be a current account deficit due to
decumulation of financial assets. There will be depreciation due to the resource
movement effect. The price falls back again. There will be domestic de-
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investment along with decumulation of foreign assets.
Finally, Corden expects the government experiencing the adverse effect
of a boom to protect the lagging sector or at least part of it. There are three
policies, which can be applied to protect the lagging sector: (i) taxing the
booming sector and using the revenue to subsidise the losing factors
(tradables) of production (the conservative social welfare function argument
based on pursuing the redistribution objective directly);(ii) subsidising
employment directly to induce a desirable resource reallocation;(iii) protecting
the infant industry especiafly when the boom is expected to be temporary and
the decline of the traded goods sector is thought to lead to non-optimal
decumulation of physical and human capital during the boom. If it is
nevertheless desirable to protect the traded goods sector to some extent, the
first and best method would be to subsidise output of the sector directly. Two
popular protectionist approaches can be implemented:
Exchange rate protection, namely a policy of avoiding real appreciation and
hence protecting the traded goods sector at the expense of the non-traded
goods sector. It can be brought about by exchange rate intervention
supported by sterilisation, whether through open market operations or a
budget's surplus, either of which will bring about the required reduction in
spending. This method will lead to excessive accumulation of foreign assets
compared to direct subsidisation, and thus will protect not only the traded
goods sector but also the booming sector.
Increased ordinasy protection by raising tariffs or tightening import quotas.
Avoiding a loss to import-competing industries will then be at the expense of
traded goods sector exportables as well as the booming sector. The traded
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goods exportables will then be hit twice, firstly by the real appreciation
(which will now be greater than before as the prices of non-traded goods
rise) and secondly by the direct resource loss to importables. However, that
can be offset and moderated by the traded goods exportables. This will
protect one part of traded goods sector at the expense of the other parts
(Corden, 1984).
Harberger (1983) developed a simple neo-classical small open economy
model. He used two versions of the model with a fixed exchange rate: the
comparative static version and the monetary dynamic version. In the former, it
is shown that a rise in the world price of oil must, ceteris paribus, cause the
price level of non-traded goods to rise. In the monetary dynamic version, it is
shown that the path of the non-traded goods price level may, as a result of oil
shock, overshoot before the final equilibrium is restored. However, the degree
of overshooting depends on the degree of spending generated by added
revenues. So, if spending increases gradually, the degree of overshooting may
decline and vice versa. Moreover, the degree of increase in the domestic price
level can be limited to the degree of appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Wijnbergen (1984) has illuminated the impacts of high and temporary oil
revenues through spending effect on the economies of the developing and
developed oil-exporting countries. Many third world oil-exporting countries are
encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base owing to
the delay in the 'Learning by Doing' experience, which would improve their
comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector, while West European oil
and gas producers are suffering from a decline in their traded goods sector,
induced by real wage pressures. Wijnbergen argued that this was an efficient
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response to the increase in income from oil production, and hence the oil
producers should move into oil-derived industries as well as non-traded goods
production and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are
exhausted.
Roemer (1985) reviews Corden and others' medium-term and Long's long-term
theoretical Dutch disease's framework. He focuses on the impacts of an export
boom on the developing countries' economies. He takes into consideration the
characteristics of the LDC's environment in relation to the Dutch disease
predictions resulting from the boom. He argues that in case of the LDC5, one
cannot generalise about the traditional Dutch disease predictions. Such a
conclusion emerges from the fact that these countries have different features,
which lead to inconsistent impacts compared to what happens in DCs. The first
difference is that LDC5 are suffering from underemployment and/or disguised
unemployment rather than full-employment.
Consequently, the impacts of resource movement and spending effects
may not be effective due to the pool or surplus in labour supply. The excess
labour supply would moderate the price increases and then tempers or even
eliminates the real exchange rate appreciation. Moreover, the output of the
traded goods sector may not fall, because this sector would not be subject to
resource movement and then to shortages in labour.
The export boom may also lead to the same implications in less
populated oil exporters, due to the large number of foreign migrant workers
recruited. The resource movement effect, can be dampened by more foreign
migrant workers, whereas the spending effect may lead to an expansion in the
output of non-booming traded goods rather than de-industrialisation. That can
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be attributed to foreign labour remittances, a rise in demand for imports and
domestic goods (some services are treated as tradables) and the nature of the
oil sector as a capital-intensive and enclave sector. Consequently, the real
exchange rate appreciation would be reduced. Nevertheless, some LDCs, as a
result of a boom, have experienced spending and resource movement effects
such as in Nigeria, and Indonesia. The second feature of LDCs is the long-run
outcome resulting from the boom, which rests on the capital intensity of the two
non-booming sectors.
In developing countries, it is hard to distinguish between traded and non-
traded sectors, because the non-traded sector mainly includes capital-intensive
utilities whereas transport services, household and personal services are labour
intensive. Similarly, the traded sector includes agriculture and food production,
both of which are quite labour intensive, whereas import-substituting
manufacturing are probably capital intensive. Finally, the classifications of
traded and non-traded goods are based on the characteristics of these goods
and are identified as traded domestically or internationally respectively. Such
identification may be obscure due to the protection of infant industries in many
developing countries. Tradables can behave like non-tradable services during
the boom.
Roemer traces three studies on the Dutch disease to estimate the
impacts of the export boom in developing countries. These three models are
utilised differently from Corden's. The Harberger model results show that an oil
shock equal to 10% of national income can lead to real exchange rate
appreciation of 2.6 to 16%. But the shift in income from the lagging sector to the
non-traded sector is only 0.4 to 2% of the national product, which is consistent
with Corden's findings. Harberger's model generates its greatest appreciation
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and shifts in output when income elasticity of demand for home products is
highest (unity) (Roemer, 1985). The second study, conducted by Dick et al.
(1983), tests the two year impact of a 10% increase in three agricultural
products (coffee, cocoa, and tea) in three nations: Colombia, Ivory Coast, and
Kenya. They found that after a sufficient appreciation of real exchange rate to
restore external balance, the services sector enjoyed the most growth from 1-
2.3% consistent with Corden's model. Most of the manufacturing sectors show
little growth or decline.
The third study was conducted by Timmer (1982), who analyses the
impact of energy prices on agriculture for seven countries, including both oil
exporters (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico) and importers (Korea, Philippines,
Sri Lanka and Thailand). A change in oil prices works its way through the
economy via a mechanism that includes changes in per capita income,
exchange rate appreciation, and rural-urban terms of trade. Based on the
structure and experience (from 1960 to 1980) of these countries, Timmer
simulates a sudden and sustained rise in the oil export share of GDP from 2-
4%. Five years after this boom has begun, agricultural value added per capita is
about 15% below the pre-boom (Roemer, 1985).
2.4 Some Empirical Studies on the Dutch Disease
The economic implications of the natural resource revenues on
economies have been increasingly covered by many economists. Most of the
studies conducted have been suited to the study of macroeconomic policy in
developed natural-resource exporting countries, such as the UK, the
Netherlands, and Australia. Nevertheless, there are some studies, which have
drawn attention to certain developing natural resource exporting economies,
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taking into consideration the economic structural differences between
developed and developing countries. Our objective is to review some
macroeconomic studies testing the effect of a natural resource export boom on
developing economies.
Forsyth and Kay (1980) computed the effects of the growth of North Sea oil
(NSO) production on the non-oil UK economy. The UK became an oil self-
sufficient nation after being totally dependent on imported oil. The rise in NSO
production led to a rise in the national income by at least 10%. So, the domestic
absorption of imported manufacturers increased causing a contraction of the
manufacturing sector rather than the agricultural sector that was protected by
CAP. Forsyth and Kay concluded that a change in the exchange rate by about
20% from 1976 to 1980 led to a change in relative prices by about 12-15%.
They gave two reasons why the manufacturing sector increased by less than
20%: (i) the domestic exporters were forced to absorb part of the impact of
revaluation and (ii) the foreign exporters somewhat increased their margins.
The structural changes were larger than the direct changes of oil on the UK
economy, because of the increase in national income and thus in the non-
traded sector and its major contribution in the traded sector. They concluded
that the higher the exchange rate, the larger the benefits to the UK economy,
despite the adverse effects which appeared in unemployment, resources
reallocation and deficits. The study focuses on impacts of the spending effect
only. The authors discuss the indirect effect on the British real exchange rate of
a redistribution of world income away from countries that compete with the UK
as exporters. One could argue that the severe UK real exchange rate
appreciation of 1979 and 1980, can be attributed mainly to the monetary
squeeze, not to a Dutch disease effect (Corden, 1984).
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Benjamin, Devarajan and Wiener (1986) developed a general equilibrium model
to test the impact of the oil boom in 1979 on the Cameroon economy. They
concluded that there was an appreciation of real exchange rate by 8.5%
leading to an overall reduction in exports by 6.1% and a rise in imports by
10.5%. Moreover, they found that there was a fall in the primary sectors and an
increase in the non-traded sectors.
Fardmanash (1991) developed a three-sector reduced-form model to test the
impact of world prices on the share of services, agricultural and manufacturing
sectors in the non-oil GDP in five oil exporting countries in OPEC. He selected
these countries with respect to the significant contribution of these sectors in
the GDP. He came to the conclusion that an oil boom negatively affected the
agricultural sector in favour of the manufacturing and services sectors. He
ignored the impacts of the spending effect as well as the domestic prices on the
tradable and non-tradable outputs.
Warr (1986) analysed the effects of the oil revenues from 1973 to 1982 on the
Indonesian economy in terms of relative prices and income distribution. He
found that the contribution of the agricultural sector in the overall GDP declined
whilst the contribution of the manufacturing sector increased gradually.
Kamas (1986) developed a macroeconomic model to examine the Dutch
disease effects resulting from the coffee and drugs export boom on the
Colombian economy during the period 1967-1982. She found that relative
prices of the non-traded goods sector rose and the exchange rate appreciated
as a result of the boom; consequently, the growth of the non-traded goods
sector increased, while the non-coffee traded goods sector experienced a
39
slower growth. The Colombian policy responses to the Dutch disease effects
allowed an appreciation of the exchange rate, which, however, was less than
that required to equilibrate the balance of payments. The major focus of the
Colombian policies was based on a reduction of the absorptive capacity
through contractionary fiscal and monetary measures.
Ge/b (1986) analysed the impacts of oil windfall gains on the structure of the
economies of seven countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. His study is based on Chereny and
Syrquin's model, incorporating the construction sector with three sectors used
in that model: Agriculture, manufacturing and services. The Dutch disease
equation used in the study was as follows
DD = (SNag + SNma) - (Sag + Sma)
Where DD represents the shortfall in the share of the non-oil tradeables relative
to their normal levels, SNag and SNma represent norms for shares in output of
agriculture and manufacturing sectors in the GDP respectively, while Sag and
Sma represent constant-price share of agriculture and manufacturing sectors
respectively. Geib concluded that Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela
had severely skewed economies in sectoral terms before the price oil increase.
The Indonesian, Ecuadorian and Iranian sectoral structures were almost
normal. The appreciation in the real exchange rate shifted the resources
allocation towards the non-traded goods sector owing to the hesitance of these
governments to devalue their currencies.
A/-Sabah (1988) investigated the existence of the Dutch disease in Kuwait
during the oil boom. He used a computable general equilibrium model to
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explain the sectoral changes in the economy. The conclusions that he reached
were: (i) a relative decline in the tradable sector is accompanied with an
increase in the non-tradable; (ii) reallocation of resources results from the effect
of the real exchange rate.
Looney (1990) developed a macroeconomic model to test the impact of the oil
boom on the Saudi Arabian sectoral outputs through the Five-Year Plans. He
estimated a series of equations linking sectoral output to factors affecting
relative profitability. He tested the output of tradables (agriculture,
manufacturing, mining and petroleum refining) and non-tradable (construction,
wholesale and retail trade, transport, storage and communication, and
ownership of dwellings) against the real exchange rate, level of inflation, level of
government spending, overall non-oil GDP and the added value of oil. His
results were significantly related to the existence of the Dutch disease in terms
of real exchange rate appreciation and inflation.
Musonda and Lovanda (1991) developed a model to test the existence of the
Dutch disease during the coffee export boom in 1976-77 on the Tanzanian
sectoral output. They tested the impact of the boom on the real exchange rate
and relative prices. They concluded that many sectors were not affected in
terms of resource movement due to the government restrictions and
intervention.
AI-Gaeed (1991) constructed a two-sector macroeconomics model to test the
impact of the oil export boom on the sectoral structure of the Saudi Arabian
economy. He concluded that the spending effect affected the consumption and
investment positively and the relative prices and the real exchange rate
negatively. However, the traditional sectors contracted in favour of the non-
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traded goods sector. He tested the impact of the spending effect rather than the
resource movement effect.
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997 and 1998) provide a definition, implications
and causes of the de-industrialisation. This phenomenon is defined as a 'fall in
the share of manufacturing employment to the total employment'. This definition
is related mainly the world's most advanced economies. It has been observed
in the 23 most advanced economies and found that there was decline from
about 28 percent of the workforce in manufacturing in 1970 to about 18 percent
in 1994. On the other side of the coin, the share of employment accounted for
by services in the advanced economies has increased fairly uniformly, with all
advance economies witnessing growth in services' employment since 1960. In
the United States, for example, the workforce employed in services has
increased from 56 percent in 1960 to 73 percent in 1994. The rise in
employment in services has been accompanied by a decline in employment in
manufacturing sector in all advanced economies. Hence, the manufacturing
decline in GDP suggests that domestic expenditure on manufacturing has
decreased while expenditure in services has increased.
Some economists regard de-industrialisation with alarm and suspect, it
has contributed to widening income inequality in the United States and high
unemployment in Europe. Some suggests that is a result of the globalisation of
markets and its impact on the rapid growth of North-South trade (trade between
advanced economies and the developing world) causes de-industrialisation.
These critics assert that the faster growth of labour-intensive manufacturing
industries in the developing countries is displacing the jobs of workers in the
advanced economies.
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On the other hand, an important implication of Rowthorn and
Ramaswamy's analysis is that the de-industrialisation is not necessarily a
symptom of the failure of a country's manufacturing sector, but it is simply the
natural of result of successful economic development and it is generally
associated with higher national and disposable incomes. As a result, de-
industrialisation can be linked to difficulties within the manufacturing sector or in
the whole economy as a whole. Economic development may cause a large
appreciation in the real exchange rate, which in turn results in a loss of jobs in
the manufacturing sector. With regard to the service sector, in these
circumstances, the service sector may be unable to absorb a sudden increase
in the supply of labour, causing higher unemployment or a fall in the growth of
living standards.
To sum up, there have been negative features of de-industrialisation
appearing in stagnant earnings and widening income disparities in the United
States and rising unemployment in the European Union. Although some of
these countries involved in the study are oil-producing countries, they are not
similar to Saudi Arabia in terms of the structure of the economy, the role of
government sector, the size of the population and the magnitude of the
industrial output. Consequently, the findings may not correspond to those of the
the Saudi Arabian economy.
Rosenberg and Saavalainen (1998) examines the dual challenge of the natural
resource boom and managing the transition to a market economy facing the oil-
rich former Soviet republics around the Caspian Sea in general and Azerbaijan
in particular. This study identifies three areas in which the standard Dutch
disease theories could apply to the case of Azerbaijan:
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1- Macroeconomic adjustment problems through risks to monetary stability,
risks to sustainability of the balance of payments, risks to the stance of the
fiscal policy over time and risks to a continued nominal appreciation of the
exchange rate.
2- Unbalanced growth
In Azerbaijan, the main potential losses would in agriculture, related
processing industries (cotton, textile, wine and food processing) and
manufacturing. The impact of resource movement resulting from the boom
appears to have little effects due to two factors. First, the booming sector will be
able to meet its labour demand from the surplus of state-owned firms without
much loss in output. Second, the overall real wages have adjusted well to
productivity changes in the country. On the other hand, the spending effect
appears to have been strong due to high public sector's demand for
nontradable goods. Moreover, the pent-up demand, particularly for consumer
goods and services, stimulates a high demand for them. Indeed, there are
indications that nontraded sector's share in GDP is expanding while prices of
nontradables are increasing relative to non-oil traded goods.
3- Waste of oil wealth through unproductive government spending.
Azerbaijan oil revenues were not saved abroad or used to reduce budget
deficits, but were invested in large projects, which may bear low rates of return.
Moreover, the viability of the projects would very likely depend on continued
subsidisation to traditional export industries. Once these sectors start suffering
from the real exchange rate appreciation, many of these industries have little
chance to be profitable. The reason behind this is that these industries are
experiencing large overcapacities since they had originally been established to
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serve the overall Soviet market. Also, the multiplier effect of public subsidies
would be weak as long as these industries have only small domestic backward
linkages.
Finally, and more importantly, the incoming oil revenues can promote rent-
seeking behaviour. The flight for rent ends up by inefficiently exhausting the
potential wealth. There is corruption in the bureaucracy, particularly in a country
with a weak political structure. The rent-seeking and its consequences have
significantly negative impact on growth. Azerbaijan may be subject to the
danger of detrimental rent-seeking as in other oil-rich developing countries.
As Azerbaijan is experiencing ill-effects of the boom, it tends to prevent
the shift of economic activity towards the booming sectors for many reasons.
Firstly, maintaining diversity for its export sector could reduce its exposure to
external shocks. Secondly, prolonged appreciation of the real exchange rate
may destroy a manufacturing base that cannot easily be rebuilt. Thirdly, the
dependence on oil wealth promotes excessive rent-seeking behaviour and
wasting of the newly acquired wealth. Fourthly, traditional export industries can
play a vital role in human capital formation and/or in maintaining backward
linkages to other sectors as well as the existence of learning by doing effect.
However, this theoretical analysis differs from the impact of oil boom in
Saudi Arabia in many aspects: first, Saudi Arabia experienced an oil windfall
resulting from the external shock, while Azerbaijan suffered from dual booms
resulting from capital inflows addressed to the oil sector (i.e., oil discovery) and
from an investment boom. Moreover, the economy of Azerbaijan is in a
transition process, while Saudi Arabia is typically market-oriented economy. So
the impact of the boom in Azerbaijan might be more severe than in Saudi
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Arabia. Second, the industrial base in Azerbaijan is developed while in Saudi
Arabia it is limited.
Therefore, the major feature of the Dutch disease (de-industrialisation)
can be viewed in Azerbaijan more than in Saudi Arabia. Third, the exchange
rate system in Azerbaijan is flexible regime, while in Saudi Arabia is fixed
exchange regime. This implies that the boom in the former may be reflected in
nominal appreciation and in the latte in higher inflation. In addition, there are
many differences including economic capacities, magnitude and quality of
labour force, wages, political and social matters among other difference. The
interpretation of this is the extent and reinforcement of the boom may reflect
negatively in different degrees.
2.5 The Literature Survey on the Slump of the Natural Resource
The economic consequences of the increases in the prices of natural
resources in general and oil resource in particular, have attracted more attention
from economists and policy makers than from the deterioration of oil prices and
thus oil revenues. This can be attributed to one or. more of the following factors:
firstly, the rise in oil prices during the first and second oil shocks was sudden,
unexpected and sharp, while the collapse in oil prices was expected due to
economic and political factors (i.e., over-supply of oil in OPEC and non-OPEC
members, energy conservation, new oil discoveries. etc); secondly, it might be
believed that lower oil prices are beneficial to the world economy, particularly
oil-importing developing countries and to the industrialised countries in terms of
income redistribution and reduction of oil importing bills; thirdly, the impact of the
decline of oil prices can be treated as a mirror image of the impact of the oil
price increases since the institutional and behavioural factors that change the
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condition work in reverse; finally, in low absorption economies such as Saudi
Arabia, the impact of oil price decline, particularly in the mid-1980s could be
regarded as either a temporary down trend or could be handled by drawing
down from foreign financial assets. This remedy can maintain its prevailing
levels of investment, imports and consumption as they were before.
Nevertheless, there are few contributions that have been conducted to
investigate the economic consequences of the collapse of oil prices. Although
some of these studies are related to developed economies, namely the UK, or
to high absorb oil-exporting economies such as Nigeria, there are few studies
conducted in line of the decline of oil price in the Arab world. It is worth noting
that these studies are only covering the period until 1986
The deterioration in oil prices started in 1982 and exacerbated in 1986
has been termed by some authors as the 'third oil shock', or the ' oil-demand
crisis', while others may use some neutral terms such as the 'crash', the
'plunge' the 'collapse, or simply a sharp decline (Ibrahim, 1988).
This sub-section is devoted to reviewing the literature dealing with what
is so-called 'third oil shock' and its impact on an economy.
AI-Yousuf (1990) investigated the impact of the collapse in oil revenues on the
economies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The loss of oil shares between 1981
and 1985 and the decline in the price of oil in 1986 together has been termed
as the "third oil shock". The structural changes that took place in both
economies following the fall in oil revenues were consistent with theoretical
predictions. There was a rise in the value added of traded goods (mainly for the
manufacturing sector, including petrochemical production) and a decline in the
value added of private-sector non-traded goods sector, particularly
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construction.
By contrast, the value added on non-market public-sector non-traded
goods (i.e., public-sector services) did not in respond to the decline in oil
revenues. It merely remained fixed in real terms during the three years following
1986, which indicates that there was no retrenchment in the public-sector
economic activity. On the other hand, public-sector consumption increased
marginally and then fell following the decline in oil revenues. This was
accompanied by a much larger decline in public-sector fixed capital formation.
The impact of the decline in gross fixed capital formation, especially by
the public-sector, was to reduce the value added in construction by half. This in
turn led to a significant reduction in private-sector economic activity.
The fall in oil revenues caused a deterioration in the balance of
payments and the fiscal budgets in both countries. The trade balances were still
in surplus but greatly reduced. In Kuwait, the reduced trade surpluses were
augmented by the invisible trade surpluses to produce current account
surpluses. In Saudi Arabia, the reduced visible trade surpluses were
outweighed by the invisible trade deficits, hence, resulting in current account
deficits from 1983 onwards. The Saudi's current account deficits were financed
by repatriating long-term financial assets. With regard to the fiscal balance
deterioration, both countries used to finance their deficits by drawing down from
their general reserves. Nevertheless, both countries have faced liquidity crisis in
different degrees although Saudi Arabia could have utilised its investment
income and/or had an access to its accumulated reserves.
With respect to employment in Saudi Arabia, the reduction in total
employment has taken place through its impact on Non-Saudis working in the
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private sector.
It worth mentioning that Al-Yousuf's study covered the period till 1988.
This implies that he did not analyse the dramatic changes taken place in the
early 1990s. The liberation of Kuwait affected both economies severely.
Furthermore, he did not elaborate the determinants of economic change
leading to his findings, such as the magnitude of changes in real exchange
rates, relative prices and structural changes.
Mabro (1985) discussed the causes of the collapse in oil demand in 1982. He
attributed such collapse to three major factors. The first factor is the stagnation
of the world economy during the early 1980s as well as to the reduction in the
world energy consumption due to higher oil prices emerged in the early and late
1970s. The second factor is related to the change in the structure of energy
supplies with coal, nuclear, and to a lesser extent, gas growing at the expense
of oil. The final factor is the expansion of non-OPEC oil producers causing a
reduction in the share of OPEC as a residual supplier in the oil market. Mabro
termed the sharp decline in oil prices as the 'oil demand crisis'.
Mabro is mainly concerned with the implications of the fall in the demand
for oil, which caused a significant reduction in oil revenues on the economic
development of the Arab world. The economic effects of the decline in oil
revenues induce positive and negative elements.
With regard to negative effects, Mabro used the rate of growth and
capital accumulation as indicators of the impact of the fall of oil revenues.
Firstly, the impact of the 'oil demand crisis' on the rates of growth tends, in
different degrees, to be significant. Secondly, the impact is much more severe
for countries with low absorptive capacities such as Kuwait, UAE, Libya, and
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Saudi Arabia than for the high absorbers such as Iraq or Algeria. Thirdly, the
impact is not significant on countries whose dependence on oil is either small or
indirect such as Egypt and Syria. In addition, the 'oil demand crisis' may lead to
weaken the role of Arab world on the international political scene.
On the other hand, the favourable implications of the fall in oil demand
can seen through dealing with oil as a depletable resource and a reduction in
the rate of extraction might treated as implicit investment in the long-term. This
can enable the oil-exporting countries to conserve their natural resources and
to bring extraction rate close to an optimum path. Moreover, the reduction in oil
revenues which accrue directly to the government may encourage them to
improve their economic management.
Ibrahim (1987) discussed how the decline in oil prices, to a large extent,
affected the economies of the majority of Arab countries through its effects on
export earnings, net remittances, income from factors of production, capital
movement and interest rates. He attributed the sharp deterioration in the Arab
countries GDP growth rates between 1980 to 1985, to the collapse of oil prices
and thus oil revenues.
Hammoudeh and Al-Barazi (1987) provided an empirical analysis of the
favourable and the adverse impacts of changes in oil exports earnings during
the period 1970-85 on economic development and the foreign trade of Arab
exporting countries. Their approach traces the impact of an oil export boom and
slump through the Dutch disease model mechanism of the spending and
resource movement effects. Their findings lend support to the symptoms of the
Dutch disease and its reverse during the boom and slump periods.
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El-Imam (1984) focused mainly on the process of draining away the wealth of
the Arab region during the 1970s rather than investigating the impact of the
decline in oil revenues on the domestic economies. However, El-Imam
attributes the decline in Arab wealth during the boom to the depreciation of their
financial assets (due to higher inflation rates) and to increased imports from
industrial countries. However, all the studies mentioned above concentrate
either on the effects of increased oil revenues or on declining revenues until
1986 where the major structural changes have not taken place yet.
Henry and Herbert (1986) concentrate in their study on the economic effect of a
lower oil price on investment plans in the oil sector in the UK and its depletion
policy. Supply-side changes may take place through changes in the relative
prices (of oil relative to other fuels) and switches in profitability from the oil
sector to other sectors in the economy. On the demand-side, changes may be
regarded as responding to changes in the exchange rate and price levels.
Powell and Horton (1985) conducted the second type of study, which explained
how a sustained fall in oil prices might be expected to affect aggregate demand
and supply in the world economy in general, and those of a net oil exporter like
the UK. This was discussed in terms of the expected degree of changes in
lower inflation rate, lower price levels, lower interest rates and redistribution of
income between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries.
Evan (1986) focused on the theory of what he coined as the typical reverse
Dutch disease on the mineral exporters In the developing countries. He
analyses some aspects of the trade policy and strategy facing Papua New
Guinea, a typical mineral developing country facing reverse Dutch disease
problems as follows: as a result of a fall in the availability of foreign exchange
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earnings, the economy will obtain fewer non-mineral tradables relative to non-
tradables, leading to a rise in the relative price of non-mineral tradables to non-
tradables, which can be achieved without a fall in the absolute price of non-
tradables. This is equivalent to a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Afolab and Bladen-Hovell (1990) conducted a comprehensive study in relation
to the effects of a fall in the price of oil on an oil exporting economy. They
investigate the two fold impacts of oil price reduction on the Nigerian economy.
The first one corresponds to the direct effect of price slump on the domestic
economy and relates primarily to change in both the balance of payments and
government finances. In addition to the direct effect, however, an oil producer
will also be influenced indirectly by the impact of a fall in oil prices on the level
of world demand (redistribution of income) and the rate of inflation (reduction in
world price levels) in the world economy.
Takagi and Yoshida (1999) investigated the response of prices of tradable
industrial goods to exchange rate movements between Japan and its seven
trading partners, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Germany and the United States. On the basis of estimating export
and import price equations by using the monthly series of unit export and import
values obtained from the period 1988-1998, they have found that changes in
Japan's exchange rates affect exports much more than its imports. This implies
that the Yen prices of Japan's imports do not fall (rise) very much when the Yen
Appreciates (depreciates), whereas, the price of Japan's exports rise (fall)
considerably in the buyers' currency. In terms of external adjustment in East
Asia, the export pricing behaviour has been more effective than the import
pricing behaviour.
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2.6 Summary
The economic consequences of the natural resource export boom have
largely drawn the attention of the international trade economists in the 1960s
and I 970s. That was due to the discovery of the natural gas in the Netherlands
in the 1960s and of the oil in the UK in the 1970s. The negative side-effect of
the export boom is known in the economic literature as the 'Dutch disease'
phenomenon. Since the mid-1800s, this phenomenon has been analysed in
different terms such as oil-syndrome and de-industrialisation, and in different
prospective such as foreign remittances, compensations, and a rise in bond
prices, shares and interest rates.
Accordingly, with regard to the export boom in mineral resources (e.g.,
gold and diamond), oil, gas and agricultural commodities (e.g., coffee and
cocoa), extensive theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted. On
the other hand, the studies of the impact of the oil export slump, particularly are
relatively few.
However, the predictions of most studies dealing with the 'Dutch disease'
are summarised as follows: (I) a rise in the relative price of the nontraded goods
with respect to the price of the traded goods; and (ii) a real appreciation in the
exchange rate; (iii) an expansion in the production of the nontraded goods
sector; (vi) a deterioration in the output of traded goods sector.
The predictions of the core Dutch disease model are based on
assumptions, such as flexible exchange rate, full-employment, fixed labour
supply, the significant role of the private sector and the size of the finacial
market, which are better suited for the developed oil-exporting countries.
However, these assumptions are less appropriate to the situation of Saudi
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Arabia, and the model needs to be developed by taking into account some
factors, such as fixed exchange rate, the existence of underemploymnet, the
flexible labour supply, the limited industrial base and the signficant role of the
government spending.
Since Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil producers and exporters in
the world oil market, the Saudi Arabian economy has experienced and still
faces fluctuations in its oil export foreign exchange earnings. This outcome is
derived from the fact that the oil export revenues constitute a high percentage
of the total exports. In addition, the oil export revenues has a significat share of
the overall GDP. Accordingly, one can expect that Saudi Arabia as oil-
dependent economy, to suffer from the oil export boom adverse side-effect
during the period between 1973 and 1981. On the other hand, it may also be
subject to the 'reverse situation during the slump period in 1982 and its
aftermath.
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Chapter Three
The Saudi Arabian Economy
3.1 Introduction
The name of Saudi Arabia was adopted in 1932 from its ruler (i.e., lbn-
Saud). However, until 1938, when oil was discovered in commercial quantities,
Saudi Arabia was typically a traditional society where little or no change had
taken place for many years previously. Its distinguished international role was
only due to the domicile of the Two Holy Mosques. These mosques attracted
hundred of thousands of pilgrims providing the country with an important source
of income but having little impact on the development of the country's economic
base.
The dramatic oil price increases in the early 1970s have profoundly
affected the country both internally and internationally. With regard to the
former, the rise in oil price accelerated the domestic development and
modernised the country in terms of economic and social standards. Regarding
the latter, Saudi Arabia became a key strategic player in the world oil market
due to its massive reserves and production capacity, as well as through its
foreign investment and ownership of western assets.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Saudi Arabian economy
giving firstly a brief historical and demographic background. The aim of this is to
show how Saudi Arabia moved from a very limited economy to become one of
the largest economies in the Middle East. Consequently, this chapter is
organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief historical and demographic
background. A description of the public sector is given in section 3.3, while
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section 3.4 reviews the non-oil sector. In section 3.5, the foreign sector is
described, and the oil-sector is presented in section 3.6. Concluding remarks
are given in section 3.7.
3.2 Brief Historical and Demographic Background
Prior to 1932, there was no state in the Arabian Peninsula known as
Saudi Arabia, but only the provinces of Hijaz and Najd and their dependencies.
King Abd Alaziz lbn-Saud, commonly known as lbn-Saud, the head of these
provinces, established his authority throughout the land boosting a national
unity and formulating a state called Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, he changed his
title from that of the king of Hijas and Najd and their dependencies to that of the
king of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is located in Southwest Asia occupying
about 2.125 million square kilometres (865,000 squared miles). It consists of
about three-quarters of the entire area of the Arabian Peninsula with a
population amounting to about 20 million including foreign workers. The new
state was almost barren desert inhabited by nomads, with oases and a few
walled towns. The main source of revenue was charges paid by the pilgrims to
Mecca and Madina. According to Young (1983), this constituted about 50% of
the total revenue and the government's yearly receipts totalled roughly five
hundred thousand dollars. There were also minor sources of revenue: (i)
customs charges which constituted about 37% of the total revenue; (ii) the rest
of revenue which came from the Islamic constitution (the Zakat), whereby
wealthy people annually paid two and half percent of their income to the
government. Nevertheless, the government faced some financial problems due
to the Great Depression in 1929-30, which was accompanied by a fall in the
number of pilgrims (the figure dropped from 100,000 in 1929 to 40,000 in 1931).
Customs receipts and imports fell accordingly. The British government started in
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1917 to subsidise King Abd Alaziz with five thousand pounds per month. This
practice was suspended in 1924, but during World War II, the British
government resumed subsidising him irregularly (Young, A., 1983). One can
conclude these sources of government revenues centred on pilgrim charges,
customs and the Zakat. During the lean years, the country could be described
as a traditional society with little change, taking place. At that time the country
was poor and undeveloped, and the economy was weak. The economic activity
was confined to livestock raising, primitive agriculture, and production of small
tools by craftsmen who lived in small towns concentrated around sources of
water (Johany, A, 1982). Dramatic change came as a result of the discovery of
oil in commercial quantities in 1938. Standard Oil of California, SOCAL, was
granted a concession for searching for oil in the eastern province of Saudi
Arabia in 1933 as a result of the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932.
The discovery of oil in huge commercial quantities became the catalyst
for progress and the engine for rapid development for the country and for the
welfare of its people. The vast production and reserves of oil gave the young
country a powerful influence and international importance.
Saudi Arabia can be characterised by three features: (i) it is the domicile
of the two holy cities of Islam -Mecca and Madina; (ii) it is the largest oil
exporter in the world as well as one of the world's largest oil producers; (iii)
possesses the world's largest oil reserves which are estimated by OPEC at over
261 billion barrels. Taking into consideration these features, Saudi Arabia has
been able to play a pioneering and leading role in Arab and Islamic countries
and to have a major influence on the world economy, especially during and after
the oil export boom in the 1970's and 1980's.
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Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has its own geographical features: a huge
land area but a small population, a shortage of water faces a surplus in oil and
natural gas. In addition, it has strong Islamic traditions and extreme climatic
conditions.
With respect to the Saudi population, there were no precise statistics for
the Saudi Arabian population prior to 1974. The 1974 Saudi Arabian census
estimated the total population to be seven million, while the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated it at 8.1 million in 1980. Those figures must be
regarded with caution due to the lack of an accurate means of calculating the
country's population. According to the public statistical survey which provided
precise statistics calculated in 1993, the total population was 16.9 million, 72.7%
of which were Saudis (12,3 million) and 27.3% were non-Saudis (4,6 million).
The growth rate is about 3.7% per annum. This high rate is attributed to a
higher mortality rate and lower death rate due to the development of medical
care in the country.
As for the age groups, Saudi Arabian official statistics show that those
people under 14 years old account for 41.75% of the total population, whereas
those between 15-64 years of age constitute 55.75% of the country's
population. Regarding the geographical distribution, Mecca, Riyadh, and
Eastern Province are the most populated areas. These areas contain 59.3% of
the total population with 22.6%, 21.2%, and 15.5% respectively.
The Saudis' manpower for 12 years old and over, Table 3.1 highlights
how the total number of those employed increased from 2.4 million in 1979 to
2.6 million in 1984 with a change of 6.3 percent, whereas the increase during
the Fifth-Development Plan (1990 to 1995) was only up by 0.7 percent 1
 which
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was low in comparison to previous rates of employment growth.
Table 3.1 Changes in the Saudi Civilians Employment in the Third
And Fifth-Development Plans
(In Thousands SR)
Economic Activity
	 Third Plan Employment	 Fifth Plan Employment
_______________ 1979	 1984 %Change 1989
	 1994 %Change
Producing Sectors*	 1,071.90	 994.9	 -7.2	 2,018.60 2,157.50	 1.3
Services Sectors**	 1,363.30 1,585.20	 16.3	 3,706.40 3,781.10	 0.2
Total Non-Oil Sector 2,435.20 2,580.20	 16	 5,725	 5,937.60	 0.7
Oil Sector	 36	 46	 27.8	 46.8	 47.7	 0.4
Total	 2,471.20 2,626.20	 6.3	 5,771.80 5,985.30
	
0.7
incivaes /kgricuiture, Mining, ana Manutacturing.
Includes Trade, communication, Finance, Government, and other services.
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Third and Fifth-Development Plans, P.100 and 121
Since the main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the economic
sectors that constitute the national economy in order to show how the economy
has operated in the past, it is necessary to focus on the public sector, the non-
oil sector, the external sector and the oil sector as long as this is related to the
main objective of the study through the government's attempts to reallocate
resources in the national economy.
3.3 The Public Sector
Neo-classical economic theory assumes that the price system in a
competitive market operates efficiently to achieve allocation of resources within
the economy. In practice, it is not possible to reallocate either productive
resources (i.e. capital and labour) or the output that is produced from their
employment so as to increase the level of economic well-being unless there is
an adjustment in demand and supply by using taxes and subsidies. Strategies
used by the public sector to allocate resources may or may not be the same as
strategies used in the market system. The rote of government in economic
relations has turned from being one in charge of justice, defence and security to
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one with the broad responsibilities of being heavily involved in economic
activity. The World Great Depression in 1929 brought about the necessity of
increased government intervention. Governments now intervene in economic
affairs on an unprecedented scale. This can be attributed to the market failure
to achieve efficient allocation of resources and to the objective of governments
to correct rather to exacerbate the degree of allocation resources (Baily, 1995).
Saudi Arabia has displayed a similar trend with a different degree of
intervention. This resulted from the major involvement and expansion of the
public sector's activities in the economy. The rise in the scope of the
government's intervention over the passage of time was due to its need to
control the country firmly after its unification in the 1930s. In addition, being a
newly established country, the private sector was inexperienced and small
which required the government to operate on its behalf, at least temporarily. But
the discovery of oil, which yielded massive wealth to the country, persuaded the
government to involve itself more deeply in this trend. As a result, the large
participation of the public sector is the most distinguishing feature of the Saudi
economy in comparison with other developing countries.
3.3.1 The Budget
The analysis of the government's budget requires firstly a general look at
mechanics and principles of the budgeting process. The Saudi budget is initially
prepared by the government's agencies as a draft budget nine months ahead of
declaring the approved budget. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance and
National Economy establishes the budget taking into account the aspects of
spending and the availability of income. Thereafter, it has to be presented to the
Council of Ministers for a final approval. If approved, the distribution of the
60
budget will take place to all government agencies by the last day of December.
On the one hand, the budget determines the potential total revenues,
which are gained largely from oil and to a lesser extent from non-oil sectors. On
the other hand, it also contains a package of potential public expenditure plans.
Public expenditures, as they appear in the budget, are represented by two
broad categories of government activity. First, there are exhaustive public
expenditures. These expenditures correspond to the government purchases of
current goods and services (i,e. salaries, wages, and consumables) and capital
goods and services (i.e, public investment in roads, communications, health,
education, etc.). The second category of public expenditure is that of transfer
payments (i.e, subsidies, social welfare, grants, aid, pensions etc.). The first
category yields returns whilst the second one is a one-sided payment which
aims to redistribute income. The magnitude of expenditures determines the
private sector reactions regarding the level and nature of economic activities for
the next year. For example, if there is an expansion in government investment
expenditures, this is a green light for contractors and importers to plan for a
relatively optimistic year and vice versa.
The legislative information contained in the budget gives an indication of
government policy, and lays out the government's current economic priorities. It
contains the government estimates of economic prospects for the coming year.
The relative importance of the policy statement emerges from the fact that the
actual revenues and expenditures can differ from the values determined in the
budget (Johany, et al. 1986).
3.3.1.1 Government Revenues
Unlike most countries that obtained their revenues from various taxes on
61
the private sector, Saudi Arabia derives the bulk of the government's revenues
from oil and oil-related products. Saudi citizens and foreign workers in the
country pay virtually no taxes. The contribution of the oil sector as a major
source of revenue can be recognised easily by looking at table 3.2. This table
depicts that the share of the oil sector ranging from 94.1% in 1974 to 57.2% of
the total revenues in 1988.
Table 3.2 Total Oil Revenues, Other Revenues, and Total Expenditure
(Current Million SR)
	
Years	 Oil Rev. Other Rev. Total Rev. % Oil Rev. Total Exp. 	 Balance
	1969	 5119	 549	 5668	 90.3	 6079	 -411
	
1970	 5862	 764	 6626	 88.5	 6307	 319
	
1971	 8146	 1234	 9380	 86.8	 7174	 2206
	
1972	 11616	 1589	 13205	 88	 9231	 3974
	
1973	 25134	 2166	 27300	 92.1	 14146	 13154
	
1974	 65911	 4112	 70023	 94.1	 26762	 43261
	
1975	 96624	 8060	 104684	 92.3	 59184	 55500
	
1976	 111288	 12808	 14096	 89.7	 97739	 26357
	
1977	 12098	 16260	 137218	 88.2	 127042	 10176
	
1978	 118006	 16994	 135000	 87.4	 146557	 -11557
	
1979	 164434	 20305	 184739	 84	 175071	 9662
	
1980	 279962	 27101	 307063	 91.2	 220763	 86300
	
1981	 335236	 36896	 372132	 90.1	 273321	 98811
	
1982	 236928	 55297	 292225	 81.1	 264272	 27953
	
1983	 161375	 62825	 224200	 72	 241411	 -17211
	
1984	 131640	 54755	 186395	 70.6	 227294	 -40899
	
1985	 98613	 47677	 146290	 67.4	 197031	 -50741
	
1986	 59699	 42832	 102531	 58.2	 174709	 -72178
	
1987	 67405	 36406	 103811	 64.9	 173526	 -69715
	
1988	 48400	 36200	 84600	 57.2	 134850	 -50250
	
1989	 75900	 38700	 114600	 66.2	 149500	 -34900
	
1990	 118142	 36579	 154721	 76.4	 210430	 -55709
	
1991	 128157	 33722	 161879	 79.2	 266370	 -104491
	
1992	 127027	 38373	 165400	 76.8	 232500	 -67100
	
1993	 106000	 35500	 141400	 75	 205500	 -64100
	
1994	 95500	 33500	 129000	 74	 163000	 -34000
	
1995	 105700	 40800	 145500	 72.6	 173900	 -28400
	
1996	 136000	 43100	 179100	 76	 198100	 -19000
	
1997	 160000	 45515	 205500	 78	 221272	 -15772
Source: SAMA, Annual Reports, Various Years
The highest rate of participation was during the 1970s and early 1980s
with an average of around 90% of the total revenues. This was due to the sharp
increase in oil prices during the first and second oil shocks. The share of oil
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revenue in the total revenues started to slow down from 1982. This resulted
from a decline in the price and production of oil. The share fell to its lowest limit
after the government ceased to be a residual producer in OPEC in 1986. The
reason for this choice was the behaviour of some OPEC members and non-
OPEC countries whose increased their production at the expense of the Saudi
quota. The remainder of the budget for that year was predominantly from
investments and reserves, that is from oil sold in previous years (Johany et al.
1986).
Other sources of revenues are extremely small. Although, their share
increased in 1988 to reach its highest level of 42.8%, this can be misleading.
The rise in share was attributed to a decline in oil revenue at a rate that
exceeded the fall in non-oil revenue. These sources can be classified into five
categories: customs duties, fees and charges for government services,
corporate and business income taxes, investment income, and miscellaneous
revenues.
Current customs duties are quite low in spite of relatively higher tariffs
imposed which range between 12% and 20% of purchasing values, Imported
items competing with domestic products have recently been taxed higher than
other goods. It is worth noting that a large number of commodities are
exempted and some others, notably foodstuffs, were subsidised. Nevertheless,
the customs charges' share in non-oil revenue accounted for about 7.5% in
1988 whereas it reached 7.2%, and 9.8%, 8.4% in 1989,1992, and 1993
respectively (IMF, Staff Report, 1994). Customs tariffs can generate a
reasonable amount of income if and only if the government abolishes any
exemptions and exceptions in yielding duties. This result can also be derived
from the fact that Saudi citizens have a high propensity to import, as well as
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high tariffs imposed to protect the Saudi industries. Nevertheless, that will only
be temporary until the country becomes a full member of World Trade
Organisation (WTO).
Fees and charges are another source of the government's income.
These are gained by the sale of services including charges for communications
and post, water, air rights, landing fees, television advertisement fees, port fees,
license fees, residence fees, and passport fees. The government receives some
revenues from the sale of government properties (such as military and some
government agencies' housing). The commercial government bodies such as
the Saudi national airline and Petromin (which markets petroleum products
domestically) are not included in the general budget. However, the revenues
which are derived from this category is relatively small. They accounted for
about 8.2%, 10.2%, 10.7%, 9.1% and 9.3% of total non-oil revenues in 1988,
1989, 1992, and 1993 respectively.
Income and corporate taxes are extremely low in comparison with other
non-oil revenues. They accounted for only 0.9% in 1988 and reached their peak
of 2.3% in 1992 (IMF, Staff Report, 1994). These negligible revenues are due to
the fact that Saudi businesses and citizens are exempt from paying any taxes
except those who came from Zakat. On the other hand, the foreign firms do pay
not progressive income tax on their profits during an initial tax holiday aiming to
encourage foreign investors to invest domestically. The revenues generated are
expected to increase in the future with the expansion in foreign and joint
ventures investments. Much of the hope for this relies on the trend of further
expansion in petrochemical production in the industrial bases in Juball and
Yanbu.
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The fourth category of non-oil revenues is that of investment income.
These yields are collected by SAMA. Their share of in non-oil revenues was
increasing until the Second-Gulf War took place. The share was around 15.1%
in 1989, but it declined to 9%, 8.4%, and 6% in 1992, 1993, and 1994
respectively (IMF, Annual Report, 1994). This was because of tower oil prices
and hence the huge government spending, causing a budget deficit during that
period, which led to the government's withdrawal of some financial assets from
their investments abroad.
The final source of the budget lists miscellaneous revenues. It includes
the Zakat, government sales of property, fines, rental on government property,
and other receipts. The Zakat is a small tax paid on one's net wealth. It is a
religious duty rather than a tax because it is distributed to the needy people and
is not included in the budget. The share of this revenue in total non-oil revenues
is calculated at an average of 8.5%. It reached 7.6% and 8.9% in 1988 and
1989 respectively, white in 1992,1993 and 1994, the percentages were 9.1%,
7.7%, and 9.0% respectively.
Recently, the government has imposed some fines for the violation of
commercial and work permit and visas' rules. It also raised some selected fees
such as domestic prices of petroleum products, telephones, air travel fares, visa
and work permits, electricity, and water, in order to restrict consumption and
also to increase its income. The intention was to push up non-oil revenues by
12 billion Saudi Riyals, even though such an action may not lead to a
remarkable rise in this category's revenue.
3.3.1.2 The Government Expenditures
The prediction of future government expenditure is a very difficult task,
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because this is linked highly with oil revenues. Forecasting the non-oil revenues
is relatively easier than the prediction of the oil revenues due to the small size of
the former as well as the fact that they are not subject to fluctuation as oil
revenues are, and they constitute a low share in the total revenues. The
difficulties in estimating the oil revenues emerge from the fluctuations on this
single product in terms of prices and quantities. The price determinations are
subject to daily-basis world market prices. Additionally, the world's oil price
deals with sophisticated pricing systems in terms of different kinds of oil in the
market (Arabian—Light, Brent, OPEC basket, etc.) and of the heavy-to-light
crude ratio. The quantity set depends upon the OPEC quota, which varies in
response to many factors including the price, non-OPEC oil producers, world
reserves, weather conditions, and economic and political stability.
Nevertheless, this difficult task which determines the forecasts for
government expenditure, has been undertaken through setting a potential oil
price around $4 to $5 per barrel below the OPEC basket price. One can argue
that the oil price may fall below this target, in which case the error will be very
slight. For example, Saudi Arabia estimated its budgeted revenues and hence
expenditures at $14 to $15 p/b, while the market price was around $18 p/b. The
conservative bent of the Saudi budget planners has resulted in a tendency for
actual revenues to exceed budgeted expenditures. However, this difficulty can
be overcome since the duration of the budget is a short-term process.
Given the difficulty outlined above, the Ministry of Finance and National
Economy divides the annual fiscal budget into four chapters. The first three
chapters contain the recurrent expenditures, while the fourth chapter includes
capital expenditures. The first chapter includes the financial provisions for
salaries, wages, and allowances. To a large extent, this chapter's expenditure,
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unlike that of the other chapters, is not subject to any reduction, even during
austerity periods. The second chapter covers general expenses, which rely on
day-to-day operational spending. This includes spending on maintenance and
spare parts, stationery, machinery and vehicles, travel expenses and ticketing,
managerial needs, furniture, ration allowances, and miscellaneous items.
Development funds, subsidies, supplies, and maintenance and operation are all
included in chapter three, whereas, chapter four includes all development
expenditures related to the capital goods spending within the government
projects.
The salient feature of budgetary history since 1970 has been the
government's efforts to accelerate the pace of development in the country.
Thereby, the government began to establish a well-equipped infrastructure, as
well as to enhance public services and to raise the Saudi standard of living. This
tendency led the government to increase its expenditures through boosting both
recurrent and project expenditures. Table 3.2 illustrates that the total
government expenditures during the periods from 1969 to 1972 were slightly
low in terms of value and growth rate. The total spending amounted to 5.9, 6.3,
7.2, and 14 billion Saudi Riyals (SR) over that period for each year respectively.
This was due to the shortage of income sources to finance the budget.
However, in 1973 and afterwards, an upward trend in government expenditure
took place. The government spending rose from SR 26.7 billion in 1974 to reach
its peak in 1981 at about SR 273 billion. These government expenditures were
proportionally distributed between recurrent and project expenditures. The
share of the latter in the total expenditures exceeded the former from 1973 to
1976. The reason behind that was the tendency of the government to improve
and to establish the country's infrastructure. During this period, the economy
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was showing signs of overheating. The huge government spending created
bottlenecks regarding the low absorptive capacity of the economy, which was
associated with incompletion of infrastructure. As a result, the inflation rate
increased dramatically to reach its highest level of 34.7 in 1975. This rate
cannot be totally accurate due to the fact that its calculation is based on the cost
of living index. Unlike the GOP deflator, which covers all prices, it considers only
the incomes of middle-class families who were spending an average of 2000-
7000 SR per month.
Nevertheless, the rise in imported consumer goods prices also pushed
the domestic inflation up slightly. Consequently, the government attempted to
reduce the high inflation rate by adopting a tightening of the fiscal policy in real
terms as long as the nominal domestic exchange rate is fixed to the US dollar.
The share of capital goods expenditures in the total spending was reduced in
favour of recurrent spending. Increased subsidies and transfer payments were
adopted in order to mitigate the effect of inflation on the citizens.
Hence, the share of recurrent expenditures increased from 50.4% in
1977 to 54% and 53.2 in 1978 and 1979 respectively. The inflation rate since
then has been under control within an acceptable rate, as shown in Table 3.3.
In 1978, the budget experienced a deficit for the first time since 1970 due to a
decline in the total revenues. Fortunately, this was a short-term deficit followed
by a budget surplus. The second oil shock which occurred in 1979, increased
the production and price of oil. As a result, the total expenditures rose from SR
17.5 billion in 1979 to reach their peak of SR 27.3 billion in 1981. Again, the
share of projects spending increased to 61.4 percent and 59 percent of the total
spending in 1981 and 1982 respectively.
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Table 3.3 Costs of Living and Inflation Rates (1 988=100)
Year Cost of Living Index (CLI) Inflation Year
	 CLI	 Inflation
1970	 32	 ----	 1984	 106.5	 -1.5
1971	 34.1	 6.6	 1985	 102.9	 -3.6
1972	 35.6	 4.4	 1986	 99.9	 -3.0
1973	 41.3	 13.8	 1987	 99.0	 -0.9
1974	 50.1	 17.6	 1988	 100	 1.0
1975	 67.5	 34.7	 1989	 101.1	 1.1
1976	 88.7	 31.4	 1990	 103.2	 2.1
1977	 98.8	 11.4	 1991	 108.2	 5.0
1978	 97.3	
-1.5	 1992	 108.1	 -0.1
1979	 99.1	 1.8	 1993	 109.3	 1.2
1980	 103	 3.9	 1994	 109.9	 0.6
1981	 105.6	 2.5	 1995	 115.5	 5.4
1982	 106.8	 1.2	 1996	 116.2	 0.9
1983	 107.8	 0.8	 1997	 116.7	 0.4
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, 1999
The golden era of having expenditures lagged behind revenues has gone
because of the world recession among other factors, which began in 1982. This
was associated with a deterioration in the oil demand in the world oil market,
which reflected negatively on the national economy causing adverse effects in
terms of spending and revenue. Thereafter, the government expenditure
showed a steady downward trend through the following decade. The slight
deficit of SR 1.7 billion revealed in 1983 could have been avoided by further
reduction in spending to match the rate of reduction in revenues.
The Saudi officials preferred not to do so, expecting that the price of oil
would increase shortly. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia agreed to be a flexible
producer in OPEC in order to maintain the oil prices. Despite being a swing-
producer, its quotas fell to one-half (less than three million barrels a day) and
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the price of oil remained low. Thereby, the economy suffered from a cumulative
deficit during the period from 1983 to 1986 when it resumed producing its quota
within OPEC. Nevertheless, regaining its quota was accompanied again with a
world recession and oil price war between OPEC and non-OPEC producers,
which led to a lower oil price.
The result was an unprecedented decline in government revenue from
1975 to reach a low of SR84.6 billion by 1988. The recovery in the world
economy in the following year raised the oil revenue and helped the
government to resume spending. Unfortunately, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990
caused dramatic changes in terms of a temporary increase in oil production and
prices. The government's obligation toward Kuwaiti citizens and the state then
pushed its expenditure to high levels. It aimed to stabilise the economic and
political situation domestically, as well as to cover the military expenses
resulting from the confrontation with Iraqi Forces. The budgets of 1990 and
1991 were consolidated in one budget. The cardinal aspect of this budget was
the huge recurrent expenditure reaching its peak of SR 398.9 billion with a
share of 87% of total government spending, as shown in table 3.4.
The general conclusions about the government budget can be
summarised as follows:
1- the bulk of the government revenues are obtained by oil revenues.
Other revenues are fairly small despite all efforts adopted to diversify sources of
income.
2- depending on a single exporting product as a mean of income creates
instability in the national economy due to fluctuations in the international market.
This outcome may be a caution for foreign and domestic private investment in
relation to risks and uncertainty in the business environment. The salient
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example, which is shown in the tables, was the chronic deficit since 1982.
Table 3.4 Components of the Budget Expenditures
(Current Million SR)
	
Years	 Recurrent	 %	 Capital	 Total Exp.
	1969	 3787	 63.8	 2151	 36.2	 5938
	
1970	 4020	 63.7	 2287	 36.3	 6307
	
1971	 4399	 61.3	 2775	 38.7	 7174
	
1972	 5283	 57.2	 3948	 42.8	 9231
	
1973	 7054	 49.9	 7092	 50.1	 14146
	
1974	 11840	 44.2	 14922	 55.8	 26762
	
1975	 27162	 45.9	 32022	 54.1	 59184
	
1976	 46973	 48	 50766	 52	 97739
	
1977	 63992	 50.4	 63050	 49.6	 127042
	
1978	 79230	 54	 67327	 46	 146357
	
1979	 93190	 53.2	 81887	 46.8	 175077
	
1980	 91079	 42.3	 129684	 58.7	 220763
	
1981	 105604	 38.6	 167717	 61.4	 273321
	
1982	 108411	 41	 155861	 59	 264272
	
1983	 121467	 50.3	 119944	 49.7	 241411
	
1984	 126438	 55.6	 100856	 44.4	 227294
	
1985	 124000	 73	 73031	 37	 197031
	
1986	 122905	 70.3	 51804	 29.7	 174709
	
1987	 126726	 70	 46800	 30	 173526
	
1988	 102332	 64.9	 32518	 24.1	 134850
	
1989	 122700	 81.8	 27300	 18.2	 149500
	
1990-91	 398900	 87	 58600	 13	 457500
	
1992	 179000	 84.7	 32300	 15.3	 211300
	
1993	 142000	 69.1	 63500	 30.9	 205500
	
1994	 124500	 76	 39300	 24	 163800
	
1995	 131700	 75.7	 42200	 24.3	 173900
	
1996	 147600	 74.5	 50500	 25.5	 198100
	
1997	 162800	 73.6	 58400	 26.4	 221272
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, 1999.
:IMF, Staff Report, 1994.
:EIU, Country Report, 1994
3- the fluctuation in oil revenues reflects directly on the scope and magnitude of
the government expenditure. During high oil prices, the budget runs at a surplus
and capital goods have a larger share than in an oil slump. In contrast, during a
budgetary deficit, the recurrent expenditure share rises at the expense of
project expenditure. This is attributed to the fact that it consists of salaries and
transfer payments, which cannot easily be subject to any reduction. The decline
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in that category is mainly related to a gradual reduction of subsidies, which are
not a major component of recurrent expenditure.
4- the government determines the fiscal policy by controlling government
expenditure only rather than through tax changes. The private sector, to some
extent, is still incapable of participating in economic activities effectively, and
also depends mainly on government spending and support.
5- other non-oil revenues are still low and may continue in this trend, particularly
after the decline of the government investment abroad in the wake of the oil
revenues' deterioration in the 1980s. One solution is the establishment of a
taxation system, which could be implemented fairly, but this might have
unpredictable consequences politically and economically.
3.4 The Non-oil Sector
The government places much emphasis on its attempts to diversify the
economy through growth in the non-oil economy. This effort has been shown
from the outset of the Third Development Plan in 1980-85. Therefore, the best
way to analyse the non-oil economy is to look at the total output produced by all
sectors concerned in some way with the non-oil components.
3.4.1 Non-oil Gross Domestic Product:
The share of the non-oil sector in the real GDP has grown at a higher rate since
1978 as table 3.5 shows to reach its highest contribution of 79.7% of total GDP
in 1985. Since then, it has continued to have a higher share than the oil sector.
In contrast to the oil sector, the non-oil sector is much less volatile, therefore, its
share of real GDP has been around 65% since 1982 and afterwards. This
structural transformation of the economy was due to the decline of the oil share
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resulting from oil revenue which declined at that time and also due to the
relatively successful achievement of emphasising a lessening of dependence
on oil.
Table 3.5
	
	
Oil and non-Oil Contribution in the Real GDP (1 970=1 00)
(Million SR)
Year	 Real GOP	 Non-oil Sector %change
	
Oil Sector	 %Change
1969	 17152	 7586	 44.2	 9566	 55.8
1970	 19582	 8040	 41	 11542	 59
1971	 22621	 8607	 38	 14014	 62
1972	 27133	 9720	 34.8	 17413	 64.2
1973	 31246	 11183	 34.8	 20063	 64.2
1974	 31539	 12636	 40	 18903	 60
1975	 34250	 15138	 44.2	 19112	 55.8
1976	 39318	 17692	 45	 21626	 55
1977	 41765	 20252	 48.5	 21513	 51.5
1978	 44521	 22522	 50.6	 21999	 49.4
1979	 49053	 25184	 51.3	 23869	 48.7
1980	 52971	 28318	 53.5	 24653	 46.5
1981	 53886	 31503	 58.5	 22383	 41.5
1982	 48030	 33721	 70.2	 14309	 29.8
1983	 47995	 34962	 72.8	 13033	 27.2
1984	 45842	 35389	 74.5	 11453	 24.5
1985	 44936	 35650	 79.7	 9286	 20.7
1986	 47511	 34479	 72.6	 13032	 27.4
1987	 46830	 35306	 74.4	 11524	 24.6
1988	 49923	 35992	 72	 13931	 28
1989	 50167	 36538	 72.8	 13629	 27.2
1990	 55565	 38894	 70	 16671	 30
1991	 60284	 39666	 65.8	 20618	 34.2
1992	 61917	 39886	 64.4	 22031	 35.6
1993	 61511	 40253	 64.4	 21258	 34.6
1994	 61841	 40542	 64.6	 21299	 34.4
1995	 62003	 40647	 64.6	 21356	 34.4
1996	 63449	 41631	 64.6	 21818	 34.4
1997	 64592	 42488	 65.8	 22104	 34.2
Sources; SAMA Annual Report, Various Years
Ministry of Planning, Achievements of the Development Plans1990-1 995
Table 3.6 indicates the values and percentages of the major components of the
non-oil GDP measured in constant prices based on figures for 1970. The
relative importance of each sector emerges as we consider the period under
concern. For example, the most striking gains were in the construction and
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trade sectors during the mid-I 970s till early 1990s, while others vary to different
degrees despite their relative importance. Brief emphasis will be placed on
construction, agriculture, and the manufacturing sectors regarding their
importance in non-oil GDP in terms of attempts at diversification.
Table 3.6 Values and Percentages of Manufacturing, Construction, and Agricultural
Sectors in the Non-oil Real GDP (1970=100)
(Million SR)
Year Non-oil GDP Manufacture %Change Construction %change Agriculture %Change
1969	 17152	 1672	 9.7	 934	 5.4	 984	 5.7
1970	 19582	 1839	 9.4	 957	 4.9	 1018	 5.2
1971	 22621	 1847	 8.2	 1053	 4.6	 1050	 4.6
1972	 27133	 1977	 7.3	 1396	 5.1	 1089	 4.0
1973	 31246	 2082	 6.7	 1737	 5.6	 1130	 3.6
1974	 31539	 2021	 -	 4.6	 2461	 7.8	 1147	 3.6
1975	 34250	 2187	 6.4	 3309	 9.7	 1221	 3.6
1976	 39318	 2479	 6.3	 4146	 10.5	 1282	 3.3
1977	 41765	 2694	 6.5	 4582	 11	 1483	 3.5
1978	 44521	 2965	 6.6	 4700	 10.6	 1550	 3.5
1979	 49053	 3226	 6.6	 5128	 10.5	 1640	 3.3
1980	 52971	 3456	 6.5	 5654	 10.7	 1735	 3.3
1981	 53886	 3699	 6.9	 6225	 11.6	 1839	 3.4
1982	 48030	 4047	 8.4	 5837	 12.2	 2023	 4.2
1983	 47995	 4578	 9.5	 5329	 11.1	 2286	 4.8
1984	 45842	 4864	 10.4	 5129	 11	 2707	 5.8
1985	 44936	 5454	 12	 4259	 9.4	 3193	 7.1
1986	 47511	 5466	 11.5	 3722	 7.9	 3673	 7.7
1987	 46830	 6166	 13.2	 3627	 7.7	 4275	 9.1
1988	 49923	 6737	 13.5	 3446	 6.9	 4736	 9.5
1989	 50167	 6555	 13	 3428	 6.8	 5068	 10.1
1990	 55565	 6917	 12.5	 3428	 6.2	 5422	 9.8
1991	 60284	 8485	 14	 3532	 5.8	 5304	 8.8
1992	 61917	 8909	 14.4	 3595	 5.5	 5399	 8.7
1993	 61511	 8750	 14.2	 3649	 5.9	 5466	 8.9
1994	 61841	 8817	 14.3	 3682	 6	 5504	 8.9
1995	 62003	 8712	 14	 3697	 6	 5521	 8.9
1996	 63449	 9142	 14.4	 3752	 5.9	 5604	 8.8
1997	 64592	 9334	 14.5	 3854	 6.0	 5713	 8.8
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Achievements of Development Plans,1996
SAMA, Annual F(eport, 1999
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3.4.2 Construction
The construction industry is made up of diverse units, varying in size
from large local and foreign companies to small-organised builders constructing
houses and minor works. The construction industry is to a large extent in the
private sector. A surge in oil revenues in the early seventies caused some
bottlenecks in the economy, particularly in seaports, roads, housing, airports
and many other areas the of physical and human infrastructures. As a
prerequisite to development, the government has encouraged that the
construction sector to play a vital role in order to match the rapid pace of
development and diversification of the economic base. Its importance rests on
its contribution to infrastructure development and fixed capital formation as well
as its wide-ranging linkages with other sectors in the economy. Therefore, it
experienced the highest growth rate within the real non-oil GDP during the
period from 1974 to 1978.
Table 3.6 shows that the construction contribution amounted to SR 934
million in 1969 then increased drastically to reach its highest share totalled at
SR 6,225 million in 1981. The growth rate of the construction sector in the entire
real GDP ranged between 7.8% and 12.2 from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s.
The establishment of new commercial and housing development, recreation
areas, and the large capacity expansion of the oil and petrochemical industries,
has stabilised its growth at an around 6% from 1986 up to 1996. This decline in
rate is attributed to the completion of most of the country's infrastructure.
Measuring changes in the construction sector in terms of employment involved
in it may clarify the variation in its contribution to GDP. The construction sector
in 1974-75 employed total of 172,000, while in 1979-89 the labour force totalled
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330,000 employees. The percentages for each period were 10% and 13%
respectively of the total labour forces in the country.
The final conclusion about the growth rate of the construction sector can
be summarised by considering the share of this sector in the overall real GDP.
During the first two five-year development plans, this was 18.57% and 17.78%
of the total real GDP respectively. During the Third and Fifth Five-year plans,
the growth rate declined dramatically to -2.8% and 0.0% respectively of the total
real GDP, due to the causes mentioned above.
3.4.3 Agriculture
The importance of agriculture to the country comes not only from its
contribution to the national output in order to match or/and exceeds the growth
rate of the population, also from its contribution to the diversification of the
economy and the reduced dependence on oil as the major source of national
income. In addition, agriculture stimulates growth and employment in other
sectors via its forward and backward linkages. The first one comprises such
activities as meat processing, the manufacturing of dairy products, the
preservation and packing of fruits and vegetables, and the manufacturing of oil
and fat, while the second one involves activities such as local manufacturing of
fertilisers, pesticides, and agricultural implements. In spite of this, unfortunately,
the agricultural sector's contribution to the real GDP has not been encouraging.
Looking at Table 3.6 gives an indication of how low in the share of agriculture is,
compared with other sectors in non-oil GDP. Excluding the years before the oil
revenue influx, the growth rate of the agricultural sector in the total output of
GDP in real terms has been relatively small. It ranged around an average of
3.4% from 1974 to 1981.
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Nevertheless, the output of the agriculture sector gradually increased
whether measured in real or nominal figures, but its contribution is low because
it is weighted by the share of oil and other sectors, which has the ability to rise
rapidly. In previous years, manufacturing, construction, and transportation,
among others, have been developed at the expense of the agricultural sector,
particularly in terms of employment and government recurrent expenditure.
Lately, the government has concentrated on encouraging the agricultural
sector to expand. The government provided attractive incentives to encourage
people and businesses to become involved in agricultural investments across
the country. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MOAW), the Saudi Arabian
Agricultural Bank (SAAB), and the Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation
(GSFML) are all government agencies responsible for accelerating the growth
of the agricultural sector. They provide interest-free loans, free reclamation
lands, production inputs, machinery and equipment subsidies (Tables 3.7 and
3.8 present all the type of government support).
In addition to that, the government agencies purchase wheat and animal
feeds from farmers at guaranteed prices, and construct flour mills and storage
facilities of Grain Silos (Presely, 1986). Moreover, agricultural researches, crop
selection, seed development, dam building, and irrigation schemes, are all
provided for the benefit of the farmers in order to reduce costs and increase
productivity. The total amount of wheat and barley subsidies was about SR 45
million in 1979 and increased gradually to reach SR 6 billion in 1991, and
thereafter, declined in 1994 to SR 5.08 billion. The subsidies started at SR 43.3
million in 1974 then exceeded SR 1.44 billion in 1984 and declined to379
million in 1994. The new arable lands allocated to the farmers totalled 6,977
hectares (one hectare equals 2.471 acres) in 1970 and reached 2.4 million
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hectares in 1994. The number of beneficiares increased in the same period of
time from 1,124 to 96,509 (Achievements Plan, 1995). As a resu't, there has
been a substantial growth of output in this sector. The contribution of the
agricultural sector in real GDP increased continuous'y from 3.4% in 1981 to
reach its peak of 10.1% in 1989 and stabilised at an average of 8.8% until 1996.
Table 3.7 Incentives for Agricultural Production
Type	 Amount	 Source
Production Inputs:
Fertiliser	 50% of cost	 MOAW
Animal feed	 50% of cost	 SAAB
Potato seed	 5 tons free; SR 1000/ton
Thereafter up to 15 tons.	 MOAW
Machinery and equipment:
Poultry equipment	 30% of cost
	 SAAB
Dairy equipment	 30% of cost
	 SAAB
Engines and pumps	 50% of cost
	 SAAB
Fish trawlers	 Variables
	 SAAB
Transportation:
Air transportation of cows	 100% of cost
	 SAAB
Output:
Wheat
Rice
Corn
Millet/barley
Dates
Date palms planted
Agricultural credit:
All types
SR2/kg*
SR 0.30/kg
SR 0.25/kg
SR 0.15/kg
SR 0.25/kg
SR 50/tree
Variable conditions
GSFMO
MOAW
MOAW
MOAW
MOAW
MOAW
SAAB
Agro-industrial credit:
All types	 Variable conditions	 SIDF
Land acquisition:
Land distribution	 Free	 MOAW
*purchase price for years 1985 to 1988: from 1979 and 1984 purchase price was
Source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Fourth Development Plan, p.182.
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It is worth noting, that the increased growth rate of the agricultural sector
has been associated with a decline in the labour employed in this sector. The
labour force totalling 695,000 in 1974-75 declined to 598,800 and 528,800 in
1980 and 1985 respectively. The expansion in output of this sector with its
declining employment can be due to large-scale mechanisation implemented in
the agricultural sector.
Table 3.8 Government Agricultural Disbursed Subsidies
(Million SR)
Year	 Wheat and
1974
1979
	
45.1
1984
	
2774.5
1988
	
4828.9
1989
	
4255.5
1990
	
5087.3
1991
	
6005
1994
	
5079.3
'oultry	 Other Agricultural Products
-	 43.3
--	 703.3
-	 1448.8
666	 304.2
283.2	 281.6
212.3	 199
210	 82
138.5	 376.7
e Development Plans, 1995, p. 241
3.4.4 Manufacture
In Saudi Arabia before and during the early periods of oil exploitation,
notably till the outset of 1970s, there was no modern industry except the oil
refining industry and cement production. The cement production was as low as
about 90,000 and 666,900 tons in 1960 and 1970 respectively, when the first
production satisfied just 24.9 percent and the latter 56.1 percent of the country's
needs. During that period, one could say that the country had little tradition of
modern industrial development outside oil refining. The early stage of developing,
the manufacturing sector was launched with the increase in oil revenues in the
early 1970s. To give a clear idea of the manufacturing sector, one can divide this
sector into two categories: non-oil based manufacturing activities and hydrocarbon
based (oil and refining are excluded). The aim of such a division is to differentiate,
to some extent, between the role of the private sector in the former and the strong
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governmental involvement in the latter. The concentration on hydrocarbon based
manufacturing will be made in relation to the diversification of the economy by
considering the comparative advantage of having the source of natural gas in
huge quantities.
3.4.4.1 Non-oil Manufacturing
The non-oil manufacturing sector is a very small fraction of the Saudi
Arabian economy. Its contribution to the GDP and the non-oil GDP during the
1970s was small and fairly constant, either measured in real or nominal values.
Its share of the overall GDP reached its peak of 2.1 percent in 1979 in current
prices and 2.8 percent in constant prices based on figures for 1970. On the
other hand, its proportion of non-oil GDP ranged around an average of 5
percent measured either in real or nominal prices. Although, the share of non-oil
manufacturing sector in non-oil GDP is low, it could have been lower than 5
percent if the cement production was excluded from the share of the non-oil
manufacturing sector. The reasons behind that rest on the investors' intention
not to be involved in such investments were: firstly, the overvaluation of the
Saudi Riyal during the boom period, which made the imported goods much
cheaper than those domestically produced; and secondly, alternative profitable
investments associated with short-term investment, high returns and low-risks
were more attractive. The most obvious examples of these investments were
trading, real estates, house building and services.
As a result, the government recognised difficulties facing the
manufacturing sector, and thereafter it worked to stimulate and establish a new
manufacturing base. The base was established through the Statute for
Protection and Encouragement of National Industries. Provision for industry
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Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
ans
16
860
2061
3954
6301
6831
5967
5338
5351
3227
1292
634
Loans
542
442
828
664
1032
1170
1055
1341
2005
2002
2012
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990-91
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
incentives, was made; and basic infrastructure and, in particular, industrial
zones were created at major cities. This policy aimed to allow the private sector
to share in the development and growth process with regard to the private
sector's ability to exploit local resources in a more efficient way than the
government. Therefore, the encouragement and incentives for the private
sector, were and still are provided by government agencies. The incentives
provided include loans with zero-interest on favourable terms, tariff exemption
on imported equipment and materials, selective tariff protection from imported
products, provision of low cost of utilities and fuels, provision of infrastructure
including industrial zones, and adoption of government procurement policies
giving preference to the local products (Table 3.9 presents some example of
loans, which were extended by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF).
Loans were first provided in 1974 at SR 16 million and increased gradually until
Table 3.9 Loans Provided to Manufacturing Sector by SIDF
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Achievements for Development Plan, 1995
SAMA, Annual Report, 1999.
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1978 when they reached about SR 6.3 billion; they rose at a fairly constant rate
to peak in 1980 at about SR 6.8 billion. The decline in oil revenues in the mid-
80s has adversely influenced the provision of loans which declined drastically in
1985 and afterwards, reaching their lowest level since the start of the
programme at SR 440 million in 1988. Following that year, the provision of
loans increased again to almost double that of previous year and continued
increasing rate until 1996 to around SR 2 billion. Such loans are available on a
case by case basis. Moreover, these loans are granted if certain requirements
are met, such as obtaining a prior license from the Ministry of Industry and
Electricity in order to avoid undesired duplication. Projects funded must be
capital-intensive and economically feasible, and provide employment and
training for Saudi citizens. Preferential treatment is given to local enterprises in
order to obtain government projects. This kind of treatment to be provided is
subject to two conditions. The first is that the price of the local bidder must not
be 10 percent higher than the foreign bid. The second condition is that the
quality of the local product is no more than 10 percent below the foreign bidder.
The government implemented such a policy in order to protect "infant industries"
from foreign competition. A tariff of up to 20 percent was imposed over similar
foreign products.
This protection of domestic products is conditioned by the judgement of
the viability of local enterprise under three prerequisite requirements. The first
requirement is that its production must be able to meet at least 50 percent of the
domestic market demand; the second is that the product must be at good
quality and at a reasonable price; the third is that time period of the tariff
imposition in favour of that product does not exceed a five-year period. Those
incentives and others such as cheap fuel, and exemption of some
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manufacturing inputs from import duties has led to an expansion and growth in
the manufacturing sector. The number of factories operating has increased as
table 3.10, shows, as has the amount of capital invested. About 199 plants
opened in 1970 and this number increased significantly to 1,422, 2,000 and
2,476 in 1980, 1991, and 1996 respectively. In terms of capital invested and
manpower employed, the figure for the total capital in the same years
mentioned above are respectively SR 2,787, million, 58,136 million, 137,818
and SR 163, 290 million. The labour force increased from 13,865 workers to
89,127, 172,848 and 225,000 in the years concerned.
Table 3.10 Number of Factories in Operation, their Capitals and Manpower
(Accumulated Million SR)
Year	 Number of Factories % change Capital	 Man-power-
1970	 199	 2787	 13865
1971	 232	 16.6	 3448	 15678
1972	 266	 14.7	 4262	 18632
1973	 292	 9.8	 4492	 20464
1974	 375	 22.3	 6320	 27970
1975	 460	 28.9	 11528	 39423
1976	 626	 36.1	 16042	 51094
1977	 841	 34.3	 23828	 66421
1978	 1071	 20.9	 26360	 76533
1979	 1206	 18.6	 34202	 89129
1980	 1422	 17.9	 -	 58136	 104845
1981	 1629	 14.6	 81748	 117189
1982	 1741	 6.9	 83610	 122772
1983	 1845	 6	 90397	 128475
1984	 1929	 4.6	 93189	 134547
1985	 1983	 2.8	 94003	 137372
1986	 2017	 1.7	 94353	 138784
1987	 2061	 2.2	 94805	 140620
1988	 2132	 3.4	 95449	 142934
1989	 2193	 2.9	 96085	 144932
1990	 2251	 2.6	 136621	 168159
1991	 2000	 1.1	 137818	 172848
1992	 2036	 1.8	 138462	 174617
1993	 2109	 3.6	 139616	 178735
1994	 2234	 5.9	 151200	 196022
1995	 2355	 5.4	 157400	 210000
1996	 2476	 5.1	 163290	 225000
After 1990, the factories producing bakery, ice, and cement-related products were transferred to the Ministry
ot l-etroleum.
Source: Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development Plans, 1990-1995
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Nevertheless, the growth rate of the non-oil manufacturing sector is still low
compared to that in developed countries such as the US and the UK, and in
some developing countries such as India, where manufacturing accounts for 25
percent of its GDP. The average overall contribution of the manufacturing sector
has not exceeded 14.4 percent of the total GOP. Table 3.11 includes numbers
of factories established for detailed commodities' production and their capital in
selected years in the national economy. The most important single fraction in
this group was of construction materials, which accounted for more than on third
of the total number of establishments (34.5%) and about one half of the total
capital (49%) in 1983. However, in 1990, chemical, rubber, and plastic capital
increased to constitute 55.6 percent of the total capital followed by food and
beverages at 17 percent and construction at 13.6 percent with the rest of the
group remaining quite small. The higher contribution of construction in the early
1980s is no surprise because of the rapid demand for infrastructure and private
house building, even though, most of the entire growth rate came mainly from
the participation of the hydrocarbon industries, which will be discussed latter.
Table 3.11 Accumulated Number of Industries and their capital invested
(Current Million SR)
Catogery	 1979	 1983	 1990	 1996
	
No.of Inds. Capital No.of inds. Capital 	 No.of Inds. Capital
	 No.of Inds. Capital
Food&beverages	 124	 1428.3	 264	 4101	 289	 6663	 391	 11,294
Textiles and	 12	 56.2	 28	 437	 35	 1001	 108	 2592.5
Clothing
Leatherproducts	 2	 9.9	 7	 52	 13	 150	 109	 1,495.6
Wood products	 31	 127.6	 51	 458	 72	 714	 163	 4,599.1
Paper product	 60	 268	 95	 935	 126	 2200	 463	 100,785
Chemical&	 109	 1563.1	 211	 6834	 293	 59,096	 464	 21,169
Rubber & Plastic _________ _______ _________ _________ _________ __________ _________ ________
Ceramic and	 2	 43.4	 6	 406	 57	 2822	 15	 4372
Glass__________ ________ __________ __________ __________ ___________ __________ ________
Construction	 289	 4,562.20	 458	 15,734	 354	 14,463	 685	 15,458.6
materials__________ ________ __________ __________ __________ ___________ 	 ________
Machanary&	 198	 1143	 430	 9,262	 532	 18,106	 59	 933.7
Metalequip.	 _________ _______ _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ _______
838	 14	 1564	 38,418	 1852	 106,330	 24	 162,789
Source: Ministry of Planning, Achievement of the Development Plans, 1995-1999
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3.4.4.2 Hydrocarbon Manufacturing
Saudi Arabia has the comparative advantage of being the largest oil
exporting country with huge reserves and a significant quantity of natural gas.
Therefore, a hydrocarbon's manufacturing base might be the most suitable
strategy to adopt in order to lessen dependence on crude oil production. In
international trade, Saudi Arabia enjoys a comparative advantage in intensive
hydrocarbon based manufacturing. The issue of comparative advantage is the
cornerstone of how far oil downstream can be highly profitable.
The local private sector in Saudi Arabia is incapable of being involved in
investment in hydrocarbon heavy industries with regard to its scope and ability
financially and managerially. Large-scale capital and highly skilled management
and labour are required for this sort of investment, which, to a large extent, are
not available in the local private sector. In addition, the manufacturing of
hydrocarbon was a matter of political as well as economic interests, which were
beyond private sector objectives. Despite the key role assigned to the private
sector in manufacturing base development, the government felt it was
necessary to be involved in the creation of heavy industry, through inviting
foreign companies to invest in this industry. The direct government involvement
in heavy industry was undertaken for many reasons: (i) this industry needs
intensive capital and other resource requirements; (ii) it requires a long-term
period from its establishment to the profitable operation of industry projects; (iii)
it has a great link with hydrocarbon policies and projects.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia created a government agency named
"Petromin" in 1962 through which to undertake investment in key basic
petrochemical and metal industries. It is a worth noting that Petromin besides its
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new task, was responsible for exploration and marketing of oil products in the
local market. The new task started with an exploitation of natural gas, which
was mainly associated with oil extraction. Due to some marketing difficulties,
most of the gas produced in the country was flared and could not be used for
the benefit of the country. For instance, of the 200 million cubic feet produced
between 1959 and 1966 only 6.1 percent went to domestic uses, 31.1 percent
was re-injected into the oil field, and 61.8 percent was flared (OPEC, Statistical
Bulletine, 1975). In addition, the world demand for natural gas as fuel or input
has increased sharply. The foundation of Petromin had to take into
consideration what was mentioned above, including the increase in the natural
gas proven reserves, in order to start setting up a hydrocarbon industrial base.
Table 3.12 shows the total reserves, marketed production, and total production
divided into flared, re-injection, and shrinkage categories.
Table 3.12 Proven and Total Production of Natural Gas
(Thousand Million Standard Cubic Meters)
Year	 Saudi Reserves Marketed Production	 Total Production
Flared Re-injected Shrinkage
1976	 1986	 4434
1977	 2478	 5565
1978	 1230	 7297
1979	 1711	 9167
1980	 3183	 11431
1981	 3346	 22245	 25583	 1411	 3143
1982	 3432	 8950	 21373	 1651	 1590
1983	 3544	 4380	 16320	 1300	 4900
1984	 3608	 18200	 4220	 1800	 8220
1985	 3687	 18800	 3000	 1300	 7500
1991	 5221	 32810	 13100	 4400	 15200
1992	 5249	 34000	 11520	 5180	 15400
1993	 5244	 35900	 9900	 5800	 15700
1994	 5260	 37700	 10200	 6400	 15900
1995	 5545	 38040	 12700	 7030	 16200
1996	 5693	 41340	 12450	 7500	 16360
1997	 5882	 43400	 12450	 7650	 165400
sources: OPEc, Annual Statistical bulletin, 19ö5-1 997
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The total reserve increased from 1,986 billion standard cubic metres in 1976 to
5,693 in 1996, while the marketed production increased from 4,434 million
standard cubic metres in 1976 to 41,340 in 1996.
Petromin began the process of developing hydrocarbon-based industries
through key basic petrochemical and metal industries, particularly after the
completion of the Master Gas System (MGS). During the period from 1967 to
1970, two factories came into operation with a small scale of production: A steel
mill with a capacity of 45,000 ton/year at Jeddah in 1967, and a 35,000 ton
capacity urea plant built by the Saudi Arabian Fertiliser Company (SAFCO) near
Dammam in 1970. The production of these plants was operated through a
technical agreement between Petromin and foreign petroleum companies for
the latter to provide the technical supervision for the construction and operation.
The expansion in petrochemical production has led the government to
differentiate between the major task of Petromin as the oil-refined distributor
and its new task of developing hydrocarbon-based industries. Consequently,
the control of SAFCO was transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Electricity
(MIE), and a huge new company was established, owned mainly by the
government under the name of the Saudi Basic industry Corporation (SABIC).
The first company (SAFCO) under the new arrangement operated successfully
and its output increased from 17 tons per year in 1970 to almost 300 tons in
1979, 97 percent of which were for export. The second company, SABIC, was
established in 1976 with an initial capital of SRIO billion, 90 percent of which, is
owned by the government, and the rest being sold to the public. It was
established for the implementation of a basic industry programme in conjunction
with suitable overseas venture partners. Therefore, it took over from Petromin
the responsibility of the Steel Mill and all other basic industries. The major task
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of SABIC was to utilise the natural gas, which is associated with the production
of oil. The utilisation of gas was through its uses as an input or fuel for
petrochemical and energy intensive industries. This added value directly to the
country's national resource, and increased foreign exchange earnings without
being subject to the fluctuations of the price and production of crude oil. This
company is classified as a high technology and capital-intensive company. By
the end of 1994, SABIC had completed 15 basic downstream and support
industries. The annual production capacities had reached 19.5 million metric
tons of petrochemical, plastics, fertilisers, metals, industrial gases, steel rolling,
and iron and steel.
The production of SABIC industries in 1994 included 11 million ton of
chemicals and petrochemicals, 4.3 million tons of fertilisers, 2 million tons of
plastics, 2.6 million tons of metal, and 1.1 million tons of other products. In
terms of employment, the total manpower employed by this company and its
affiliated companies stood at 11,539 employees, of whom Saudi nationals were
63 percent in 1994, while in 1989, the total manpower employed were 8,938 of
whom Saudi nationals constituted 59.5 percent.
Finally, one can conclude that there was a successful effort in the pace
of development and growth in the manufacturing sector in general and in
hydrocarbon-based manufacturing in particular. Taking exports as an economic
indicator for measuring the government plan, shows that industrial exports, with
the exclusion of oil products were around SR 15.6 billion in 1994. This was
about thirteen times more than the value of exports in 1984. Petrochemical
exports of SABIC, amounted to about SRIO.2 billion, thus contributing 65
percent of the total value of industrial exports. Exports of other manufacturing
industries stood at about SR5.4 billion, accounting for about 35 percent of the
88
total industrial exports (Ministry of Planning, Facts and Figures, 1995). If the
overall performance of the industrial sector is measured in terms of its
contribution to the real GDP, that shows the growing contribution of the non-oil
GDP (see Table 3 6). During the period from 1991 to 1996, if the oil share is
excluded, the share of the manufacturing sector was the highest among other
components of the overall real GDP with an average share of about 14.3
percent.
3.5 The Foreign Sector
The relatively large size of the foreign sector and thus foreign trade is
one of the most distinguished features of the Kingdom's economy. This
outcome is derived from the higher contribution of export and import values in
the total GDP (more than 90%) of the national economy. Moreover, the
significance of foreign trade is evident in that Saudi Arabia is the largest oil
exporter in the world and was also ranked as one of the ten largest exporters in
the 1970s. In terms of imports its relative weight in world trade was the 35th in
1975 to become I 1th by the end of 1978 (Third Development Plan). Beyond the
importance of the country's exports and imports, there are two crucial features
which confirm its interactive ties with the world: the first is the Saudi
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which accounted for $19,273
million in 1979 and jumped to peaked at $25,004 million in 1985 and then
started fluctuating in response to the country's oil revenues (Tanzi, 1990); the
second feature is the huge foreign workers' remittance which increased from
$6,510 million in 1988 to reach its highest level of $18,102 million in 1994
(Balance of Payment Statistical Year book, IMF, 1994).
To understand the vital importance of the foreign sector in the Saudi
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Arabian economy, it is necessary to shed light on some aspects of foreign
trade, starting with imports, and including its contribution to the overall GDP, its
composition, and the country's major foreign partners. This will be followed by a
focus on exports which will be broken down into three parts: crude oil; refined
and petrochemicals; and other exports with an indication of their destinations.
There will then be an overview of the Saudi Arabian balance of payments.
3.5.1 Imports
Saudi Arabia imports have grown rapidly as table 3.13 shows, with the
absolute value of imports increasing at an accelerated rate from SR 2,578
million in 1969 to reach SR 14,823m in 1975. The reason behind this is the
need for tradable and non-tradable goods to meet the high level of demand
emerging from the influx of oil revenues. As the basic infrastructure was not
completed during that period, a shortage of domestic goods production, a rise in
income, and a high propensity to import, caused imports to increase
dramatically by 107 and 68.3 percent in 1976 and 1977 respectively. The
imports measured in absolute values reached a peak in 1982 amounting to SR
139,335 million followed by a declining trend of 2.8, 12.3, 27.9 and 17.3 percent
in the following four years before recovering to establish a positive growth rate.
The reason for such fluctuations derived from changes in oil export revenues
that financed the vast development projects and thus government spending
which, in turn, reflected directly or indirectly the value of imports. Therefore,
prosperity of oil prices and oil production including the Kuwait invasion period in
1990, brought about a rise in imports to SR 124,606 million in 1992 with a 14.4
percent increase. Again, the fall in oil price, resulting from the world recession
afterwards, led to a decline in imports in terms of values and percentages. The
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crucial role of imports in the country can be seen clearly through their
contribution to the overall GDP. This was around one fifth of the total nominal
GDP in 1969, and for the following two years, it was around 13.9 and 13
percent respectively. The high contribution of imports during this period,
reflected the small proportion of the oil export revenues and thus the entire
GDP, rather than an increase in volume of imports. Hence, when the country
enjoyed massive oil wealth, the import contribution in the overall GDP fell to 7.4
and 7.3 percent during 1973 and 1974 respectively.
Table 3.13 Export and Import Values and Percentage Changes
Current Million SR
Year	 Export* %Change	 lmport**	 %Change Trade Balance
1969	 9496	 4.2	 3378	 31	 6118
1970	 10907	 14.9	 3197	 -5.4	 7710
1971	 17303	 58.5	 3668	 14.7	 13635
1972	 22761	 31.5	 4708	 28.4	 18053
1973	 33309	 46.3	 7310	 55.3	 25999
1974	 126223	 278.9	 10149	 38.8	 116084
1975	 104412	 -17.3	 14823	 46.1	 89589
1976	 135154	 29.4	 30691	 107	 104463
1977	 153209	 -17.3	 51662	 68.3	 101547
1978	 138243	 -9.8	 69180	 33.9	 69063
1979	 213183	 54.2	 82223	 18.9	 130960
1980	 362885	 70.2	 100350	 22	 262535
1981	 405481	 11.7	 119298	 18.9	 286183
1982	 271090	 -33.1	 139335	 16.8	 131755
1983	 158444	 -41.6	 135417	 -2.8	 23027
1984	 132299	 -16.5	 118737	 -12.3	 13562
1985	 99536	 -24.8	 85564	 -27.9	 13972
1986	 74377	 -25.3	 70780	 -17.3	 3597
1987	 86880	 16.8	 75313	 6.4	 11567
1988	 91288	 5.1	 81583	 8.3	 9700
1989	 106295	 16.4	 79219	 -2.9	 27076
1990	 166339	 56.5	 90283	 14	 76056
1991	 178624	 7.4	 108934	 20.7	 69690
1992	 188325	 5.4	 124606	 14.4	 63719
1993	 158770	 -15.7	 105616	 -15.3	 53154
1994	 159590	 0.5	 87449	 -17.2	 72141
1995	 187403	 17.4	 105187	 20.3	 82216
1996	 212625	 13.5	 103980	 -1.1	 108645
1997	 227443	 6.9	 107643	 3.5	 119800
* Exports FOB, ** Imports CIF
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Annual Report, 1997
:SAMA, Annual Report, Various Years.
:Ministry of Planning, Achievements of Development Plans, 1996
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Notwithstanding, the pace of the development process and the increase
in per capita income, imports exceeded one third of the GDP in 1983 and 1984.
Afterwards, as shown in Table 3.16, the imports contribution in the GDP settled
at around one fourth until 1996 with the exception of 1992 and 1994: in 1992,
the increase was largely due to a rise in government project-related imports and
only partly to the private sector activity; whilst, in 1994, the decline in imports
reflected a growing reliance on domestically produced goods and services as
well as because of the austere fiscal policy undertaken by the government. In
addition, the reduction of government expenditure has reduced the purchasing
power of the Saudi citizens as the GDP per head declined from $16,650 in 1981
to $ 5,500 by the end of 1980s (EIU, Country Profile, 1995-96). In 1996, this
figure increased to $7,458 in 1996 and ranked fourth within the GCC members
(Annual OPEC Statistical Bulletin, 1996).
The composition of imports rests on four major items: machinery,
mechanical, and electrical equipment; foodstuffs and beverages; transportation;
and basic metals and metal articles. Table 3.14 shows the large contribution of
foodstuffs and beverages ranging from 31.6 to 19.9 percent during the period
preceding 1975. This was due to the higher demand for such products, which
were not satisfied by domestic production. During the same period, the
machinery, transportation and basic metals were the highest share following
foodstuffs and beverages. The emphasis development, in the wake of the oil
price rises, changed their shares in favour of machinery, mechanical and
electrical equipment. It is no surprise that the share of this latter item has
continued to dominate the large share of total imports for about thirteen years
with an average of one fourth of the whole imports. The period from 1990
onwards, has witnessed a higher contribution of motor vehicles' imports
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reflecting a buoyant consumer market. The exception to this trend occurred in
1995-96, when the demand for vehicles dampened in favour of the machinery,
electrical, and mechanical equipment which had the largest share of total
imports of 21,9 and 21 percent respectively, followed by vehic'es, foodstuffs and
basic metals in that order.
Table 3.14 Composition of Exports and Imports ( percentage)
	
Year	 Export Components 	 Import components
	Crude Oil
	
Oil-Related	 Metal	 Food & Beverages Transports Mech. & Mac. Others
	
1970	 83.2	 16.5	 9.4	 31.6	 13.4	 18.5	 27.2
	
1971	 88.2	 11.7	 10.4	 29.9	 11.5	 18.5	 30.3
	
1972	 90.5	 9.2	 10.1	 25.9	 15.1	 20.7	 28.2
	
1973	 92.3	 7.4	 10.7	 23.4	 14.2	 21	 31.7
	
1974	 94.3	 5.5	 10.6	 19.9	 16.7	 19.7	 33
	
1975	 92.8	 6.5	 9.3	 15.5	 20.7	 19.4	 35
	
1976	 93.9	 5.8	 11.7	 11.5	 18.4	 24.3	 34
	
1977	 94.9	 4.8	 14.8	 10.4	 12.8	 27	 35
	
1978	 94.2	 5	 13.9	 11.3	 13.1	 28.7	 33
	
1979	 93.9	 5.2	 15.6	 12.8	 12.6	 27.6	 32.5
	
1980	 94.5	 4.7	 14.5	 14.1	 13.9	 24.4	 33
	
1981	 94.8	 4.4	 14.6	 14.5	 14.5	 25.4	 31
	
1982	 92.7	 6	 14.9	 13	 17.2	 25.5	 29.6
	
1983	 89.7	 8	 14.1	 12.2	 14.1	 26.7	 32.9
	
1984	 86.6	 10	 11.9	 15.8	 13.4	 23.9	 35
	
1985	 76	 18.4	 12	 15.1	 14.1	 20.9	 37.9
	
1986	 73	 17	 9.2	 16.8	 13.3	 20.7	 40
	
1987	 63.5	 24.5	 8.4	 17.1	 13.5	 19.1	 41.8
	
1988	 60.3	 22.6	 10	 16.1	 14.6	 19	 40.3
	
1989	 66.5	 18.4	 8.2	 15.9	 18.5	 18.4	 39
	
1990	 74.1	 16.2	 8.7	 14	 20.5	 16.4	 40.4
	
1991	 78.3	 13.4	 9.1	 13	 21	 19.4	 37.5
	
1992	 78.8	 10.2	 9	 10.6	 24	 21.1	 35.3
	
1993	 75.5	 15.6	 10.1	 10.8	 20.8	 21.3	 37
	
1994	 77.8	 11.2	 9.3	 12.9	 20.7	 20.7	 36.4
	
1995	 71	 20.2	 10.3	 12.5	 14.4	 21.9	 40.9
	
1996	 72.2	 16.4	 9.9	 12.2	 15.3	 21	 41.6
	
1997	 87.6	 1	 12.4	 9.0	 9.4	 15.5	 20	 46
ources: /M/k innuai epon, various years
Ministry of Planning, Achievements Development Plans, 1996
Parallel to the changes in the composition of the Kingdom's imports,
there was a geographical shift towards Japan and Western Europe, whose
shares in 1972 increased for the former from 14.3 percent and for the latter from
28.6 percent to become 20 and 43.7 percent respectively in 1984.
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Nevertheless, as Table 3.15 indicates, the US was the major single import
partner until 1984, when Japan became the leading import single supplier from
1984 until 1988 with the exception of 1986. The strength of the US dollar has
encouraged Saudi importers to shift to Japan.
Table 3.15	 Share of Major Saudi Import Partners ( Percentage)
Year	 US	 Japan	 UK	 Germany	 Italy	 W. Europe
1972	 19.5	 14.3	 7.3	 6.2	 4.1	 28.6
1973	 19.6	 15.7	 6.5	 6.4	 2.7	 28.9
1974	 22.6	 18.3	 7.6	 7.8	 3.6	 29.4
1975	 23.1	 20.7	 6.7	 8.7	 4.9	 29.2
1976	 18.7	 12.2	 5.9	 8.3	 4.9	 35.3
1977	 18.6	 11.6	 6.2	 8.4	 6.1	 37.6
1979	 20.7	 16.2	 8.1	 10.3	 8	 44.8
1980	 20	 17.9	 6.4	 9.0	 7.3	 43.1
1981	 21.6	 17.2	 6.8	 8.1	 6.7	 37.7
1982	 21	 19	 7	 11	 6	 39
1983	 19	 19	 6	 10	 8	 43.2
1984	 17	 20	 6	 8.0	 7	 43.7
1985	 17	 19	 6	 9.0	 7	 39
1986	 17	 16	 7	 8.0	 7	 38
1987	 15	 17	 8	 8.0	 7	 38
1988	 16.2	 16	 7.3	 7.2	 6.5	 40
1989	 18.2	 14.2	 10.2	 6.3	 5.7	 41.7
1990	 16.7	 15.3	 11.3	 7.4	 4.6	 44
1991	 22.2	 13.7	 11.3	 7.8	 4.6	 43
1992	 22.5	 14.2	 10.8	 7.4	 5	 40.7
1993	 20.6	 12.6	 11	 7.0	 5.1	 39.5
1994	 21.3	 11.7	 8.5	 8.3	 4.7	 39
1995	 22	 9	 8	 8.0	 4	 40.2
1996	 22	 9.1	 11.9	 7.7	 5.6	 39.4
1997	 22.2	 6.6	 10.5	 5.4	 4.6	 39.5
Sources: IMF, Staff Report, 1994, p.48
hlU, Uountry I-'rotile, 1994, p.64
The US was and still is the major single import partner, One can argue
that the reason for this is the existence of massive the American companies and
expertise working in the country and also the influence of American's style of life
on the majority of the Saudis graduating from US educational institutions.
Moreover, one cannot ignore the political influence and relations that have led
Saudi Arabia to select American products at the expense of the others.
3.5.2 Exports
Table 3.16 indicates how the absolute value of exports rises in response
to any changes in either oil prices or production or both. In this respect, the
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export value increased by 279 percent from SR 33,309 million in 1973 to reach
SR 126,223m in the following year, in 1981 they reached SR 405,481 million.
This drastic rise in export absolute values was attributed to the first and second
oil shocks resulting from the Arab-Israeli war and the Iranian revolution
respectively. The world recession took place in the early 1980s causing a fall in
oil prices, which reflected negatively on the Saudi export receipts declining by
33.1 percent in 1982. The downward trend in total exports continued, reaching
SR 74,377 million in 1986, the lowest export volume since 1973. As mentioned
earlier, the cause of this sharp decline was due to the Kingdom's abundance of
being a swing producer in the world oil market.
Historically, oil export receipts have accounted for the bulk of total export
revenues despite government endeavours to diversify the country's export
base. The crude oil exports consisted of more than 90 percent of the total
exports from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. Table 3.14 presents the crude
oil exports domination, which peaked in 1977 and 1981 at 94.9 percent and
94.8 percent respectively. In more recent years, petrochemicals in particular
and other manufacturing products reduced the crude oil dominance and their
shares reached their highest in 1987 and 1988 when their contribution rose 24.5
percent for petrochemicals in 1987and 17.1 percent for other manufacturing
products in 1988. This shift is attributed to two factors: the first and most
important is the relative success of the government's attempts to diversify the
economy towards a non-oil manufacturing base, whereas the second factor is
the fall of the oil export revenues, particularly from the mid-I 980s till 1990.
In terms of the oil exports contribution to the GDP, table 3.16 shows that
the average share was about 55 percent of the overall GDP until the early
1980s with the exception of the years following the oil-shocks in the early
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eighties and mid-seventies when the oil export revenues jumped leading to
higher participation of exports in the GDP. From the outset of the Iraqi-Kuwait
conflict until 1996, there was a steady contribution of exports ranging from the
highest of 42.4 percent in 1990 to the lowest of 35.5 percent of the total GDP in
1994.
Table 3.16 The Contribution of Export and Imports in the GDP
	
Year	 Nominal GDP	 Share of Exports	 Share of Imports
	
1969	 17399	 54.6	 19.4
	
1970	 22921	 47.6	 13.9
	
1971	 28258	 61.2	 13
	
1972	 40603	 56	 11.6
	
1973	 99314	 33.5	 7.4
	
1974	 139599	 90.4	 7.3
	
1975	 164526	 63.5	 14.2
	
1976	 205056	 66	 15
	
1977	 225401	 68	 23
	
1978	 249539	 55.4	 27.7
	
1979	 385807	 55.3	 21.3
	
1980	 520585	 69.7	 19.3
	
1981	 524720	 77.2	 22.7
	
1982	 415234	 65.3	 33.6
	
_____983	 372023	 42.6	 36
	
1984	 351397	 37.6	 33.8
	
1985	 313942	 31.6	 27.3
	
1986	 271091	 27.4	 26.1
	
1987	 275453	 31.5	 27.3
	
1988	 285145	 32	 28.6
	
1989	 310823	 34.2	 25.5
	
1990	 391994	 42.4	 23
	
1991	 442037	 40.4	 24.6
	
1992	 461398	 40.8	 27
	
1993	 443842	 358	 23.8
	
1994	 450065	 35.5	 19.4
	
1995	 469121	 40	 22.4
	
1996	 509284	 41.7	 20.4
	
1997	 513520	 42.8	 20.3
Source: Ministry of Planning, Achievements for Development Plans, 1990-1995.
:SAMA, Annual Report, 1999.
The geographical distribution of the Saudi exports confirms that the
major importers were Japan, Italy, France, Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom during the period from 1971 to 1974. The contribution of these
countries in the Saudi exports changed slightly due to the oil sanction
undertaken by some Arab oil exporters during the Arab-Israeli war and Japan
continued to be the leader of the Saudi export partners until 1988. In the
following until 1995, the US became the major partner importing from Saudi
96
Arabia with an average share of one fifth of the total Saudi exports. Table 3.17
shows how some Far-Eastern countries, particularly Singapore and South
Korea have increased their purchasing
Table 3.17 Geographical Destinations of Exports ( Percentage)
Year Japan W.Europe France Italy Holland Germany UK Asia* Korea Singapore US
1971	 16.1	 48.5	 9.6	 10.2	 9.1	 3.4	 8.7	 9.4	 Na	 Na	 3
1972	 15.1	 55.5	 9.3	 11.2	 11.9	 3.2	 8.1	 9.2	 1.8	 Na	 5
1973	 14.8	 52.4	 9.2	 10	 9.3	 3.3	 8	 10	 2.6	 Na	 5
1974	 16	 51.6	 11.5	 10.3	 2.6	 4.4	 9.3	 9.2	 2.6	 1.9	 4
1975	 19.6	 43.5	 10.8	 7.6	 5.1	 3.5	 6	 10.2	 2.1	 2.5	 4
1976	 20	 41.1	 11.5	 6.4	 5.1	 3.1	 4.9	 10.4	 1.9	 3.4	 5
1977	 19	 39.5	 9.6	 7.3	 5.3	 2.9	 4.2	 11.8	 2.5	 3.7	 10
1978	 20.2	 37.3	 10.7	 6.8	 4.4	 2.7	 3.4	 13.8	 Na	 Na	 16
1979	 17.3	 40.3	 8.4	 8.1	 5.5	 2.8	 3.3	 12.8	 Na	 Na	 17
1980	 17.4	 41.5	 9.2	 6.1	 6.8	 3	 3.5	 12.8	 3.2	 3.8	 15
1981	 17.2	 41.6	 9.5	 7.1	 5.6	 4.2	 3.4	 13.3	 3	 4.8	 13
1982	 23.8	 35	 9	 5	 4.8	 4.3	 2.9	 20	 3.9	 5.3	 8
1983	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na	 na
1984	 32.5	 20	 4.3	 4.6	 1.8	 1.8	 1.5	 20.3	 3.3	 5.4	 7
1985	 30	 24	 5	 3.8	 5.8	 2.1	 1.9	 14.8	 2	 3	 6
1986	 20.4	 32.2	 5.6	 7.6	 4.9	 3	 2.8	 11.2	 2	 2.7	 17
1987	 22.7	 22.1	 2.6	 4.1	 6.2	 1.4	 2.2	 16.4	 3.2	 5	 20
1988	 16.9	 23.3	 5	 3.2	 5.4	 2.3	 1.5	 16.8	 1.9	 5	 22
1989	 17.4	 21.5	 7.4	 4	 4.5	 0.9	 1.6	 16.3	 3.8	 5.4	 26
1990	 19	 18.4	 4.8	 3.6	 4.7	 0.6	 2	 17.3	 5.6	 5	 24
1991	 16	 21.3	 4.6	 4.3	 6.1	 0.6	 2	 17.7	 6.8	 5.2	 23
1992	 16.4	 22	 4.4	 4.1	 5.3	 1	 2	 19.6	 7.5	 4.9	 21
1993	 16.9	 23	 4.4	 5	 4.3	 1.2	 3.3	 20.9	 7.9	 7.9	 18
1994	 16.7	 22.8	 5.5	 2.9	 3.3	 1.2	 2	 29.8	 9.8	 5.3	 17
1995	 16.2	 22.4	 3.9	 3.9	 4.6	 1.2	 1.5	 25.6	 10.6	 7.9	 17
1996	 16.9	 20.3	 4.5	 3	 3.2	 1.3	 0.8	 21.3	 11.1	 6.4	 15
1997	 17.3	 19.2	 4.7	 3.8	 3.5	 1.2	 0.9	 28.1	 10.2	 6.9	 15.2
xcIuaIng japan anu me iviiaaie tast
Sources: SAMA, Annual Report, Various Years.
Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report,1994
Singapore is share rose in 1974 from 1.9 percent to its peak of 7.9 percent of
the Kingdom's total exports in 1996, while South Korea also increased its share
of purchasing Saudi exports, with the exception of 1988, from 1.8 percent in
1972 to 10.6 percent in 1996. Finally, one can expect a growth in the country's
exports when Saudi Arabia becomes a member of the TWO and the 125
members lift all constraints imposed on petrochemical products.
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3.5.3 Balance of Payments
Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a positive balance of trade every year since
the present statistical series began in 1961. The predominant influence on the
trade balance has been the trend in oil earnings, which historically have
accounted for the bulk of export receipts. It is no surprise that the country has
experienced a massive trade surplus during the two oil shocks. Table 3.18
shows how the trade balance in 1974 rose from $30,068 million, which was
more than seven times than that in 1973. Moreover, it peaked in 1981 at
$81 ,94lmillion. In the following year, due to a decline in oil revenues, the trade
balance began to decline dramatically to reach its lowest positive balance of
$3,060 million in 1986. However, in later years, an improvement in oil price took
place bringing about a gradual upward growth in the surplus to reach its peak
since 1981 of $31,196 million. In the 1990s, the rise in the trade surplus is
explained principally by the growth of oil demand resulting from the UN
embargo on Iraq, which encouraged the Saudi to increase their production of oil
from 5.064 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1989 to 8.118 mb/d in 1991 and
again to 8.331 mb/d in the following year. Thereby, the Kingdom's visible trade
surplus succeeded in offsetting the services and transfers deficits until 1983,
with the exception of 1978 when the visible trade surplus declined to $19,598
million from $28,137 million in 1977. However, the decade of the 1980s
witnessed adverse development in the world oil market which directly affected
the receipts side of the current account, and at the same time the disbursement
rose due to government commitments towards the financing of its development
as well as to the expansion of the private sector by the purchase of consumer
and capital goods.
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Table 3.18 Balance of Payments
(Current Million $)
Year Balance of Trade Services and Transfers Payments Capital Account and Reserves
1965	 748	 -632	 -775	 -116
1970	 1353	 -1250	 -1543	 -104
1971	 1844	 -870	 -1215	 -974
1972	 2876	 -787	 -1258	 -2089
1973	 4075	 -1545	 -2324	 -2530
1974	 30068	 -6973	 -9575	 -23095
1975	 23628	 -9319	 -12520	 -14309
1976	 28386	 -14104	 -18671	 -14282
1977	 28137	 -16231	 -22242	 -11906
1978	 19598	 -21813	 -28280	 2215
1979	 37101	 -25075	 -32792	 -12026
1980	 75156	 -32398	 -43665	 -42758
1981	 81941	 40813	 -56834	 -41128
1952	 39439	 -31966	 -50821	 -7573
1983	 12441	 -29291	 -49511	 16850
1984	 8868	 -27269	 -44867	 18401
1985	 7028	 -19963	 -36025	 12935
1986	 3060	 -14855	 -28798	 11795
1987	 4855	 -14630	 -27742	 9775
1988	 4511	 -11852	 -24658	 7341
1989	 9067	 -18619	 -31636	 9552
1990	 22723	 -26876	 -39275	 4153
1991	 21581	 -49218	 -60973	 27637
1992	 19908	 -37647	 -48623	 17739
1993	 16406	 -33675	 -43282	 17269
1994	 21175	 -31662	 -39155	 10487
1995	 24259	 -29585	 -38183	 5326
1996	 35207	 -34527	 -42589	 -680
1997	 33373	 -33120	 -43497	 -253
(-)indicates payment in the current account items, and outflow in the capital account items.
Sources: SAMA, Annual Report, 1998
Accordingly, the country's visible trade surplus since 1983 failed to offset
deficits resulting from debited payments and services. In nominal terms the
current account deficit was on a steadily downward trend until 1991 when it
reached the highest ever peak of $27,637 million, due to the huge government
spending related to the Gulf conflict. The sharp increase in the invisible deficit
coincided with the invasion of Kuwait and can be attributed to many factors: the
most influential factor was the big rise in government expenditure with regard to
the conflict, on providing more services and more foreign assistance for
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supporting Kuwait; the second factor was the private sector and the individual
outflows either through the Saudi citizens or through remittances transferred by
expatriate workers in the country; the third factor was the fall in government
investment abroad resulting from the low interest rates and reduction of official
assets held abroad. On the other side, the only other significant services inflow
were the earnings from Muslims coming to the holy mosques. Such an
exceptional case caused the deficit to rise sharply. Despite that, the invisible
trade deficit began to decline steadily, except in 1996 when the deficit increased
slightly due mainly to an increase in import services.
Generally speaking, causes of the permanent deficit of the current
account of the balance of payments including the deterioration in oil prices and
consequently oil revenues, are attributed mainly to the outflow of capital to pay
for services like military spending (included in the services' section in the
current account) and to foreign remittances. The deficit must be funded either
by drawing on official assets or, instead, through private capital inflows that
have been a major source of financing the current account deficit. The latter
alternative was recently undertaken when private capital inflows funded about
80 percent or more of the deficit (EIU, 1996-97).
One can conclude that the external sector is the key factor in the
structure of the country's economy. The high need for, and dependency on, oil
receipts have enabled Saudi Arabia, as one of the largest oil producers and
exporters in the world oil market, to have a vital role in the world economy.
Having such a role in the world economy derived from its oil finance and gained
through oil exports, has also facilitated the growth of imports needed for its
development process. This has made the country one of the major trading
partners of the industrialised countries. The massive increase in foreign-
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exchange reserves has put the country in a position to extend its foreign aid to
other countries and to take part in the operation of some international and
regional funds. The country's increased influence in the world economy
occurred particularly in the 1970s and 1980s.
3.6 The Oil Sector
The crucial and important role of the oil sector in the structure of the
kingdom's economy has been presented in the preceding sections through a
focus on its contribution and influence on the overall GDP, government
revenues and expenditures, the foreign sector, and on all aspects of the
country's development process. Therefore, in this chapter, less attention is paid
to the oil sector's impact on the rest of the sectors in the economy. On the other
hand, there is greater concentration on the oil sector in terms of production,
prices, reserves, and the stages of the oil industry's historical improvement. It is
worth highlighting the major features of the oil sector before dealing with other
aspects of it.
Obviously, characteristics of the oil sector are somewhat different from
those of other sectors in the Saudi Arabian economy. It is a capital-intensive
sector with highly skilled labour. By its nature, the oil industry is a highly
localised industry; it is located exclusively in the Eastern Province of the country
with the exception of the quantities of small super oil Arabian-Light discovered,
lately in the Middle Province. The oil sector is labelled as an enclave sector
regarding its partial isolation from the rest of sectors in terms of labour and
capital mobility. The only link the oil sector has, is the financial surplus and
cheap energy, which have supported and built the other sectors in the
economy.
1Qj
3.6.1- Oil discovery
The history of petroleum in Saudi Arabia started in 1923, when the King
granted the British company, General Eastern Petroleum Company, a
concession for the exploration of oil with an area of 36,000 miles in the Eastern
Province of the country. The failure to find oil after four years led the company
and the government to cancel the granted concession and the company to
discontinue payments to the Saudi government
The declining number of pilgrims, as the major source of government
income, during the Great Depression led to a desperate financial position which
reflected adversely on the economy of the newly-established country.
Therefore, King Abd Alaziz encouraged American oil companies to start
searching for oil on the mainland of the country. The discovery of oil in Bahrain,
which is near Saudi Arabia, in June 1932, by Standard Oil of California
(SOCAL), gave the oil company a ray of hope to explore the oil in Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, the King granted this company a concession to launch its
operations in 1932. Nevertheless, neither the Saudi officials nor the oil
companies were optimistic about finding commercial quantities in the desert.
The search for oil was strained in the violently hot desert and the oil was not
easy to find. However, four and a half years of intensive work came up with
unbelievably positive results. After six disappointing attempts, oil was found on
the seventh successful attempt with the lucky Seven Well in the Dammam
Dome in 1938. The dream became a reality when they realised that they had
found the world's richest oil field beneath the desert (Young, 1983).
SOCAL formed a subsidiary company called the California Arabian
Standard Oil Company (CASOC) to conduct operations in Saudi Arabia, but the
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name was latter changed, in 1944, to the Arabian American Company
(ARAMCO) with a concession period of sixty years.
The discovery of oil was accompanied by the beginning of World War II,
which interfered with the flow of supply and shipment to the oil market.
Nevertheless, the exploration continued and an oil refinery was built. Shortly
before the war's end, a refinery with a capacity of 50,000 barrels a day was on
stream in September 1945 (Young, 1983).
Moreover, in 1949, Saudi Arabia has granted a sixty-year petroleum
concession to the Getty Oil Company to explore oil in the neutral zone where
Saudi Arabia shared rights equally with Kuwait. This concession included the
company's right to explore and produce oil in territorial waters for a distance of
six miles. The agreement included better advantages for the government than
ARAMCO's did. These benefits included 25 percent of profit tax and 55 cents as
a royalty for each barrel produced, whilst ARAMCO did not pay taxes and
agreed only 21 cents for each barrel produced. Getty's production began with
11.6 million barrels in 1957 and rose to 28.7 million barrels in 1970 (Mansour,
1973). Later, another concession was granted to the Arabian Oil Company, a
subsidiary of the Japan Petroleum Trading Company, for forty years. The
drilling, in the offshore area of the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, started in 1959 and oil was discovered in 1960. The production
increased from 3.7 million barrels in 1961 to reach 62.7 million barrels in 1970
because of the demand for oil in Japan. On the other side of the country, in
1965, the Saudi government signed an agreement with the French-owned
Societe Auxiliare de Ia Regie Autonomes des Petroles (AUXIRAP) to explore for
petroleum in the Red Sea (Al-Farsy, 1982). Oil was not found, but instead gas
and liquid gas were discovered. However, the dominant oil-company was and
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still is ARAMCO in terms of production, refineries, concession areas,
employment, and exports. The involvement of Getty and the Arabian Oil
Company in the oil industry in comparison to ARAMCO is minimal. Finally, this
dominating oil company was bought by the Saudi Arabian government in 1980.
3.6.2 Oil Production and Reserves
As mentioned earlier, the daily assessments of crude oil prices and of oil
quantity produced from each country were firmly controlled by the major oil
companies. These companies determined the volume of production and the oil
prices unilaterally without consulting the host oil producing country. As a result
of this, among other factors, OPEC took on this controlling role at the end of the
1970s after tough negotiations and contentions with these companies. This will
be discussed later.
Saudi Arabia has become the largest crude oil producer in the world
since 1993 when its oil quota reached about 8.048 mb/d in comparison to
Russia and the US with 7.856 mb/d and 6.847 mb/d respectively (OPEC
bulletin, 1996, Table 3.19). The importance of ARAMCO stems from its
domination over the crude and refined oil produced in the country. Table 3.20
illustrates an example of the contributions of the three companies, which are
involved in producing crude oil in the total production. On the other hand, if any
reduction is undertaken, the leading company is sacrificed in favour of the other
two. In 1985, ARAMCO reduced its contribution to the lowest ever from 1,435
million barrels in 1984 to 1,110 million, whereas Getty had no changes and the
Arabian Oil Company reduced its production from 55.9 million to 47 million
barrels. The highest contribution for the latter companies was about 6.6 percent
of the total production in 1970, while the lowest share of these companies
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occurred in 1991 with as low a percentage as 1.2. Recently, the leading
company has dominated the crude oil production with a share of 98 percent.
Table 3.19 Crude Oil Production by Oil Companies Operating in the country
(In Million US Barrel)
	
Year	 Aramco	 Getty	 Arabian Oil	 % Aramco	 % Getty
	
1974	 2996	 29.8	 68.7	 96.8	 0.96
	
1975	 2492	 31.1	 59.5	 96.5	 2.3
	
1976	 3054	 29.7	 55.7	 97.3	 0,8
	
1977	 3291	 32	 34.8	 98	 0.95
	
1978	 2944	 29.5	 56.3	 97.2	 0.9
	
1979	 3377	 30.1	 72.7	 97	 1
	
1980	 3505	 28.5	 69.9	 99.3	 0.8
	
1981	 3513	 27.1	 40.1	 98.1	 0.8
	
1982	 2309	 23.6	 33.4	 97.6	 1
	
1983	 1597	 19.9	 51	 95.7	 1.3
	
1984	 1435	 24.8	 55.9	 94.7	 1.6
	
1985	 1110	 24.8	 47	 93.9	 2.1
	
1986	 1712	 24	 45	 96.6	 0.9
	
1987	 1457	 24	 48	 95.3	 1.6
	
_____ 1988
	
1804	 25	 34	 96.8	 1.4
	
1989	 1775	 24.5	 49.5	 96	 1.3
	
1990	 2284	 13.5	 42.6	 97.6	 0.6
	
1991	 2904	 37.5	 23.5	 98	 0.4
Source: Ministry of Plannina. Achievements for Develoøment Plans, 1995.
By taking a general look at the country's crude oil production since the oil
was discovered, one can recognise that the oil production followed an upward
trend until the beginning of 1981, with the exception of 1975 when the
production declined by 16.6 percent. The establishment of OPEC, the
nationalism which evolved in the 1960s, and the military conflicts effectively
contributed to dictate to the oil host countries, to some extent, to participate in
oil companies benefits and share in the oil policy determination decisions. This
caused a rise in the price and production of oil. Such an effort and its reactions
in the oil market will be discussed later.
However, the Saudi share of the total world oil production started to
decline from 1981 because of the world recession taking place as well as the
conservation of energy adopted by the industrialised countries. The slump in oil
production was more painful to the Saudis when they agreed to be a swing
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producer to the world oil market in 1982. Their daily production declined sharply
from 9.809 mb/d. in 1980 to 6.483 mbld. The reason behind that was that the
independent oil producers as well as the OPEC members increased their
production at the expense of the Saudi share in the oil market. Being a victim of
such a situation, particularly when the oil production reached 3.175 mb/d, would
hurt the people and the Saudi Arabian economy at the same time. Saudi Arabia
ceased to be a swing producer in 1986, when it regained its normal quota within
OPEC. The decision to quit led to a drastic deterioration of oil prices. OPEC
members took a collective decision to reduce each member's quota to varying
degrees, and therefore, the Saudi production declined again. However, the
recovery of the oil market took place causing the quota to rise gradually.
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces in 1990 caused a shortage
in oil supply and thus a rise in oil prices. As a result, the United Nation
requested that the Saudi government offset the halt in Kuwaiti and Iraqi exports
and increased their production from 5.090 mb/d in 1989 to 6.412 mb/d and
8.118 mb/d in 1990 and 1991 respectively. This episode led the Kingdom's
annual oil production to rise more than 62 percent between 1989 and 1991.
Since then, the determined production volume has varied slightly but the prices
have fluctuated in response to the daily-basis supply and demand mechanism,
the Saudi government policy and the constraint collective decision taken within
OPEC. The production of oil, with respect to OPEC and the total world
production is significantly influential due to the volume produced or the capacity
of oil production that allows the production of more than 10 mb/d. The daily
average production of 9.808 mb/d in 1981 gave the country its highest
contribution ever within OPEC at 43.6 percent, which was 17.5 percent of the
total world oil production. Table 3.20 shows the Saudi daily average production
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since the commencement of oil production in 1938 and the share of this
production within OPEC and the world since 1975.
Table 3.20 Saudi Arabian Oil production Since the Oil Discovery
(Thousands of Barrels)
Year	 Daily Average	 % change	 Year	 Daily Average	 % change
1938	 1.4	 1968	 3,042.90	 8.5
1939	 10.8	 671.4	 1969	 3,216.20	 5.7
1940	 13.9	 28.7	 1970	 3799.10	 18.1
1941	 11.8	 -15.1	 1971	 4,768.90	 25.5
1942	 12.4	 5.1	 1972	 6,016.30	 26.2
1943	 13.3	 7.3	 1973	 7,596.20	 26.3
1944	 21.3	 60.2	 1974	 8479.70	 11.6
1945	 58.4	 174.2	 1975	 7,075.40	 -16.6
1946	 164.2	 181.2	 1976	 8,577.20	 21.2
1947	 246.2	 49.9	 1977	 9,199.90	 7.3
1948	 390.3	 58.5	 1978	 8,301.10	 -9.8
1949	 476.7	 22.1	 1979	 9,532.60	 14.8
1950	 546.7	 14.7	 1980	 9,900.50	 3.9
1951	 761.5	 39.3	 1981	 9,808.00	 -0.9
1952	 824.8	 8.3	 1982	 6,483.00	 -33.9
1953	 844.6	 2.4	 1983	 4,539.40	 -30
1954	 961.8	 13.9	 1984	 4,079.10	 -10.1
1955	 976.6	 1.5	 1985	 3,175.00	 -22.2
1956	 1,002.80	 2.7	 1986	 4,784.20	 50.7
1957	 1,030.80	 2.8	 1987	 3,975.20	 -16.9
1958	 1,058.50	 2.7	 1988	 5,152.40	 28.1
1959	 1,152.70	 8.9	 1989	 5,064.50	 -0.5
1960	 1,313.50	 13.9	 1990	 6,412.50	 26.6
1961	 1,480.10	 12.7	 1991	 8,117.80	 26.6
1962	 1,642.90	 11	 1992	 8,331.70	 2.6
1963	 1,786.00	 8.7	 1993	 8,047.70	 -3.4
1964	 1,896.50	 6.2	 1994	 8,049.00	 0.0
1965	 2,205.30	 16.3	 1995	 8,023.40	 -0.3
1966	 2,601.80	 18	 1996	 8,102.30	 1
	
__________ _______________ __________	 1997	 8,102.30	 0.0
Sources OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin,1996
:SAMA, Annual Report, 1997
The role and importance of Saudi Arabia comes not from its current
position as the largest producer and exporter of oil in the world, but from the
enormity of the remaining oil reserves, as shown in table 3.21, Proven
announced reserves of 261,444 million barrels of crude oil are approximately 32
times the size of the 1996 production. At this level of production, the life-span of
reserves is about 88 years. Undoubtedly, the total reserves are expected to be
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more than what is indicated. In 1996, Saudi Arabia possessed and still does
about 25% of the world proven reserves, which accounted for 1,047 billion
barrels, and 32.6% of the OPEC reserves. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly has
suggested that Saudi proven and presumed reserves could reach about 600
billion barrels (BMI, Saudi Arabia, annual report, 1994).
Table 3.21 Proven Oil Reserves in Saudi Arabia,
the World, and OPEC Shares in World Reserves
(Million Barrels)
Year	 Saudi Reserves	 World Reserves	 Share of OPEC
1970	 138700	 549735	 73.2
1971	 138260	 569827	 75.6
1972	 137070	 579868	 73.5
1973	 136830	 580496	 72.5
1974	 141040	 654103	 74.5
1975	 170567	 624577	 71.9
1976	 167428	 633758	 71.6
1977	 164070	 636164	 70.4
1978	 168940	 626764	 70.7
1979	 166480	 635594	 68.5
1980	 168030	 656187	 66.2
1981	 167850	 670017	 65.4
1982	 165482	 697931	 67
1983	 168848	 706779	 67.2
1984	 171710	 742082	 68.7
1985	 171490	 767898	 69.8
1986	 169744	 870191	 73.9
1987	 169585	 899662	 74.9
1988	 254989	 991286	 76.7
1989	 260050	 997683	 77.2
1990	 260342	 998580	 76.7
1991	 260936	 1003725	 77
1992	 261203	 1010197	 76.6
1993	 261203	 1009821	 76.7
1994	 261374	 1019563	 76.2
1995	 261450	 1030212	 76.2
1996	 261444	 1047200	 76.6
1997	 261541	 1057078	 76.9
sources: OPEC, Statistical bulletin, 1985-1991
OAPEC, Statistical Report, 1979-80
Due to the kingdom's large oil reserves and its moderate stance on oil
price increases, it has been used during the past three decades to fill the gap
emerging from any shortfalls of other oil producers as happened during the
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Iranian Revolution in 1979 and finally in the last Gulf crisis in 1990-91. The high
correlation between the production and the market price or price system
requires that we look at oil prices from previous years as well as at present.
This will be discussed on the following pages.
3.6.3 Oil prices
Since the crude oil pricing was not and still is not determined
endogenously by oil-producing countries, one has to consider the development
of the pricing system in the oil market. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was obvious
that the major oil companies named the "Seven Sisters" (Exxon, BP, Shell,
Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, and Socal) were unilaterally controlling not only the price of
crude oil but also exploration, production, refining, transportation, and marketing
of almost all of the oil resources in the non-communist world. Therefore, it is no
surprise that these Seven Sisters were dominating about 98.3 percent of the
international oil trade in 1950 (Griffin and Teece, 1982). Accordingly, the price
of oil was administratively determined and changed by these integrated
companies regardless of whether the price was equal to the marginal cost and
regardless of the mechanism of supply and demand.
According to Griffin and Teece, in 1950, the difference between the
market price of $1.80 per barrel (p/b) and the payment accrued to the host
country of $0.60 p/b left a margin of about $1.20 p/b, including production cost
and profits. These large profits had tempted some private and state-owned oil
companies to enter the oil market to explore the oil in areas not included in the
major oil companies' original concessions.
Nevertheless, oil prices reached their highest level in 1957 when the
price for Arabian-Light was $2.08 p/b. Over the following three years, the price
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declined to $1.80 p/b in August 1960 (Skeet, lan, 1988). This decline was
traced to the US's imposition of oil import quotas and the expansion of the
Soviet Union's oil exports. The former caused large supplies from independent
companies resulting in a price discount in an effort to increase their share in the
crude oil market, whilst the latter was caused by the USSR's needs for foreign
exchange as well as its attempt to break the domination of the major oil
companies (Sampson, 1975). Therefore, this factor coupled with a rise in the
production in the non-communist world led to an oil market price's fall during the
period concerned. It is worth noting that the major oil companies were
determining tax and royalty payments to the host countries according to the
posted price rather than the realised price. Since the posted price was relatively
stable, the oil exporting countries were not influenced by fluctuations in their
incomes. If the actual price exceeded the posted price, that benefited the oil
companies interest at the expense of the oil exporting countries. On the other
hand, as the actual price declined, the gap between actual and posted prices
widened. To shift some of the burden of falling prices to the exporting countries,
the major oil companies reduced the posted prices without any consultation with
the governments of the oil-exporting countries. As a result of this, the major oil
companies reduced the posted prices in 1959 and 1960 by 10 and 7.5 percent
respectively (Al-Sultan, 1990). The rising of the nationalism in the Arab World
together with massive support from some of the oil exporting countries, notably
Venezuela and Iran, led to action to protect their countries from the major oil
companies' exploitations.
Five oil-exporting countries (Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela) who represented 90 percent of the crude oil trade in the
international market, met in Baghdad in 1960 and decided to establish the Oil
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This organisation admitted other oil
exporting countries such as Qatar in 1961, Libya in 1962, Indonesia in 1962,
Abu Dhabi in 1967, Algeria in 1969, Nigeria in 1971, Ecuador in 1973,and
Gabon in 1975 (Skeet, 1988). The immediate aim of such an organisation in
1960 was to stop any further reduction of oil prices, while further objectives
could be summarised as: (i) unification of the oil policies between the members
and safeguarding their interests individually and collectively; (ii) stabilising the
oil prices in international markets and eliminating any harmful and unnecessary
fluctuations; (iii) providing an efficient, economical, and regular supply of oil to
consumer countries coupled with a fair return on the members' capital for
investments in the oil industry (Al-Farsy, 1982). The ultimate and longer-term
aim was to gain the entire independence of the oil sector in the economy.
As a result, OPEC demanded that the major oil companies restore the
posted price to what it was prior to reduction, but the majors oil companies
ignored them and insisted on negotiating with OPEC members individually
rather than collectively. Table 3.22 indicates that OPEC failed to raise the oil
market prices but also failed to prevent the price from declining during the
1960s. This failure could be traced to the limited influence on the oil market
resulting from the oversupply of oil by independent companies as well as the
intention of each member of OPEC to maximise its output. The success of
OPEC over the domination of the oil-companies started in 1970 when Libya put
pressure on them to increase the posted price of 30 cents p/b and to set the tax
rate at 58 percent. The success of Libya was attributed to its high quality oil and
to its closure to the West as well as the fact the companies working there were
mainly independent companies (Al-Sultan, 1990). The oil companies agreed to
carry out these demands and thus other OPEC members adopted a resolution
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calling for a minimum of 55 percent tax rate and an increase in the posted price.
Table 3.22 Oil Posted and Market price for Arabian Light (API 34)
(in US Dollar)
Year	 Posted Price	 Market Price
1960	 1.80	 1.50
1965	 1.80	 1.27
1970	 1.80	 1.60
1971	 2.18	 1.65
1972	 2.45	 1.85
1973	 13.65	 4.10
1974	 10.40	 10.30
1975	 10.46	 10.46
1976	 11.51	 11.90
1977	 12.70	 12.68
1978	 12.70	 13.50
1979	 22.84	 38.17
1980	 31.22	 38.63
1981	 34.16	 33.73
1982	 33.80	 31.00
1983	 28.75	 28.38
1984	 28.75	 28.81
1985	 28.00	 27.86
1986	 27.83	 13.55
1987	 17.59	 17.10
1988	 17.44	 11.52
1989	 17.44	 17.15
1990	 17.61	 29.32
1991	 17.61	 18.93
1992	 17.61	 18.56
1993	 15.68	 15.68
1994	 15.39	 15.39
1995	 16.73	 16.73
1996	 19.91	 19.91
1997	 18.71	 18.71
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Achievements for Developments Plan, 1990-1995.
Al-Kholi, Oil Economics, 1992, p. 353.
Accordingly, negotiations with oil companies in Teheran and Tripoli in
1971 led the tax rate for the Persian Gulf states to rise to 55 percent and to a 30
cents increase in the posted price to $2.18 p/b, whereas the Mediterranean
nations success was to raise the posted price to $3.447 p/b. These price
settlements were subject to change due to inflation rate and the American dollar
exchange rate. Due to the devaluation of the US dollar in 1972 and 1973
resulting from the removal of US dollar convertibility into gold, the posted price
was raised by 8.5 percent and 12 percent respectively (Al-Roomy, 1987).
The posted crude price was determined by OPEC rather than by the oil
companies during the period from 1973 to 1986. This could be traced to many
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major economic, political and military events taking place during that period.
The first crucial event was the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, when
the Arab nation used oil as a weapon and boycotted oil to the US and
Netherlands causing the prices to jump to $12.7 p/b in 1978. The dramatic
change followed was the Iranian nationals' strike in 1978 causing a cut in their
production from 6 mb/d. to 2.3 mb/d. This cut and the success of the Iranian
revolution created a panic in the oil market causing a sharp increase in oil price
to $23.5 p/b in 1979. At the same time the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980,
and OECD strategies to raise their reserves, contributed to dramatic market
price jump to about $41 p/b in December 1980 (Al-Sultan, 1990).
In the mid-I 980s, the world demand for oil dropped due to many factors:
the first and most important was the increase of non-OPEC countries at the
expense of the OPEC share in the market. Table 3.23 shows that the share of
OPEC started to decline gradually during the period from 1979 to 1985, when
their share dropped from 29.898 mb/d to 17.315 mb/d respectively.
Table 3.23 World, OPEC and Some Non-OPEC Countries' Oil Production
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
The major non-OPEC countries contributing to the increase were notably the
USSR, the US, China, Mexico, the UK, China, and Norway. The other reasons
were the conservation policies adopted in industrialised countries after 1973,
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and the economic recession, which spread throughout the world economy
during the 1980s. The oil market became more competitive than it had been in
the mid-I 970s.
Moreover, the decline in their oil share of the market created competition
among the OPEC members to exceed their quotas. The price of oil dropped to
$29p/b in 1983 and was followed by another decline to $28 in 1985. OPEC
declared a price war against non-OPEC producers in 1985 in order to protect
their fair market share. Nevertheless, the price decreased to $20 p/b due to its
failure to control the oil prices. The price collapsed to less than $10 p/b in 1986
and remained around $11 to $13 in 1988. Peter Ellis Jones has suggested
some reasons behind the failure of OPEC in 1985. The first was that OPEC
thought that a reduction in posted prices would stimulate the demand for oil
without taking into consideration that the nature of the oil demand was less
elastic and its response to the price decline would be less effective. The second
reason was the OPEC's overestimation of the price decrease on the production
of the non-OPEC countries. Since the actual production cost is minimal, this
would not preclude the sales at the current price level. The third one was the
unwillingness of non-OPEC countries to co-operate with OPEC in terms of
pricing and production (Al-Sultan, 1990).
The suspension of oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait resulting from the
Kuwait invasion in 1990 led to a rise in the price oil again. Although Saudi
Arabia increased its production to offset the shortage in the oil market, the price
of oil reached $22.26 p/b and declined later when the market absorbed the
shock, remaining at an average of $16.5 p/b until 1995, and remained around
$18 p/b until the Asian Crisis took place (OPEC Statistical Bulletin, 1995, p.122)
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
The economy of Saudi Arabia, broadly speaking, can be divided
historically into four major stages. The first stage, which began in 1902 when
King Abd Alaziz regained power over the Riyadh region, lasted until the
discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1938. During this period, economic
activity outside Hejaz, where the Holy Cities are located, was confined to
livestock-raising by nomads, primitive agriculture and production of simple tools
by craftsmen, who lived in small towns around sources of water. The main
source of income for the government came from the annual influx of pilgrims
who arrived each year on their trek to Mecca. Other minor sources of income
included the customs charges and the two and half percent of income paid
annually by wealthy people to the government as Zakat. However, the limited
annual income had no impact whatsoever on the country's development base.
The second stage began with the discovery of oil on March 16, 1938.
This coincided with the beginning of World War II, which prevented the
government from fully developing the oil resources of the country and benefiting
from the inflow of money. By 1948, and for the first time, Saudi Arabia had
some, albeit limited, capital to invest in national development. Then, the
government started to organise and lead the process of economic development.
Consequently, from 1952 to 1970, the government managed to sustain steady
national development and economic growth at impressive rates. The GDP grew
by an average rate of 10.6 percent in current prices, physical infrastructure was
developed relatively rapidly; the educational and health services, were to some
extent, expanded. By 1970, the key structural characteristics of the expanding
Saudi Arabian economy could be clearly identified by two factors: the first was
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the inadequacy of infrastructural facilities and the shortage of manpower and
the second was the financial constraints (due to the control of oil marketing by
major oil companies) which dictated caution in setting the pace of future growth.
Hence, the government of Saudi Arabia introduced the technique of national
development planning, with the First Development Plan in the period 1970-75.
The most outstanding feature of the first plan comprised two elements. The first
was its success in raising the Kingdom's proportion of oil revenues, partly
through increasing the government's share of the ownership of the oil sector.
The second was the historic action taken by OPEC and OAPEC, which led not
only to an increase in the price of oil but also to changes in the system of
determining prices.
However, changes in the country's revenues were mainly affected by oil
earnings, reflecting daily crude oil production and international oil prices. This
high dependence on oil was the cause of most of the substantial economic
difficulties as the country underwent some extraordinary cycles of booms and
slumps. From 1973, the Saudi Arabian economy was subject to the third stage,
which ended in 1981, after two substantial oil boom shocks had taken place: the
first oil boom shock was caused, among other factors, by the Arab-Israeli War in
late 1973, while the second oil shock began with the Iranian Revolution in 1979
and ended with the oil price increases in 1981. During this period, all major
economic sectors grew rapidly, with the construction sector showing the largest
expansion, and the agricultural sector the smallest. In addition, the real GDP
showed remarkable growth at an average of 9 percent a year. The GDP was
determined principally by government spending which in turn, was determined
by budgetary developments. The aim of massive government spending was to
establish a viable modern economy at almost any cost. Since the Saudi
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currency was fixed to the US dollar, the rise in government spending was
accompanied by high rates of inflation, especially during the beginning years of
the oil boom period (1974-75).
In summary, Saudi Arabia succeeded in achieving its main development
objectives, detailed more fully in the Second Development Plan (1975-80).
These objectives included: (1) defending the country and maintaining internal
economic and social stability; (2) raising the people's living standard and
welfare through a high rate of balanced economic growth; (3) reducing
dependence on oil as a source of national income; (4) developing indigenous
human resources through education and health care; (5) building the physical
infrastructure required for the attainment of these goals. The oil boom period
was reversed by the decline in oil prices starting in 1982.
The fourth stage experienced by the Saudi Arabian economy began with
the decline in oil price and production from 1982 followed by the collapse of the
oil price in 1986. The causes of such a reverse were due to several factors:
namely the world recession, which followed the sharp increases in the oil price;
the conservation polices adopted, particularly by industrial countries; new oil
discoveries, particularly in the North Sea and Mexico and the expansion in the
non-OPEC countries' production. As a result, Saudi Arabia was severely
affected by such an oil price decline since it was the largest producer among
OPEC members. This was reflected in its GDP per head, which fell back from
$17,000 in 1981 to $5,500 before the invasion of Kuwait and rose nearly $7,000
from 1994 onwards. The rise in the Saudi population accompanied by a
reduction in subsidies led to emerging unemployment and a decline in national
welfare. The objective of internal and external stability was only achieved in
part, inflation rate was kept under control during the entire period after the first
117
oil boom, but the national budget and the balance of payments recorded
significant deficits from 1983.
However, the positive economic consequences of the oil slump were as
follows: government spending was rationalised and reduced; serious attempts
were made to diversify the economy; and successful policies were adopted to
hold down domestic prices.
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Chapter Four
The Theoretical Framework
4.1- Introduction
This study is concerned mainly with the theories of international trade and
open economy macroeconomics as they relate to the impact of a natural resource
boom and slump on the resource allocation in an economy. These two fields
provide economic models for analysing the impact of resource-earning changes on
an economy and examining policies which can be adopted by governments to
eliminate or to moderate the adverse side-effects of such changes. These
economic models depict the relationship between resource revenue fluctuations
and domestic absorption (consumption and investment), the real exchange rates
variability - or change in the relative prices- and the external and internal balances.
However, The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical effects of an
export boom and slump in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate
through achieving the following four objectives: firstly, to investigate the extent to
which a boom in a particular export sector (i.e., oil) affects the supply of the non-
traded goods sector at the expense of the supply of the traded goods sector;
secondly, in contrast to the first objective, to investigate the extent to which a
slump in an export sector can reallocate the domestic resources in favour of the
traded goods sector; thirdly, to show that a boom and slump in an economy are
associated with changes in the price of the non-traded goods sector relative to the
price of the traded goods sector and thus in the real exchange rates (appreciation
or depreciation); finally, from a policy point of view, to discuss government policy
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responses to fluctuations in a export sector with particular attention to the Saudi
Arabian case.
In sum, the overall goal of this chapter is to incorporate an examination of
both downward and upward theoretical effects on the domestic economy. To
achieve this, Corden and Neary's (1982) theoretical model has been adopted, with
some limitations, taking into account both the economic literature and the local
circumstances of Saudi Arabia. The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2
provides a brief review of previous studies and oil revenue movements during the
last three decades, while Section 4.3 presents a discussion of the theoretical
impact of the natural resource boom, based on Corden and Neary's (1982)
theoretical framework. The impact of the natural resource slump is examined in
section 4.4. Section 4.5 identifies the model constructed and looks at its structure.
In section 4.6, the macroeconomic effects of the external resource change are
provided, while the policy response is reviewed in section 4.7. Conclusion is
provided in section 4.8.
4.2 Previous Studies and Oil Revenues Movements
4.2.1 Previous Studies
Extensive studies have been conducted in order to examine the impact of a
resource boom on a small open economy. There is much historical evidence of
sectoral boom implications for the domestic economy. Forsyth and Nicholas (1983)
have pointed out that the flow of gold from the American colonies to Spain in the
sixteenth century caused negative consequences for the Spanish industries
(Corden, 1984). However, the development of direct studies related to the impact
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of a rise in a country's revenues on a domestic economy date from 1857.
According to GeIb (1988), Cairnes analysed the effects of the Australian gold
discovery on other sectors of the economy. He pointed out that the discovery of
gold in 1851 brought about an increase in gold prices, which transmitted to the rest
of the economy. Such a rise in all domestic prices led to a change in the country's
comparative advantage from producer of pastoral products to gold production.
Consequently, Australia switched from being a net exporter to a net importer of
agricultural products (GeIb, 1988). Moreover, the impact of German reparation
payments for damages in World War I on some economies was examined by
Keynes in 1920 (UI Haque, 1982).
Decades later, extensive studies had followed and a comprehensive
theoretical framework formulated, emphasising on the effects of a sectoral boom
on the rest of a domestic economy. These studies are largely related to
macroeconomic effects in developed countries. Examples of these studies are
those of Snape (1977), Barker and Braibusky (1981), Corden (1981,1984), Corden
and Neary (1982), Eastwood and Venables (1982), Enders and Harberger (1983),
Long (1983), Edwards and Aoki (1983), Neary and Wijinbergen (1986) among
others. The majority of these studies concentrate mainly on the impact of the
discovery of oil and natural gas on the economies of the UK, Netherlands, and
Norway.
Some theoretical models used in previous studies, have been developed to
be implemented, in the developing countries with slight assumption alterations.
These assumptions have taken into account the characteristics of the developing
countries such as unemployment, openness, the role of the private sector and the
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size of the financial market. Studies conducted into the cases for developing
countries focus mainly on the adverse side-effects either of a commodity price
boom such as that of coffee, tea, and cocoa in Columbia and Tanzania, or of a
natural resource boom such as that of oil, natural gas and minerals in Indonesia,
Kuwait, Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador and Saudi Arabia. Examples of these
theoretical and empirical studies are these of Corden and Warr (1981), Wijnbergen
(1984), Kamas (1986), Roemer (1985), Al-Sabah (1988), Looney (1990), Al-
Gaeed, (1991), and Fardmanesh (1991) among others1
On the other side of the coin, there is by now a growing literature, both
theoretical and empirical, on the study of the effects of a sectoral economic slump
on the rest of the economy. Although the impact of the boom periods, has attracted
a much greater literature. However, there are few theoretical and empirical
researches that have been conducted with regard to the economic consequences
of an oil price fall. The scarcity of these studies can be attributed either to treating
the impact of oil price decline as the same as the impact of oil price increase but in
reverse (the reverse Dutch disease), or to the potential business cycles of the
temporary oil boom. Moreover, the decline in oil price may have few negative
effects; indeed they are more likely to be positive on oil-importing countries.
Nevertheless, the studies related to the economic consequences of a lower oil
price can be divided into two categories. The first one is related to the impact of oil
fall on oil-exporting developed countries, notably the UK, such as those of Henry
and Herbert (1986) and Powell and Horton (1985). The second is related to the
impact of such declines on the economies of oil-exporting developing countries,
such as those of Mabro (1985), Evan (1986), Ibrahim (1987), Hammoudeh and Al-
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Barazi (1987), Afolab and Bladen-Hovell (1990) and Al-Yousuf (1990) among
others.
However, all the studies mentioned above concentrate either on the effects
of increased oil revenues or on declining revenues.
4.2.2 Oil Revenues Movements
Prior to the 1970s, there was no cohesive long-term national or global
energy policy. The major oil companies which had an oligopolistic hold over world
markets to a considerable extent determined pricing and production levels. Despite
the birth of OPEC in 1960, these companies continued to control and manage
almost all oil extraction, refining and marketing in the western world. Hence, there
were little practical differences between domestic and foreign oil markets
(Amuzegar, 1983). Thus, the posted oil price remained around 1.8 dollar per barrel
for the Arabian Light (API, 34 as an indicator for the oil pricing).
In the early 1970s, the role of OPEC increased and the relationship between
oil-exporting countries and the major oil companies underwent drastic changes.
These changes affected not only the process of oil price determination but also the
whole operation of the oil market. The sharp increases in crude oil price between
1973 and 1980 led to a massive increase in oil revenues of oil-exporting countries,
particularly countries with higher production capacity and higher oil reserves.
However, the causes of such a rise have been subject to debate among energy
economists. Four major theories (the property right theory, the target revenue
theory, the cartel theory and the market theory) explain the causes of such
increase in oil prices, which have been indicated in an earlier chapter2. On the
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other hand, the decline in oil prices started in 1982, bringing about a fall in oil-
exporting countries' oil revenues. The causes of this can be attributed to many
factors, the most important of which, are oversupply among both OPEC members
and non-OPEC oil-exporting countries, successful energy-conserving efforts, and
the encouragement for new oil discoveries as well as improvements and
exploitation of alternative resources. Declining demand for oil led OPEC for the first
time to assign production quotas to its members.
When OPEC started to gain control over the volume of production and price
determination, Its strength was severely tested, as it had hitherto been amenable
to substantial fluctuations in the world demand for oil. As a result of fluctuations in
oil prices, oil revenues had proved to be highly volatile, which induced sharp
external shocks and thus exceptionally large oscillations in the national income.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how oil prices fluctuated over the 1965-1 997 period.
This reflected directly on oil revenues and thus on the whole economy. Export
instability can be considered as a vital source of macroeconomic uncertainty in
developing countries. In Saudi Arabia in particular, the oil sector is the engine of the
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national economy and hence when oil revenues fluctuate, this reflects directly on its
foreign exchange earnings. The measures that are commonly used to assess the
level of dependence on oil exports are illustrated in Table 4.1. These measures
include the ratio of oil exports to total exports 3 oil exports to the GDP and the oil
exports to overall budget revenues. The fraction of oil exports constitutes an
average of 90 percent of total exports during the period from 1970 to 1990.
However, oil exports as a proportion of the GDP fluctuated sharply during the boom
and slump periods. In 1974 and 1980 following the boom, the ratio of oil export to
GOP reached its highest level of 99.9 and 74 percent respectively. On the other
hand, the ratio of oil exports to GOP fell to around 25 percent in the lowest slump
year in 1986 and so did the contribution to total revenues.
Such fluctuations have triggered significant economic structural changes.
The price increases in the middle and late seventies provided Saudi Arabia with
abundant financial resources, which were used to make substantial investments.
Yet, adverse effects outside the oil sector, which served to lessen its benefits, often
paralleled the oil boom. The patterns of the government and consumers' spending
during the prosperity period led to a contraction of the traded sector in favour of the
non-traded sector. On the other hand, when Saudi Arabia was hit by the
consequences of the slump of oil revenues in the early eighties, the economy was
skewed and structurally unbalanced. Therefore, the emergence of the new
downward trend was similar to the earlier trend but in reverse, i.e., an expansion of
the manufacturing and agricultural sector at the expense of the services and other
non-traded sectors.
125
Finally, to trace the various consequences of the fluctuations of the natural
resource foreign exchange receipts on a domestic economy, it is necessary to
examine the macroeconomic implication of the boom and slump separately in a
static framework.
Table 4.1 The Role of Oil in the Saudi Arabian Domestic Economy, 1970-1 990
(In Saudi million current Riyals)
Year Oil Exports Total Exports OX/TX OXIGDP Oil Revenues* Other Revenues*
OX	 TX	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)
1970	 10879	 10907	 99.7	 56	 88.5	 11.5
1971	 17065	 17092	 99.8	 68	 86.8	 13.2
1972	 22701	 22761	 99.7	 72	 88.0	 12.0
1973	 33197	 33309	 99.7	 50	 92.1	 7.90
1974	 125939	 126233	 99.8	 99.9	 94.1	 5.90
1975	 103374	 104412	 99.3	 66	 92.3	 7.70
1976	 134695	 135152	 99.7	 71	 89.7	 10.3
1977	 152665	 153209	 99.6	 69	 88.2	 11.8
1978	 137112	 138242	 99.2	 56	 87.4	 12.6
1979	 211244	 213183	 99.1	 65	 89.0	 11.0
1980 359865	 362886	 99.2	 74	 91.2	 8.80
1981	 402511	 405481	 99.3	 72	 90.1	 9.90
1982	 267806	 271090	 98.8	 59	 81.1	 18.9
1983	 154879	 158444	 97.3	 42	 72.0	 28.0
1984	 127860	 132299	 96.6	 37	 70.6	 29.4
1985 93947	 99536	 94.4	 30	 67.4	 32.6
1986	 66887	 74377	 89.9	 25	 58.2	 41.8
1987	 76499	 86880	 88.1	 28	 64.9	 35.1
1988	 75667	 91288	 82.3	 27	 63.6	 36.4
1989	 90235	 106294	 81.5	 30	 66.2	 33.8
1990	 150226	 166339	 83.8	 30	 76.4	 23.6
1991	 162764	 178624	 91.1	 37	 76.4	 23.6
1992	 173752	 188425	 92.2	 38	 76.8	 23.2
1993	 144202	 158770	 90.8	 32	 74.9	 25.1
1994	 142401	 159590	 89.2	 32	 74.0	 26.0
1995	 162593	 187403	 86.8	 34	 72.2	 27.8
1996	 202638	 227428	 89.1	 38	 75.9	 24.1
1997	 199172	 227443	 87.6	 36	 77.9	 22.1
*percentage Distribution of Government Revenues.
Source: Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, Achievements of the Development Plans (1970-1993)
:SAMA, Annual Report, 1999.
4.3 The Theoretical Impact of a Natural Resource Boom
Corden (1984) considers three causes leading to a sectoral boom: (i) a
once-and for-all technical improvement that causes a reduction in production cost
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in that sector: Ireland, Japan and Switzerland are examples of such;(ii) discovery of
new resources that leads to a boom in that sector: natural gas in the Netherlands
and oil in the UK are good examples; (iii) a rise in a price of a product in high
demand in world markets relative to importable prices: the striking example here is
the increase in energy in the 1970s as well as the increase in some primary
commodity prices such as coffee in the 1970s. Roemer (1985) has included capital
inflows as another cause of sectoral booms. Capital inflows can cause this via: (a)
the remittances from overseas migrants as happens in Bangladesh, Turkey,
Yemen, and Egypt; (b) high interest rate attracting flow of capital in as happened in
the US in 1982-84 and: (c) large reparations such as occurred in the 1920s when
Germany compensated France for damage in World War I (Roemer, 1985). One
can argue that the capital inflows in Roemer's examples cannot have the same
major impacts as new oil or gas discoveries can in relation to the size of the foreign
exchange obtained and the period of the continuity involved.
Broadly speaking, a boom represents, on the one hand, a significant rise in
the national income and thus opportunities for an accelerated development of
domestic economy and a rising standard of living for the people. On the other
hand, economic structural changes may take place through changes in the relative
price and thus the real exchange rates. This outcome affects the output of the
traditional traded sector (agricultural and manufacturing sectors) negatively and the
output of the non-traded sector (services) positively. As mentioned in Chapter two,
the adverse side-effect of the boom is referred to as a Dutch disease problem as
this emerged after the Slochtern gas field discovery in the Netherlands in the
1960s. Increased energy prices and a strong Guilder followed. Despite the welfare
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gains resulting from the significant increases in Holland's national income as well
as an improvement in the balance of payments, there were major problems
associated with the beneficial effects. Edwards and Aoki defined this phenomenon
as follows:
An increase in the price or production of a commodity export results in a real
appreciation of the exchange rate, and in a loss of competitiveness of the
traditional (non-oil) tradable goods sector. This phenomenon has also referred to
as de-industrialisation or tradable-squeeze effects (Edwards and Aoki, 1983,
p.220).
Most analytical approaches dealing with this phenomenon are either through
the Australian or the Scandinavian models. The Australian model is based on the
"dependent economy" model, which has its origins in the writings of Salter (1959)
and Swan (1960) in the Australian trade literature. Such a model assumes that the
economy is a price-taker in the world market for exportables and importables and
thus the terms of trade are exogenously determined. Further, it distinguishes
between tradables and non-tradables with wage and price flexibility in order to
ensure fullemployment in the economy. On the other hand, the Scandinavian
model developed by Aukrust (1977) captures the essential aspects of the price
adjustment mechanism in relation to external shocks (Dornbusch, 1980). It is a
model of inflation distinguishing between sheltered (non-tradables) and exposed
(tradables) industries on the basis of a production function, which depends only on
the level of employment of labour with constant returns to scale. The approach
used in this study is of an open dependent economy. It is an extension of the two-
sector economy in the Australian tradition when labour is assumed to be the only
input while capital is fixed in addition to factor specific to each sector.
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4.3.1 The Static Effects of a Resource Boom
The simplest general equilibrium model in which the static effects of a
resource boom can be analysed based on the basic model developed by Corden
and Neary (1982). Since a natural resource boom is considered to be sizeable and
temporary, the analysis will be of a short-run nature. This implies a negligence of
the depletion policy and thus the cost of extraction. Moreover, the economy is
assumed to be small and open. It has three sectors: the booming traded sector (B),
the non-booming traded sector (T) and the non-traded sector (N). Tradables
consist of all exportables and importables, whose prices are determined
exogenously in international markets, while non-tradables prices are determined
endogenously through interactions between domestic supply and demand.
However, all goods in the three sectors are assumed to be normal goods and
produced according to a neo-classical production function with two factors of
production: labour and capital. This can be expressed as:
Y= F(L, K)
Where Y, L and K represent total output (GNP), labour and capital respectively.
Each sector in the economy is restricted by a factor specific to that sector and by
labour. The labour factor is assumed to move freely between the three sectors,
while capital is immobile between them.
The pre-boom equilibrium condition in such an economy is assumed
through the labour and commodity markets' equilibrium conditions. This implies
that the economy operates under internal and external balance. The external
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balance requires a balance in the balance of payments current account where the
value of export (X) is identical to those of imports (M):
X=M
Internal balance means that resources are fully employed. Hence, the potential
output (Y*) is equal to actual output (Y):
Y*=Y
One can also state that income must coincide with domestic expenditure:
Y=c
On the income side, the national income can be expressed as the sum of total
outputs of all sectors as follows:
Y= PnYn+PtYt+PoYo
where Pn, Pt and Po are prices of non-tradables, tradables and oil goods
respectively, while, Yn, Yt and Yo are outputs of non-tradables, tradables and oil
respectively. On the other hand, the expenditure side includes spending in the non-
tradable and tradable goods. Spending in oil will be excluded due to the
assumption of confining oil for exports rather than for home consumption. This can
be expressed as:
C = PnCn + PtCt
Where Cn and Ct represent the consumption of nontradable and tradable goods
respectively.
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A rise in oil price or production, under a fixed exchange rate, leads to an
increase in oil export foreign exchange earnings, as transfers from abroad cause
the national income to rise, If the extra income is saved or invested abroad, no
structural adjustments in the economy are needed as long as the economy is
experiencing equilibrium. Such an outcome can be attributed to the continuity of
internal balances (so far as there is no change in non-traded goods' output) as well
as in external balances (the surplus on the current account is matched by a deficit
on the capital account). In other words, the income elasticity is equal to zero and
the slope of the relative price remains unchanged. Practically, this choice cannot
easily be adopted due to economic (development requirements) and social
(sharing benefits of the oil windfall) needs. Alternatively, the extra income that
resulted from the oil boom should be transmitted to the domestic economy partially
or entirely. As mostly happens, the extra income spent domestically will be
followed by structural adjustments in the domestic economy in order to
accommodate a higher real income obtained. These adjustments can be observed
through the role of spending and resource movement effects in the economy.
1-The Spending Effect of the Resource Boom
Initially, the pre-boom equilibrium condition in the economy is assumed. In
addition, the market for non-traded goods clears instantly, where non-traded goods
domestic output is required to be equal to the non-traded goods consumption. This
equilibrium condition can be written as:
Yn (Pn/Pt) = Cn (Pn/Pt, Y)
where	 8Yn/Pn/Pt> 0 and 6Cn/6Pn/Pt< 0, Cn/6Y> 0
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Here, Pn/Pt represents the relative price of non-traded to traded goods. The output
of non-traded goods depends positively on the relative price, while the demand for
non-traded goods depends negatively on the relative price and positively on the
real income measured in terms of tradables. Therefore, equilibrium in the
commodity market is brought about by adjustment of the relative price of non-
traded to traded goods. Hence, the relative price and thus the real exchange rate is
a key variable in this economy.
Under a fixed exchange rate, the increment in income warranted by a higher
price or production of a natural resource (such as oil) will cause domestic spending
and thus aggregate demand to rise for both sectors. As a consequence, the short-
run response to higher demand for non-traded goods has to be satisfied by an
increase in its output. Otherwise, with a constant relative price, the domestic
economy will experience a disequilibrium condition since the consumption of non-
traded goods is greater than its production. To restore equilibrium, the excess
demand will be dampened by an increase in the price of non-traded goods. As a
corollary of a higher price of non-traded goods, an appreciation of exchange rate
takes place. Such an outcome leads to an expansion in the non-traded goods
sector. In the traded goods sector, it is the higher demand for tradables that brings
about an increase in its output as the relative price remains unchanged. As might
be expected to restore the balance in the economy, the higher relative price of non-
traded goods will create an appreciation of exchange rate and make the domestic
products more expensive than those produced abroad. As a result, imports rise
and the output of traded goods shrink owing to the spending effect.
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The implications of such changes for the patterns of output and relative
price in the economy can be illustrated by using Salter's (1959) diagram. In Figure
4.2a, all traded goods' output (booming and non-booming traded sectors) is
measured on the vertical axis, while the non-traded goods output is measured on
the horizontal axis. Domestic resources are fully utilised along the production
possibility curve PPC, denoted by TN. The domestic economy experiences
equilibrium at point A, where: (i) producers maximise their profits by setting the
marginal rate of the transformation curve equals to the slope of relative prices (P0).
The relative price line (Po) shows at which the tradables and tradables can be
exchanged; (ii) the utility maximisation requires that the slope of collective
indifference curve (Uo) is equal to the slope of relative prices (Po). The income-
expansion path, denoted by Do curve, shows the combination of tradables and
non-tradables demanded as income increases. This curve is assumed to be
positive due to the normality of all goods in the economy. In addition, it has a
decreasing slope to denote the higher income elasticity of demand for non-traded
than for traded goods (although some empirical studies reveal a small difference
between the two elasticities (Morely, 1989). Hence, the economy, without oil price
increases, enjoys equilibrium at point A, where the quantity demanded and
produced for all composite goods are equal, denoted by ONo for non-traded and
OTo for traded goods sectors. A rise in natural resource foreign exchange earnings,
given the relative price, will shift the PPC vertically upwards from NT to NTI. The
windfall is equivalent to the 111 assuming that the output of non-traded goods in
the short-run is unchanged. This is attributable to the fact that the natural resource,
particularly the petroleum industry, is assumed not to use any domestic inputs
(Neary and Wijnbergen, 1986).
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The Impact of the Spending Effect of a Boom on the Commodity Market
However, when oil revenues is spent partially or entirely in the domestic economy,
the equilibrium point, assuming a fixed relative price of non-tradables versus
tradables (Pn/Pt), moves from point A to point C.
Since the relative price is held constant and in turn the slope of the price line
(P1) at point C, is equal to the slope of the relative price line (P0) at point A, the
desired consumption is determined at point F, where the new indifference curve
(Ui) is tangent to the relative price (P1) and to the income-expansion path. Hence,
the domestic economy at point C would be in a disequilibrium condition, because,
at point F, there is an excess demand for non-traded goods, denoted by BE
exceeding its production of ONo. Whereas the excess demand for tradables,
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denoted by AB, is an excess of its production at To (BC represents the surplus in
the current account). Consequently, in traded goods sector, the excess demand for
tradables is satisfied by increased imports since the price of tradables is
determined exogenously and hence its price will not change. On the other hand,
with respect to the fullemployment assumption, the excess demand for
nontradables leads to raise its prices. This induces the relative price of non-traded
to traded goods (Pn/Pt) to go up and thus the exchange rate of the domestic
currency appreciates.
An increase of the Pn/Pt leads to three consequences: (a) on the supply
side, an expansion in the production of nontradables due to the higher profitability
obtained from a rise in its price; (b) on the demand side, a higher relative price
dampens the demand for nontradables; (c) the slope of the Pn/Pt becomes
steeper than it has been before. A degree of change in the slope depends mainly
upon the strength of the income and substitution effects affecting the nontradable
sector. Thereby, the impact of substitution and income effects is replaced by
Corden and Neary (1986) by using a terminology of the spending and the resource
movement effects. However, the rise in the Pn/Pt eliminates the excess demand
for nontradables and excess supply of tradables. In Figure 4.2b, the initial income-
expansion path, Do, moves upward to Dl (resulting from higher income), and the
most profitable production blend moves clockwise along the upper PPC. The
equilibrium condition is restored at a point located between F (excess demand for
nontradables) and point C (excess supply of tradable by AB) and where the slope
of relative price P2 is tangent to the upper PPC and intersects with the demand
curve Dl at point K. The location of point K is determined by size of the income
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and substitution effects4. As shown in Figure 4.2b, the impact of the spending
effect on the commodity market can identified by: (a) an expansion of the
production of the nontradables from its initial position of No to N2 and (b) a
deterioration of the domestic, tradable production from To to T3. Hence, de-
industrialisation (or increased in imports) results from the impact of the spending
effect causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate rather than from resource
movement within the economy.
Having discussed changes in the commodity market, one should depict
what would happen in the labour market. In Figure 4.3, the vertical line measures
the wage in terms of tradable goods, while the horizontal line SM measures the
labour input for producing non-tradable and manufacturing goods' outputs. The
output of non-traded goods is measured from the left to the right, whereas the
manufacturing is measured from the right to left. The traded goods sector is divided
into booming and manufacturing industries in order to examine the spending and
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Figure 4.3 The Impact of Spending Effect on the Labour Market
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resource movement effects resulting from a boom in the manufacturing industry.
Lb, Lm and Ln represent the demand curves for booming, manufacturing and non-
traded goods respectively. These are downward sloping curves depicting the
inverse relationship between the wage and the demand for labour.
The equilibrium condition is at point A, where the output of non-traded and
manufacturing sectors is SS0 and MMo respectively. When a boom takes place,
the price of non-traded goods rises and the demand for labour will increases
causing the demand curve for labour to shift upwards to Lnl. The final equilibrium
will be at point Z. As a result, the wage rises to WI, which reduces the
manufacturing output from Mo to Ml and increases the output of non-traded goods
from So to SI. This leads to a deterioration in the manufacturing sector at the
expense of an expansion in the non-traded sector. This is owing to a real
appreciation of real exchange rate resulting from the spending effect.
2-The Resource Movement Effect of the Resource Boom
The previous analysis deals with an enclave type of economy, which implies
that no resource movement is involved as a result of a natural resource boom. To
examine what would happen when the booming sector is expected not to be an
enclave, it is worth noting that each sector is assumed to have its own single
specific factor in additional to the labour, which is intersectorally mobile. With such
specifications, the equilibrium condition of the spending effect can be rearranged in
the commodity market as5
Yn =Yn (q/W) = Cn (q, Y) and	 Yt = Yt(W) = Ct (q, Y)
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Where aYn/a(qIW) > 0, Cn/q <0, and oCnIaY> 0, 3Yt/ÔW < 0, aCtlaq <0, and
actiia''> 0
q represents the relative price of non-traded to traded goods, while W denotes the
wage rate measured in terms of traded goods. In these two equations, there are
two endogenous variables, q and W. In the non-traded goods sector, the output
depends positively on the ratio of the relative price to the wage rate in terms of
traded goods, whereas the traded goods output depends negatively on the wage
rate. The equilibrium condition emerging from the labour-market clearing
L = Ln(q/W) + Lt (W) + Lb (W)
Here L is the total labour supply, which is assumed to be fixed, while Ln, Lt and Lb
are the labour demand functions for non-traded, non-booming traded and booming
sectors respectively.
A rise in the natural resource export price, at a constant wage, will raise the
profitability in the booming sector and thus the demand for labour. Such an
outcome induces a movement of labour out of both the traded and non-traded
sectors towards the booming sector. This effect reveals two directions of labour
mobility:
(a) The movement of labour out of non-booming traded goods towards the
booming sector, resulting from a higher wages, will induce a contraction in the
output of the traded goods sector. Corden (1984) terms this result "the direct de-
industrialisation effect". However, the fall in the non-booming traded sector
(manufacturing and agricultural sectors) does not involve any connection with the
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non-traded market. Moreover, that does not require any changes in the relative
prices and the real exchange rate. Figure 4.4, shows that the equilibrium is at point
A, where the wage is represented by Wo, and demand for labour traded and
nontraded sectors are at points So and Mo. The increase in the wage of the
booming sector tends to attract more labour from the traded to its own sector. This
can be seen by shifting the labour demand curve for the booming sector upwards
to LbI, causing the wage to go up to WI and in turn contracting the output of the
manufacturing sector from MM0 to MMI. However, the slope of Lb, Ln and Lm
determines the quantity changes in their sectors.
(b) The movement of labour out of the non-traded goods sector towards the
booming sector, at constant relative prices, will dampen its production from SSo to
SSI, since the non-traded market is subject to the interaction between the
domestic supply and demand.
Figure 4.4 shows that the non-traded production declined below its initial
labour market equilibrium point at So. As resource movements cause a fall in non-
traded supply below its balanced position, this requires that the nominal wage
resulting from the excess demand will rise to W2, and so will the price of non-
traded goods. The outcome is that the real wage (W/Pn) rises, attracting more
labour to that sector causing Lno to shift upward to LnI, and output will expand to
S2, where the equilibrium point becomes at B, when the rise in nominal wage
exceeds the increase in its own price. If otherwise, the production, will fall.
However, the rise in the relative price of non-traded goods will lead to appreciation
bringing about additional movement of labour out of traded goods to the non-traded
goods sector. This deterioration in the production of traded goods causes further
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de-industrialisation, where MI moves to M2. This is called "indirect
industrialisation" (Corden, 1984, p. 361).
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Figure 4.4 The Impact of the Resource Movement Effect on the Labour Market
Combining the spending and resource movement effects, one can observe
from Figure 4.5 that relative price (Pn/Pt) denoted by q is measured on the vertical
axis, while the horizontal axis represents the output of demand for non-traded
goods measured from left to right, and the non-booming traded sector output is
measured from right to left.
To sum up, the impact of the two effects resulting from the resource boom
on the domestic economy will have the following consequences: (I) the two effects,
resource movement and spending effects, tend to reduce the employment and
output of non-booming traded sectors. The spending effect raises the relative price
of non-traded goods and thus generates appreciation in the exchange rate. This is
illustrated by the upward shifting of the demand curve for non-tradables from Dno
to Dnl, leading to contraction of the manufacturing sector from Mo to MI, while the
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resource movement has two directions to affect the production of tradables. The
expansion in the booming sector draws labour out of tradables and the rise in the
Figure 4.5 The Combined Spending and Resource Movement Effects
price of non-tradables results from a lack of supply due to labour movement to the
booming sector; (ii) the resource movement tends to raise employment and output
of the booming sector, while the spending effect tends to do the reverse; (iii) the
two effects implication on the non-traded goods, however, have opposite impacts.
The spending effect raises the output of non-traded goods from No to Ni (as Pn/Pt
rises), while the resource movement tends to lower it from No to N2 (as labour
moves out to the booming sector). The net effect depends on which of the two
effects are stronger. If the compensated own-price and income elasticity of
demand is stronger than the resource movement impact, the output of non-traded
goods expands. If otherwise, the production will shrink.
With regard to oil as a capital-intensive sector, which employs a negligible
fraction of labour, this implies that a concentration will be mainly on the spending
effect only. Consequently, the key variable in the domestic economy will be the
mechanism of the relative prices of the non-traded to the traded goods sector.
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Assuming the relative price adjusts to clear the non-traded market, the relative
price can be written as:
Pn=Pn(W, Pt; OR)
where	 aPn/aW, aPn/aPt and oPn/aOR > 0
OR represents oil revenues. The increase in the money wage (W), given the price
of traded goods, will generate an excess demand for non-traded goods. However,
the increase in the demand for labour, which raises the money wage, will in turn
affect the relative price positively. On the other hand, higher oil revenues raise the
money supply as well as the expenditures in non-traded goods. This will affect the
relative price positively. Moreover, the output of traded goods can be written as
follows:
Yt=Yt(W, Pt;OR)
Where	 YtThW <0, aYtThPt> 0, and Yt/OR < 0
The increase in the money wage is expected, ceteris paribus, to lower the
demand for labour resulting from a reduction in the real output of tradables. An
increase in the price of traded goods has a negative effect on the output of the
traded sector. Assuming there is no government subsidy, oil revenues have a
negative impact on the traded sector. As expenditures rise, the relative price of
non-traded goods, and thus the marginal revenue product in the non-traded sector,
stimulates the labour migration from the traded sector to the non-traded sector.
With the absence of government subsidy, the firms cannot pay higher wages,
which raise its production cost since its price is linked with the international market
rather than with the domestic market. Finally, the output of the non-traded sector
can be written as follows:
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Yn = Yn (W/Pi, Pn; OR)
Where W/Pi represents the real wage with regard to the price of i sector.
ôYn/âW/Pi>or<O, öYnThPn>O, and aYn/aOR>O
The output of non-traded goods varies regarding how the real wage is measured. If
the wage is deflated by the price of traded goods, the increase in the nominal
wage, given the price of traded goods, will reduce the output of non-traded goods
as the real wage increases. However, if the wage is measured in terms of non-
traded goods price, the output may rise as the relative price increases. This
outcome is due to a decline in real wage (W/Pn as Pn rises), which stimulates the
production of non-traded goods and thus increases the labour employed in this
sector. Regarding the price of non-traded goods and oil revenues, both variables
affect the production of non-traded goods positively. Consequently, the spending
effect causes the output of the non-traded goods sector to expand (as Pn rises),
while both effects are undetermined as explained earlier.
4.4- The Theoretical Impact of a Natural Resource Slump
Almost all major oil-exporting countries have two major features in common.
First, their oil and non-oil incomes are taxed at different rates. Second, the change
in their oil revenues has an immediate impact on the balance of payments current
account (Persaran, 1984, p.254). Hence, it is to be expected that a decline in
commodity prices will have its impact, to different degrees, on an economy,
particularly on countries with the least diversified production structure. This is due
to the fact that these countries depend on primary commodities for the bulk of
exports earnings. In oil-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia the decline of oil
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export revenues has affected the domestic economy severely. The negative effects
of the oil price collapse are strong and widespread. Therefore, the decline in oil
receipts has resulted in austerity budgets, which in turn has had a substantial
negative impact on government spending. Allocations for all the major sectors have
been cut sharply, with the largest reduction observed for the infrastructure and
municipal services (Sid-Ahmed, 1990, p.31). On the other hand, the drastic decline
in oil prices may have some positive implications for the economy, with less
concentration on the oil and non-tradable sectors.
Taking into consideration all assumptions implemented above in the
resource boom analysis, and under a fixed exchange rate, a decline in the natural
resource (denoted oil) price or production causes a fall in foreign exchange yields
obtained as transfer from abroad. Therefore, a downtrend of national will be
accompanied by a decline in oil revenues. If borrowing from abroad and/or drawing
out some of their international reserves are chosen in order to compensate for the
shortfall in oil earnings, no adjustments are needed since the economy maintains
an internal and external economic balance, Internal balance implies that there are
no changes in the non-traded goods market (the price level remains unchanged).
External balance is achieved as the deficit in the current account is matched by a
surplus in the capital account. Therefore, the income elasticity is zero and the
slope of the new relative price (P1) remains unchanged from the old one (Po). In
contrast, if the deterioration in oil revenues is allowed to transmit to the domestic
economy, the economy faces structural changes causing a disequilibrium
condition. Such an outcome requires adjustments to be implemented in order to
obtain equilibrium. These adjustments resulting from changes in the relative prices
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can be put into practice via the role of spending and resource movement effects on
the domestic economy.
1- The Spending Effect of the Natural Resource Slump
The mechanism of the relative price of non-traded goods has a prominent
role in the economy that experiences fluctuations in its external sector (oil). Given
the assumption that the market for non-traded goods clears instantly, the pre-
slump equilibrium condition requires that non-traded supply must be equal to its
demand. This result can be written as:
Yn (q) = Cn (q,Y)
Where	 oYn/6q > 0, CnI6 q< 0, and 6Cn/öY> 0
While, in the traded goods' market	 Yt (q) = Ct (q,Y)
Where	 öYt/oq <0, CtI6 q< 0, and 6Ct/6Y> 0
These two equations can be rearranged as follows:
Yn=Xq
Where () denotes proportional rate of change of variable i, such as ?n = dy/y6,
while ? represents the relative price elasticity. The output of non-traded goods
depends positively on the relative price, while demand for non-traded goods
depends on the relative price negatively and positively on the real income
measured in term of tradables.
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The downtrend of oil revenues under a fixed rate, affects the national
income by reducing expenditures on the domestic economy. As a result, the
demand for non-traded goods declines according to the effect of the income
elasticity of demand. If the relative price remains unchanged, the lack of demand
will generate disequilibrium in the economy so far as the output of non-traded
goods exceeds the counterpart demand. To come up with equilibrium, the excess
supply will be retrenched by a decline in the relative price of non-traded goods.
Accordingly, a depreciation of the real exchange rate exists accompanied by a
contraction in the output of the non-traded goods sector. However, the output of
the traded goods sector responds positively by raising its production since the
domestic products become cheaper relative to those imported from abroad (the
country's position is more competitive). One can conclude that the spending effect,
resulting from the deterioration in oil revenues, will reallocate the domestic
resources through expansion in the traded goods output at the expense of the non-
traded goods output. The magnitude of the spending effect depends on the income
elasticity for demand for non-traded goods and on the relative price elasticity too.
By using the preceding Salter's diagram as well as its notations, Figure 4.6a
demonstrates that the decline in foreign exchange earnings, treated as transfer,
shifts the upper PPC vertically downward from NT to NTI. The shortfall in earnings
is equivalent to 111. The equilibrium point remains at point A so long as the slope
of the relative price (P1) is equal to that of Po. Furthermore, the new equilibrium
condition can be achieved at point C, if and only if the decline in foreign exchange
receipts are compensated either by borrowing from abroad and/or withdrawing
from the country's foreign reserves. In such a case, the economy experiences an
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The Impact of the Spending Effect of the Slump on the Commodity Market
internal balance (as output of non-tradable remains unchanged) as well as having
an external balance (the deficit on the current account is matched by a surplus on
the capital account). In practice, a drop in the country's revenues (obtained as
rent), transmitted into the domestic economy. The outcome expected is the
economy would experience a disequilibrium. Accordingly, three consequences
emerge:
(i) There is no change in the production of non-traded goods owing to the
assumption that the oil sector does not use any inputs from the other sectors in the
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economy; (ii) the desired demand for non-tradable sector lags behind its production
by BE; (iii) an excess supply of non-oil-traded goods by BC (AB represents a deficit
on the current account). It is worth mentioning that price of tradables are not
subject to any changes since it is determined by world market, However, the
emergence of an unbalanced economy appears in Figure 4.6a where the new
relative price (P1) intersects the income-expansion path (Do) at point F. To restore
equilibrium, a decline in the price of non-traded goods is necessary in order to
achieve balanced economy by (a) reducing the profitability of non-tradables, which
induces an elimination of the excess supply of non-traded goods and; (b) a
depreciating of the exchange rate of the local currency makes the exportable
goods cheaper and importable goods more expensive than those of domestic
ones.
If the country is not export-oriented, the demand for importable goods
decline as their prices go up; (c) the slope of the relative price of nontradables to
tradables (P2) declines to become flatter than the slope of the relative price (P1).
Changes of P2 depends upon the strength degree of the spending effect (income
effect). As a result of the relative price mechanism resulting from spending effect,
Figure 4.6b shows the income-expansion path moves downward from Do to Dl
and the most profitable production point C move counter-clockwise along lower
PPC, while the most utilised consumption point F moves clockwise until all
becoming tangent to the lower PPC at point K. This point is located between F and
C and its location determined by role of the elasticities of demand and supply of
non-traded goods. However, the restoration of equilibrium causes reallocation of
resources through a contraction of the non-traded production from No to NI and an
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expansion of the traded good production from T2 to T3. This analysis emphasises
on the impact of spending effect on the commodity market during the slump period,
but to get a clear picture, one should point out the effect of slump through spending
effect on the labour market as well.
Figure 4.6b shows the pre-slump equilibrium condition in the labour market
is achieved at point A. The wage is represented by Wo, and S So and M Mo
indicate the labour employed in non-tradables and tradable respectively. The
deterioration in income takes place and the spending in both goods, with a fixed
labour supply, declines. Since the output of non-traded goods remains unchanged,
the output of tradables falls. While the demand for the non-traded goods sector
declines, it rises for tradables and while the price of non-tradables falls, the price of
tradables increases.
S	 Si So	 Mi	 Mo	 M
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Figure 4.7 The Impact of Spending in the Slump on the Labour Market
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The fall in the relative price leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate,
which will cause the labour demand curve for non-tradables Ln to shift
downward to Lnl. The rate of the wage declines to Wi and the output of non-
tradables, resulting from the decline in labour employed, shifts from So to SI.
In terms of tradables, their output rises from Mo to Ml. Summing up, in the
labour market, a depreciation of the exchange rate leads to an expansion of the
traded goods sector and contraction of the non-traded goods sector.
2- The Resource Movement of the Natural Resource Slump
Most theoretical analysis seems to treat the oil sector as though there is
no participation of the factors of productions in the other sectors of the
economy. This might be acceptable due to the fact that oil is a highly capital-
intensive advanced technology, and highly skilled-labour sector. Nevertheless,
one can examine what would happen when the oil sector shares some factors
of production with other sectors in the domestic economy. Therefore, it is
assumed again that each sector has its own specific factor in addition to labour
and that labour is expected to move freely between all sectors.
With these specifications, the equilibrium condition of the spending effect
can be rearranged in the commodity market as:
Yn =Yn (q/W) = Cn (q, Y)
	 (non-traded market)
where	 aYn/0(q/W) > 0 , Cn/aq <0 , and ôCn/ÔY> 0
Yt = Yt(W) = Ct (q, Y)	 (traded market)
where	 aYt/aW < 0 , ôCt/ôq <0 and aCt/laY> o
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In these equations, there are two endogenous variables, q and W. In the
non-traded goods sector, the output depends positively on the ratio of the
relative price to the wage rate in terms of traded goods, whereas the traded
goods output depends negatively on the wage rate. The additional equilibrium
condition emerging from the labour-market clearing is as follows:
L= Ln(q/W) -I- Lt (W) ^ Lb (VV)
Here L is the total labour supply, which is assumed to be fixed, while Ln, Lt, and
Lb are the labour demand functions for the non-traded, the non-booming
traded, and the booming sectors respectively. A fall in oil prices and/or
production, at a constant wage rate, will reduce the oil sector's profitability and
thus the demand for labour as the wage rate declines. Consequently, labour
moves out of the oil sector towards the traded and non-traded sectors affecting
their outputs in terms of labour employment and wage rate. First, in the traded
sector, the labour movement into the traded goods sector induces an
expansion in output of this sector. This causes what can be called a "re-
industrialisation" or "induced-industrialisation". However, the rise in the traded
goods sector is attributable to the increased labour employed rather than any
involvement of the non-traded sector via its relative price and depreciation of
the exchange rate. Figure 4.8 illustrates how the oil price decline affects the
demand for labour exchange rate. Figure 4.8 illustrates how the oil price decline
affects the demand for labour in the oil sector and hence its curve shifts
downward from Lbo to Lbl. The distance MIM0 indicates such expansion in the
traded goods sector. Second, the movement of labour out of the oil sector
towards the non-traded sector, at a constant wage rate, causes an increase in
the output of the non-traded sector from So to S2. Figure 4.8 shows that there
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is an excess supply since the point S2 lies to the right of the initial point of
equilibrium (So).
This implies that the decline in the price of non-traded goods is expected as
well as a decline in the production. The real wage measured in terms of non-
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Figure 4.8 The Impact of Resource Movement on the Oil Slump
traded sector causing an expansion of traded goods' output from Ml to M2.
This is due to the downturn of the relative price of non-traded goods, which,
brings about the depreciation in the exchange rate that leads the domestic
products to be cheaper than those from abroad. Consequently, additional
movement of labour to the traded goods sector generates what is so called the
"indirect re-industrialisation". On the other hand, the output of non-traded goods
can expand or contract. If the decline in the relative price is larger than the
nominal wage, this will cause a decline in his sector as at (S3), and vice versa.
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Combining the spending and resource movement effects, it can be
observed from Figure 4.9 that the impact of the two effects resulting from the oil
slump on the domestic economy will have the following consequences: (i) the
two effects, resource movement and spending effects, tend to raise the
employment and output of non-booming traded sectors. The spending effect
reduces the relative price of non-traded goods and thus generates a
depreciation in the exchange rate.
This is illustrated by the shifting of the demand curve for non-tradables
downward from Do to DI, leading to an expansion of the manufacturing sector
from Mo to Mi, while the resource movement operates through the decline in
the oil sector, which draws labour out of the oil sector toward the traded sector
causing an increase in its production; (ii) the resource movement tends to
reduce the employment and output of the oil sector (due to labour movement),
while the spending effect tends to do the reverse (due to depreciation);(iii) the
two effects on non-traded goods, however, have opposite impacts. The
spending effect reduces the output of non-traded goods from No to Ni (as
Pn/Pt declines), while the resource movement tends to raise it from No to N2
(as labour move from the oil sector). The net effect depends on which of the
two effects are stronger. If the compensated own-price and income elasticity of
demand is stronger than the resource movement impact, the output of non-
traded goods deteriorates below its initial point. However, if the resource
movement is stronger than the spending effect, the output may rise above the
initial point, It is worth mentioning that the relative price in both effects causes
an expansion of traded goods from Mo to Ml and M2. Structural changes in the
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domestic economy resulting from oil revenue fluctuations entail that policies
need to be adopted to reallocate domestic resources.
Having discussed the theoretical implication of the natural resource
fluctuations of the domestic economy, it is appropriate to focus on the impact of
the external shock on the Saudi Arabian economy. Hence, the theoretical
model of Corden (1984) has to be amended by taking into account the local
circumstances of Saudi Arabia.
q =Pn/Pt
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Figure 4.9 The Impact of the Two Combining Effects on the Oil Slump
4.5- Limitations of the Theoretical Model
Corden and Neary's three-sector analysis is a helpful theoretical
framework for increasing our understanding of the adverse side-effects of oil
windfalls in developing countries. However, there are a number of factors,
which make its application in the situation of Saudi Arabia less appropriate.
Firstly, the model rests on the assumption that the economy is a full
employment economy while in Saudi Arabia, there is substantial
154
underemployment. Prior to the influx of oil revenues, many Saudis were
engaged in low-productivity subsistence agriculture and/or were under-
employed urban job seekers. As a result, one might expect that those workers
would have been absorbed into the traded and non-traded sectors, moderating
the impact of spending and resource movement effects. The movement of
underdeveloped labour to increased supply industries might dampen the
relative price of non-traded goods and thus the appreciation in the real
exchange rate.
Secondly and more importantly, the model assumed a fixed labour
supply. This assumption in the case of Saudi Arabia has been relaxed due to
the government policy adopted after the oil wealth gains. This policy
encouraged recruitment of a large number of foreign workers to compensate for
the shortage in skilled labour needed for expanding the economy. In 1974, the
non-Saudis were about 0.791 million compared to the Saudis of about 7.0
million at that time. The last population survey, calculated in 1993, indicated a
total Saudi Arabian population of 16.9 million, with non-Saudis representing
around 4.6 million (27.4 percent) of the total population. The growth rate of the
Saudi and non-Saudi population over the 19-year period was 98 percent and
486.3 percent respectively7. The impact of the dramatic influx of expatriates is
reflected in both the outputs of traded and non-traded goods. With the supply of
traded goods, the infusion of foreign labour helped to mitigate the resource
movement effect and led to little loss in traded goods production. On the other
hand, the increases in the price of non-traded goods resulting from the
spending effect attracted more foreign labour to this sector. Therefore, the
production of the non-traded goods sector may increase and is accompanied
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by moderating price increases so long as wages are concerned. The
appreciation in real exchange might be limited as a result of hindering the
resource movement effect. In additional to that, the labour immigrants, to some
extent, remit income home or consume imported goods. This leads to a
dampening in spending effect and a reduction in the real exchange rate
appreciation. Additionally, when an oil revenues' slump exists, the employment
of expatriates would be reduced as the demand for non-traded goods declines
and some can move out into traded goods. This would lead to a slight change
in the labour cost of traded goods, but prices would not be expected to go up as
Corden's model predicts, while the demand for non-traded goods can smoothly
rise as a result of the reduction in the non-tradable production. The resource
movement and spending effect could be moderated and the real exchange rate
might not depreciate as strongly as expected.
Thirdly, the model assumed the existence of de-industrialisation
emerging from new oil discoveries (equivalent to an increase in oil prices). In
the case of the Saudi Arabian economy prior to 1973, the manufacturing sector
was limited and less likely to be adversely affected than the agricultural sector.
De-agriculuralisation, rather than de-industrialisation, would have been more
likely to happen as the Dutch disease literature predicts. Some economists
(such as Timmer, 1982, and Roemer, 1986) define de-industrialisation as
slower-than-normal growth or one where the growth rate lags behind the
service sector, rather than absolute decline. Both of the former definitions seem
to be more appropriate to the case of the Saudi Arabian economy. This
outcome emerged from the fact that the number of Saudi Arabian agricultural
villages declined sharply from 7,805 in 1970 to 3,084 by 1975. This is reflected
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in a decline in the contribution of the Saudis engaged in the agricultural sector,
declining from 40 percent to 28 percent of output from 1970 to 1975 (Looney,
1990). Furthermore, Table 4.2 demonstrates that the growth rate in the output
of the actual agricultural sector in the first five-year development plan was 3.6
percent, which was slightly below the targeted rate of 4.6 percent. This implies
that de-agriculuralisation existed at least till the mid-I 970s. On the other hand,
the following three development plans led to a rise in the agricultural production
exceeding its planned targets, due to the introduction of subsidies starting from
the third development plan. In terms of the manufacturing sector, the actual
growth rates usually lagged behind the target growth except in the second
development plan. Nevertheless, the growth rate of the manufacturing sector
was expanding to such a degree as to be inconsistent with Corden and Neary's
theoretical framework.
Fourthly, the model falls short of formulating a comprehensive theoretical
framework for oil-exporting developing countries with respect to the role of the
government. The model invariably ignored the role of the government and its
control over the oil sector revenues. Moreover, the short-term financial
repercussions of the changes in oil income, operating via the government
budget constraints, were also neglected. This assumption is inappropriate for
Saudi Arabia in the sense that the private sector was not as developed in terms
of assets and experience as in developed countries. Therefore, it is vital to
incorporate into the model the involvement and expansion of the public sector's
activities in the Saudi Arabian economy. The rise in the scope of the
government intervention over time has been due to its need to control the
economy after the unification of the country in the 1930s. Historically, the
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private sector has been small and inexperienced one and business has been
unable and unwilling to undertake large-scale investments. For example, the
government took on the responsibility to carry out major projects such as
communication, transport, construction and the countrywide road network 8
 The
participation of the public sector via the budgetary expenditure is the most
distinguishing feature of the Saudi Arabian economy. Therefore, government
spending is a key indicator of the impact of oil revenue changes.
	 In addition,
the government has been the major source of the increased private sector
liquidity. In Looney's (1990) analysis of the gross liquidity pumped into the
economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, around 94 percent of the private
sector cash flows came from the government, and only 6 percent from the
commercial bank credit.
Table 4.2 Annual Average Targets and Actual Real Growth Rates Under the
Development Plans
As a result, government domestic spending exercises a dominant
influence on the money supply. Because of the strong link between government
spending and the money supply, the role of monetary policy has been limited
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and major changes in monetary expansion have been brought about through
the regulation of government spending.
Consequently, government spending, and in turn the money supply, is
expected to have a strong impact on changes in the relative price of non-traded
to traded goods, the real exchange rate and reallocation of domestic resources.
As a corollary, the model developed for the Saudi Arabian economy has to
include the two independent variables of government expenditure and money
supply in order to capture the impact of the spending effect on the national
economy.
4.5.1 The Model
The significant changes in the Saudi Arabian oil revenues during the last
three decades and their implications for the domestic economy suggest the
need to examine the impact of such changes on the price levels (broken down
into traded and non-traded prices), the real exchange rate, and outputs of the
traded and non-traded goods sectors.
A number of studies have been conducted to analyse the economic
implications of unanticipated changes (particularly a rise in commodity prices)
for an economy. Some of these studies such as Forsyth and Kay ( 1980),
Cordon (1981) Bruno and Sachs (1983) and Neary and Wijnbergen (1986)
focused mainly on the economic sectoral effects of North Sea Oil on the British
economy, while Eastwood and Venables (1982), Buiter and Purvis (1982),
Fender (1985) and Chalterji and Price (1988) among others emphasised on the
macroeconomic effects on the UK economy. In addition to the U.K., the oil
revenue effects on the economies of Norway, the Netherlands, and Canada
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have been subjected to analysis and discussion in Barker and Brailovsky
(1981).
Despite the important contribution of the preceding studies, these
studies are highly related to the structure of the industrial economies rather
than to oil-exporting developing countries. The economic characteristics of the
former differ from those of the latter in terms of floating exchange rate, the role
of the private sector, international capital mobility, and importantly,
fullemployment. Furthermore, they ignore the financial repercussions of oil
income that operate through the government budget constraint and the asset
position of the private sector (Pesaran, 1984, P. 253). Those assumptions
might be inappropriate, to a large extent, for the developing oil-exporting
countries in general and for Saudi Arabia in particular.
On the other hand, studies such as those of Warr (1986), Woo et al.
(1994) and Morley (1989) among others, conducted in relation to the economic
implication of a commodity price increase in oil-exporting developing countries
have identified some features, which differ from those of some oil-exporting
countries. The most important distinction is the existence of thriving
manufacturing and agricultural sectors prior to the emergence of oil as the
dominant activity. Examples of these countries are Mexico, Iran, Indonesia,
Algeria, and Nigeria. However, in Saudi Arabia, the manufacturing sector, in
particular, was limited and in its early stages, so that de-industrialisation in its
broad sense was not as negatively affected as economic theory predicts.
However, de-agriculturalisation and slower growth rate of the manufacturing
sector might appear as a result of influx of oil revenues.
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Consequently, to describe the reaction that the economy may have to a
rise or fall in the international oil price, a simple model will be developed to
analyse the export boom and bust phenomenon.
4.5.2 Basic Structure
The model is a simple version of the dependent open economy model of
Salter (1959) and Swan (1960). Its derivation is based on the Corden (1984)
model. This model probably is one of the simplest that can be used to cope with
the adverse side-effects on the Saudi Arabian economy of the dramatic
changes in oil revenue in the boom and slump periods, taking into account the
structure and sources of growth of the Saudi Arabian rentier economy. First, it
is important to consider what is meant by a rentier economy, rentier economy is
defined as an economy that receives on a regular basis substantial amounts of
external rents. External rents are in turn defined as a stream income which is
not required to reward capital and labour or to pay for intermediate inputs
(Daniel, 1990, p. 2), in the sense that this rent (Ricardian rent) is recognised
when the price of oil is independent of the cost of exploiting this resource. The
lack of any meaningful relationship between the level of oil production and the
local economy can be seen from the negligible effect of oil extraction cost on
determining its price (a variant of the Hottling rule that takes oil pricing into
account). In the case of Saudi Arabia, the oil cost at its peak capacity is of an
average of 2.5 dollars per a barrel (Middle East Oil and Gas, 1995. P. 50). This
implies that the oil revenues received by the government have very little to do
with the production processes of the domestic economy, in the sense that the
inputs from the local economy, to a large extent, are insignificant.
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Accordingly, the oil sector as a whole and in turn oil price and revenues
have to be specified due to their roles as major variables in the economy. The
essential characteristics of the oil sector are distinguished as follows: (I) the oil
price is determined in the international market rather than in domestic economic
policies (no power in the market); (ii) the oil is priced and sold in U.S. dollars;
(iii) the extraction cost is a negligible portion with regard to its costs, therefore,
the depletion cost is neglected in the model; (iv) the oil sector is completely
owned by the government and hence all the oil earnings accrue directly to it
rather than to the factors of production. Consequently, the government plays a
crucial role in maintaining and controlling the economy.
The model assumes that the Saudi Arabian economy is a three-sector
economy: oil, non-oil traded goods, and non-traded goods sectors. Each class
of goods is taken to be a composite so that the relative prices of goods within
each group are invariant. Traded goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes
in the sense that there are no trade barriers. The aggregation chosen here
places emphasis on the relative price of non-traded in terms of traded goods.
The price of traded goods is determined exogenously in the international
market as long as the economy is assumed to be open and small, whereas, the
price of non-traded goods is determined indogenously through the interaction
between the domestic supply and demand. Furthermore, all goods in the three
sectors are assumed to be normal goods and produced according to the neo-
classical production function with two factors of production: labour and capital.
This can be expressed as:
Y=Y(L, K)
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Where Y, L and K represent the total output, labour, and capital respectively.
However, each sector in the economy is restricted by a factor specific to that
sector in addition to the labour. The labour factor can move freely between
traded and non-traded sectors. Since the boom or slump is assumed to be
sizeable and temporary, the analysis is considered to be of a short-run nature
and cannot be changed during the time span in which the analysis holds. Thus,
every sector has a predetermined fixed quantity of capital.
As mentioned earlier, the oil revenues will be treated as an 'external
renter'; the demand-side of the economy will be taken into account through the
impact of the spending effect rather than the supply-side of resource movement
involvement. The model used will be applied to examine the effects of oil
revenue changes during two separate periods within the entire sample from
1965 to 1997. To achieve this aim, one can use this unified model in order to
test the impact of the oil export boom (henceforth, stage one) from 1965 till the
end of the boom in 1982. In addition to that, the impact of the oil export slump
(stage two) will be tested as well covering the period from 1983 to 1997.
4.6 The Macroeconomic Effects of the External Resource Change
Oil revenue fluctuations are commonly viewed as an important factor
behind the variations in resource movements in an open economy. The
enormous growth of oil revenues resulting from the 1973-74 and 1979-80
energy shocks led to an enormity of domestic expenditure. The predicted
consequences of such an increase can be specified in terms of its changes in
macroeconomic variables: first, the relative price of non-traded versus traded
goods went up causing the exchange rate to appreciate; second, an
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appreciation in the exchange rate called for a reduction in the country's
competitiveness in the world market; third, the production structure shifted in
favour of non-traded goods.
On the other hand, the collapse of oil prices occurring since 1982 has
created a decline in the domestic expenditure. The outcomes resulting from
such a reduction were, as expected to widespread: first, a fall in the relative
prices brought about a depreciation in the exchange rate; second, a lower
exchange rate raised the country's competitiveness in the international market;
and third, the production structure turned in favour of the traded goods.
For more exposition of the macroeconomic effects, it is necessary to
highlight the role of the oil revenues changes in determining the relative price of
non-traded in term of traded goods, the real exchange rate, and the reallocation
of resources which has taken place in the domestic economy.
4.6.1- The relative price
A temporary (unanticipated) rise in oil revenues causes the economy to
run a trade surplus. This surplus must be matched by an excess demand for
non-traded goods. Since the market for non-traded goods is assumed to clear
instantaneously, the price of tradables must rise relative to the exogenous price
of traded goods. A rise in the price of non-tradables relative to tradables
reduces the output of traded goods and increases the output of non-traded
goods, which corresponds to a movement along the economy's PPC. A rise in
the relative price will also increase domestic consumption of tradables and
discourage consumption in the non-traded goods sector. Lower production and
greater consumption of traded goods will reduce the traded surplus, while larger
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output and reduced consumption of non-traded goods will eliminate the excess
demand for these goods.
On the other hand, the reverse situation prevails when a decline in oil
revenues takes place. Various price indices are used as proxies for prices of
non-traded and traded goods. The most popular are indices of GDP deflator
and Consumer Price Index (CPI), representing the price of non-traded goods,
while Import Price Index, Wholesale Price Index, World Price Index, and
Industrialised Countries Consumer Price Index are proxies of the price of the
traded goods. Table 4.3 shows some selected price indices that illustrate the
response of the relative price to the external shocks. This table indicates that
the relative price increased during the boom periods of 1973-74 and 1979-80,
while in the slump period in 1983 onwards, the relative price declined. One can
conclude that oil price and thus oil revenues are major determinants of the
relative price. Oil revenues are included because oil prices may rise or fall while
oil revenues might not follow the same trend due to the quantity of oil produced
that might compensate for the increase or decrease in oil prices. The
consequences of an oil boom represented by oil price and oil revenues are not
the only determinants of changes in relative prices as the comparative static
analysis predicts. In such a static framework, all other determinants of the
relative price are held constant. In practise, however, it is obvious that these
factors are not necessarily stationary. As noted before, since oil revenues in
Saudi Arabia typically accrue directly to the government, monetary and,
especially, fiscal policy play a most crucial role in the direction of government
spending. Fiscal policy involves both macroeconomic decisions (spending
affects overall level of demand) and microeconomic decisions (choosing a
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pattern of expenditure) that serves such goals as better distribution or greater
efficiency or is intended to encourage or discourage specific types of economic
Table 4.3	 Selected Relative Prices
Relative P. Relative P.	 Relative P.	 Relative P.
Year	 Pn/Pt*	 Pn/Pt**	 S .GDPd .il .CPI***	 S.GDPdIW.CPI
1965	 106.1	 96.6	 48.5	 75.3
1970	 94.7	 92.7 __________ 48.0	 71.4
1973	 100.8	 97.5	 1106	 160.2
1974	 107.8	 97.1	 135.9	 194.1
1978	 147.9	 143.3	 121.2	 159.4
1979	 137.3	 131.1	 155.5	 199.6
1982	 110.8	 108.1	 127.5	 147.7
1984	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1986	 87.7	 94.9	 71.0	 58.7
1987	 84.2	 93.0	 70.9	 52.9
1990	 77.0	 86.9	 74.2	 36.5
1991	 77.4	 90.1	 74.1	 32.2
1992	 74.9	 89.3	 72.6	 27.6
1994	 72.4	 89.7	 67.5	 18.5
1996	 72.6	 90.4	 71.2	 17.1
1997	 70.8	 89.6	 69.5	 16.2
* reoresents Domestic Price Index divided by Industrial Price Index
** calculated by dividing Domestic Price Index by Industrial Wholesale Price Index.
S, I, and W stand for Saudi, Industrial, and World figures
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, 1994 and 1998.
activity. Saudi policy instruments such as subsidies, tariffs, access to credit,
and government investment aim favouring activities have a major impact on the
relative price. To sum up, the government spending primarily affects the relative
price since it falls mainly on non-traded goods through investment in its
infrastructure.
In the light of what has been mentioned above, two additional
variables affecting the behaviour of the relative price, namely government
spending and broad money supply, should be included in the equation. The
objective of this, is to capture the spending effect resulting from oil shocks. The
new equation developed has the relative price of non-tradables as a dependent
variable and four explanatory variables: oil revenues, price of oil, government
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spending and money supply. It is expected that all independent variables are
positively related to the relative price. Hence, the relative price equation can be
rearranged as follows:
q =q(ORt, POt, Gt, Mt)
	 4.1
q/ 60R, öq/6P0, 6qIoG, and 6q/6M > 0
Where OR and P0 represent the oil revenues and price of oil respectively,
while Gt and Mt are the government spending and broad money supply
respectively.
In an important strand of literature on open economy, there is a strong
link between changes in the relative price and the real exchange rate. This is
due to the fact that changes in determinants of the relative price reflect directly
on changes in the country's external position in the sense of changes in its
international competitiveness.
4.6.2 The Real Exchange Rate
The distinction between the nominal and real exchange rate has become
increasingly important. The nominal exchange rate is a monetary concept that
measures the relative price of two currencies. The nominal exchange rate is
frequently defined as the number of units of domestic currency per unit of
foreign currency. This can be expressed as:
e = Pd/Pf
Where e is the nominal exchange rate, while Pd and Pf are the amount of home
and foreign currencies respectively. An increase in domestic currency is
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referred to as a depreciation with respect to foreign currency, while a decrease
in domestic currency is identified as an appreciation.
Exchange rate policy involves choosing an exchange rate system and
determining the particular rate at which foreign exchange rate transition will
take place. There are commonly three options for exchange rates: pegging the
domestic currency to a single foreign currency, notably one of an industrial
country's currency; or pegging it to a basket of currencies, chiefly, Special
Drawing Rights (SDR); and finally, adopting an independent floating exchange
rate.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, the vast
majority of developing countries continued to maintain fixed exchange rate for
their currencies. Developing countries have typically fixed their currencies in
terms of industrial foreign currency, mostly, the U.S. dollar. The striking
objective of pegging to one currency is to avoid fluctuations in the exchange
rates, which might harmfully affect the economies in terms of instability in
domestic prices and revenues. Saudi Arabia pegged its domestic currency - the
Riyal- to the U.S. dollar after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate (Al-
Gaeed, 1991, P. 71). This can be attributed to many reasons: (i) as the oil
revenue was and still is denominated in the U.S. dollar and since oil revenues
accrue to the government, it would help to forecast the potential budget with no
major uncertainty; (ii) the U.S. is one of the main trading partners and hence
most Saudi investments are denominated in U.S. dollars. (iii) it would keep the
domestic prices relatively stable, especially when Saudi Arabia depends heavily
on trade for final, intermediate, raw material and capital goods. However, in
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order to maintain the level of the peg, it must also follow policies, which will
maintain stable prices. Thus, an exchange rate peg may serve as a basis for
following macroeconomic policies consistent with domestic stability (Bath, 1992,
P. 37).
One can argue that the U.S. dollar itself is subject to fluctuation as well,
which raises the importance of pegging the local currency to a basket of the five
major hard currencies in order to avoid any fluctuations in a single currency,
namely the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Saudi Arabia pegged its currency to
SDR from 1975 to 1981. The appreciation in the U.S. dollar in 1979, however,
allowed the government to abandon the SDR and to repeg its currency to the
dollar.
Nevertheless, the nominal exchange rate cannot give an accurate
picture of the country's international competitiveness position. This is due to the
fact that the nominal exchange rate does not measure the purchasing power
parity (PPP) of the domestic currency with respect to its counterpart in the
foreign country. The traditional PPP forms are based on: (i) the low of one
price, which relates exchange rates to prices of individual, homogenous goods
in different countries; (ii) absolute PPP, which relates exchange rates to overall
price levels; (iii) and relative PPP, which relates exchange rate to changes in
inflation rates among the countries concerned. Their usefulness as guides to
exchange rate behaviour is limited. This can be due first to the adoption of a
floating exchange rate, which fluctuates to offset the differences in price levels
across countries, while Saudi Arabia and 35.9% of the world nations pegged
their own currencies to a single currency in 1990 (Bath, 1992, P. 40). Secondly,
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transportation and information costs, and institutional impediments to trade,
such tariffs and quotas, prevent the price levels from being equalised (Clark, et
al., 1994, P.4). Alternatively, most recent studies define the real exchange rate
as the domestic relative prices of the traded goods to the non-traded goods.
This can be expressed as:
Real Exchange Rate (RER) = Price of tradable goods (Pt) I Price of
nontradable goods (Pn)
Examples of these studies are those of Khan and Ostery (1991), Marsh
and Tokarick (1994), Micossi and Milesi-Ferretti, (1994), Zietz (1996) and
Masters and lanchovichinal (1998) among others. The definition of the real
exchange rate in terms of the price of traded to non-traded goods identifies
more readily the incentives that guide domestic resource allocation. Its focus on
domestic resource allocation has made this alternative definition of the real
exchange rate a favourite tool for analysing issues of competitiveness for
developing countries (Zietz, 1996, P. 147). A decline in the RER, or a real
exchange rate appreciation, reflects an increase in the domestic cost of
producing tradable goods, if there are no changes in relative prices in the rest
of the world. In this case, the RER decline represents a deterioration of the
country's international competitiveness. Symmetrically, a rise in the RER
represents an improvement in international competitiveness.
However, changes in RER are sometimes affected by real events in the
economy (Edwards, 1992. P.46). There are a number of factors which have
contributed to changes in RER in Saudi Arabia: the rise of oil price and oil
revenues during the 1970s induced an appreciation of the Saudi RER via the
170
spending effect resulting from an increased relative price of non-traded goods.
In contrast, the decline of oil revenues in the early 1980s brought about a
depreciation in the RER. In Figure 4.10, changes in the RER have fluctuated in
response to the oil price and thus oil revenue changes during the sample
period. The consequences of oil price and oil revenue upward and downward
changes are not the only determinants of the RER as the comparative static
analysis predicts. Edwards (1992) counted many factors that play a large role in
determining the RER domestically and externally.
Figure 4.10
	
The Real Exchange Rate Movements
The major factors related to the Saudi Arabian economy are international
prices, international transfer, subsidies and the composition of government
expenditure. Since the oil revenues accrue to the government and thus
transmit partially or entirely to the domestic economy, government spending
through the national budget has a dominant control over the expenditure and
money supply. Consequently, the plausible factors determining the Saudi
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Arabian RER can include oil price, oil revenues, government spending and
money supply. This can be expressed as:
RER = RER (ORt, POt, Gt, Mt)	 4.2
öRER1 60R, öRERJöPO, öRER/öG, and RER/öM <0
The relationship between the RER as a dependent variable and
explanatory variables is expected to be negative as theory and empirical
studies predict. It is worth mentioning that the real exchange rate is measured
on aggregate external and internal price indices such as domestic CPI, national
GDP deflators, world price index and industrial price index. The different
measures of the RER seem to lead to different conclusions, where the RER is
calculated on the basis of different deflators. All price indices used as proxies of
the price of tradable and non-tradable goods are discussed in the following
chapter.
Regarding the importance of the RER as the cornerstone in the existing
natural resource fluctuations' model, it is necessary to analyse its influence on
the sectoral outputs of the Saudi Arabian economy.
The theoretical natural resource literature predicts that any unanticipated
oil revenue changes would reallocate resources employed in the national
economy. This reflects the need to examine the implication of oil revenue
changes on the total output, decomposed into non-traded and traded goods
productions, although, world and national statistical references are not
produced with regard to such division.
172
4.6.3 The Non-Traded Goods Output
The theoretical literature on the impact of the natural resource changes
on the sectoral domestic economy relies upon a neat division of the
commodities into tradable and non-tradable goods. While the conceptual
dichotomy between tradables and non-tradables is convenient for theoretical
purposes, it does not fit closely with the available data 1 . As a result, however,
some economists have identified approaches to separate them for empirical
purposes. Manufacture and agriculture are defined as tradable even though
some of them are non-traded goods, while the category of non-tradables
includes services (although many of services are tradable goods. An
alternative approach used by Kamas (1986) is to identify the commodity's
tradability according to its share in the international trade, while some
economists use the United Nations International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC). In the latter classification, a primary sector includes
agriculture, fishing and trapping, and forestry, while the industrial sector
includes mining and quarrying.
However, in this study, agriculture and manufacture will be treated as
being in the traded goods sector, whereas the service sector will include
construction, transportation and communication, real estate and business
services, personal and other services.
Despite these different definitions, it remains possible to extract a
relatively clear picture of the impact of the natural resource changes on the
allocation of resources.
It seems obvious that the two major external oil shocks have played a
significant role over the last three decades in the Saudi Arabian economy.
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Table 4.4 shows fluctuations in the production and the growth rate of the traded
and non-traded goods sectors over the sample period of the study (1 965-1 997).
As the economic literature predicts, the oil price explosion of 1973-74 led
the volume as well as the growth rate of tradable goods to increase
considerably. From 1972 to 1981, with the exception of 1968, the growth rate of
non-tradable goods expanded faster than the corresponding trend in tradable
goods. The former reached its highest growth rates of 20.1 and 20.2 percent in
1975 and 1976 respectively. The tremendous growth rates following the oil
boom were due to large government spending in which the major share was
directed to the non-traded goods sector. However, the growth rate of non-
tradables tended to grow but in decreasing rates from 1977 onward, with the
exception of 1979, due to the higher oil prices since. The decline in the growth
of the non-traded goods sector was attributed firstly to the reduction in
government spending during the increased inflation rate resulting from the
bottlenecks in the economy during the accelerated development in the booming
era; and secondly, to the slight decrease in the nominal US dollar over 1975-
78, which might have affected the purchasing power of the Saudi Riyal.
Nevertheless, the two booming periods have caused the growth rate of the non-
tradable sector to soar around 20.2 and 11.9 percent in 1976 and 1980
respectively.
As the world economy moved into recession in the 1980s and successful
conservative measures were adopted in the major oil consuming countries, the
demand for oil declined and thus the oil prices fell by six to eight dollars per
barrel. The decline in the growth rate of the non-traded goods sector in 1982
and afterwards was related to two factors: (i) the deterioration of government
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spending resulting from the collapse of the country's oil revenues; (ii) the
completion of the major infrastructure projects which were carried out during the
booming periods. 1990, reaching its highest peak since 1982. These results are
consistent with the theory of the Dutch disease predictions.
Table 4.4 Outputs and Growth Rates of Traded
and Non-trade Sectors
Year	 Non-Tradable Growth (%)	 Tradable	 Growth
______	 Output	 _________	 Output	 (%)
1965	 33887	 4839
1966	 35373	 4.4	 5171	 6.9
1967	 36847	 4.2	 5501	 6.4
1968	 40441	 9.8	 5820	 5.8
1969	 42020	 3.9	 6142	 5.5
1970	 43568	 3.7	 6558	 6.8
1971	 46200	 6.0	 6981	 6.5
1972	 51028	 10.5	 7448	 6.7
1973	 58774	 15.2	 7898	 6.0
1974	 68951	 17.3	 8381	 6.1
1975	 82835	 20.1	 8994	 7.3
1976	 99563	 20.2	 9861	 9.6
1977	 115002	 15.5	 11134	 12.9
1978	 130185	 13.2	 12489	 12.2
1979	 146141	 12.3	 13793	 10.4
1980	 163468	 11.9	 15342	 11.2
1981	 184064	 12.6	 17948	 17.0
1982	 193020	 4.9	 19850	 10.6
1983	 193985	 0.5	 21495	 8.3
1984	 187788	 -3.2	 25217	 17.3
1985	 186138	 -0.9	 28045	 11.2
1986	 177753	 -4.5	 29705	 5.9
1987	 182163	 2.5	 32242	 8.5
1988	 183377	 0.7	 34636	 7.4
1989	 184814	 0.8	 36631	 5.8
1990	 190211	 2.9	 38057	 3.9
1991	 205921	 8.3	 38321	 0.7
1992	 205888	 0.0	 39024	 1.8
1993	 209080	 1.6	 39549	 1.3
1994	 180577	 -13.6	 40491	 2.4
1995	 180577	 0.0	 40901	 1.0
1996	 184095	 1.9	 42292	 3.4
1997	 187593	 1.9	 43747	 3.4
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, Various Years
M. of Planning, Achievements of Development Plans, (1990-1995)
International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, IMF, 1997
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On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian economy experienced a negative
growth rate of 3.2 percent in 1984 and then it regained positive rates after the
oil price recovery in 1987. Further evidence of the impact of the oil price and
government spending increases on non-traded goods can be seen clearly from
the Iraq-Kuwait crisis which started in 1991. This induced the Saudi Arabian oil
revenues to rise in terms of price and quantity and thus the production of non-
tradables jumped 8.3 percent in 1991 from 2.9 percent in
One can conclude that the standard Slater-Swan neo-classical model of
adjustment predicts several consequences of an oil-led boost (slump) in
domestic expenditure. Firstly, the real exchange rate will appreciate
(depreciate) and thus, secondly and more importantly, this is associated with a
shift in production structure toward the non-traded (traded) goods sectors. From
the above analysis, the model designated must shed light on the major
variables that might be expected to affect the production within the non-traded
goods sector in the national economy. These variables can be specified as oil
price, oil revenues, the real exchange rate and government expenditure. As the
theory predicts, the production of non-tradables is expected to respond
negatively to the real exchange rate, while the rest of variables are expected to
respond positively. This can be rewritten as:
NT = NT ( Pot, ORt, RERt, Gt)
	 (4.3)
NT/6Po, NT/6OR, and öNT/öG > 0
	 and öNT/öRER < 0
4.6.4 The Traded Goods Output
An obvious bench mark for tradability is the extent to which particular
goods are actually traded. This bench mark implicitly underlies the short-cut
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adopted in most empirical studies of labelling agriculture and manufacture as
tradable.
The world oil price quadrupled over 1973-73 caused a first external oil
shock. Thereafter, another oil price increase followed in 1979-80 peaking at
around $35 per barrel. This oil boom has been characterised as one with a
large government spending effect resulting from a tremendous increase in the
Saudi Arabian national wealth. Hence, the basic outcome of such change has
brought about an appreciation of the local currency. This would have been
associated with a fall in the supply of the domestic traded goods sector.
Consequently, the difficulty that arose can be classed as an adverse effect of
using oil revenues. The latter turned out to be a mixed blessing in spite of a
higher proportion of wealth for the country.
Similarly, the collapse of the world price of oil in the mid I 980s caused a
reverse effect of the oil boom in terms of a depreciation in the real exchange
rate and thus the expansion of the production of the traded goods sector at the
expense of the non-traded goods sector. The distinguishing features of the
domestic growth rate of the output of tradables responding to oil revenue
changes were: (i) the growth rate of tradables was positive but in a decreasing
rate particularly during the first two years after the first external shock.
Thereafter, the growth rate declined from 6.7 percent in 1972 to 6 and 6.1
percent in 1973 and 1974 respectively. On the other hand, the growth rate of
this sector during the second oil shock in 1979 led to a fall from 12.2 in 1978 to
10.4 percent in 1979; (ii) the highest growth rate ever was of 17.3 percent in
1984 as a result of a deterioration in oil prices and revenues which began in
1982; (iii) during the 1972-80 period, the growth rate of tradables had lagged
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behind non-tradables. These consequences are viewed as consistent with the
literature of the natural resource boom predictions.
On the other hand, as shown in Table 4.4, the oil price declined in the
early 1980s and afterwards and the growth rate of tradables grew faster than
non-tradables except in 1991 when the growth rate of tradables declined to 0.7
percent compared with 8.3 percent of non-tradables, due to the massive
government military expenditure required during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
However, just as an oil boom caused a squeezed traded goods sector,
the oil slump has led to an expansion of its production, both of which are
consistent with the economic theory if the differential of the growth rate
between the two sectors is the norm rather than of one deteriorating at the
expense of the other. Saudi Arabia has experienced a growth of the traded
goods sector even in the boom periods. This can be attributed to tremendous
subsidies provided by the government during that period as noted in the
previous chapter.
Similar to the discussion of variables affecting the production of the non-
traded goods sector, the production of the traded goods sector can be specified
as a function of oil prices, oil revenues, government spending and the real
exchange rate. The first three variables are expected to affect it negatively,
while the real exchange rate is expected to affect it positively. This can be
expressed as:
I = T ( Pot, ORt, Gt, RERt)
	 (4.4)
6TThP0, öT/öOR, öTI6G <0 and T/öRER> 0
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The question may be raised with regard to the inclusion of the oil
revenue and the government expenditure in such equations is the possibility of
the present of high multicollinearity between these variables, which is likely to
severely affect the estimation results. Hence, a statistical test has been used to
check the degree of multicollinearity between the oil revenue and the
government expenditure for the entire sample period and for every three years
of the sample. This test indicates a small degree of multicollinearity for both
periods with an exception of the first three years of the sample 9 . This
unexpected result can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, the oil revenue,
during the oil boom, did not fully transmitted to the domestic economy since a
significant amount of oil receipts were either saved and invested abroad, and/or
allocated to developing countries and financial institutions in forms of
assistance, aid, grants and loans (Amuzegar, 1999). During the oil slump, the
government expenditure did not highly follow the decline in oil revenue due to
the fact that the government found itself in a position to continue to accelerate
its development projects through drawing down from its reserves as well as
increasing its borrowing domestically and internationally 10 . Second, although
the oil revenue was massive during the boom period, the government
smoothed it expenditure as an instrument of the fiscal policy to combat the
pressure of inflation.
Finally one should demonstrate the complete model showing the
endogenous and exogenous variables in logarithms as well as the identification
properties as follows:
1-Irp= a1 +/31Irev+y1Ig+e
2-Irer = a2 +/32 Irev+ y2 !g +
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3- IT = (13 ^ r1rp+ Xi Ims + öIpO + Ø1Iwp + e
= (14 + 2r+ 72 !g + X2 Ims +	 + Ø2IWPt + e
5- Yn,=S+T,
Endogenous Variables:
rp = the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods
rer = the real exchange rate (PtIPn)
T = the value of traded goods
5= the value of nontraded goods
Yn= non-oil GDP
Exogenous Variables:
rev = oil revenues
g = the government expenditure
ms = the broad money supply (M3)
P0 = the price of oil
wp = the world price index
Since precondition for the application of the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) of
an equation in the model has to be identified, the order condition of
identification as a necessary but not sufficient condition is used. The order
condition of an equation to be identified requires that the number of exogenous
variables in the system is equal or greater than the number of slope of
coefficients in the equation concerned (Studemund, 1996).
Applying such requirement on each equation in the model indicates that
the number of exogenous variables in the model (i. e., 5) exceeds the number
of slope coefficients of the relative prices and the real exchange rates
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equations (i. e., 2). Similarly, the slope of coefficients of the traded and
nontraded goods equations are four, while the number of exogenous variables
are five. Since, the identity equation is not estimated, it is not necessary to deal
with its identification properties. As a result, the order condition implies that all
equations are over-identified. According to Studement (1996), 2SLS can be
applied to equations that are either exactly or over-identified.
However, these equations are expected to demonstrate and explain the
impact of oil changes on the economy. Such outcome is associated with some
adverse side-effects, the government has to intervene through implementing
appropriate economic polices in order to mitigate such negative results
emerging form the external shock.
4,7 Policy Response
The oil income increase can be a mixed blessing if the policy adopted is
not adequate to relieve the economy. It is needless to say that adjusting to
external shocks is not easy and painless. Rather, it requires hard decisions to
escape from adverse external shocks with only minor effects rather than a
major reduction in the traditional sector. The question raised is: What policy
should be followed to avoid the reallocation of resources and redistribution of
income resulting from the oil export fluctuations?. In the oil export boom, the
answer depends upon the political and economic situation in which a country
experiences such effects. In the literature, the government has many domestic
options to choose from in order to protect the traditional sector and achieve the
external and internal balance. To show mathematically how a government
policy responds to an export change, in particular an export boom, one can use
the model assumptions indicated earlier in this chapter. For the sake of
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simplicity, all variables other than the real exchange rate and government
spending are ignored. Hence, we have:
Traded goods
Supply of traded goods Ts = Ts (RER) where öTs/8RER> 0
. Demand for traded goods Td = Td (RER, G) where Td/RER <0 and
6Td/6G > 0
. Trade balance TB =Ts(RER) + OR - Td(RER)
The derivative of TB with respect to RER is öTB/6RER= 6Ts/RER - Td/öRER
> 0 and the derivative of TB with respect to G is 6TB/öG = -
Where f3 is the proportion of government spending on traded goods, e is the
nominal exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency
It can been seen that a devaluation (a rise in e) or a depreciation (a rise
in Pn/Pt) in the exchange rate will improve the trade balance since Ts/RER>
0 and öTd/6RER< 0 , and thus 6TB/8RER = Ts/6RER - 6Td/öRER > 0. With
regard to government spending, a reduction in government spending will
improve the trade balance as well, since 6TB/G = -
The interpretation of the trade balance improvement is straightforward.
Devaluation in the exchange rate raises the price of imported goods, which
causes the residents demand to switch from imported goods to domestic
goods. Moreover, with respect to foreign demand, the domestic goods become
cheaper than foreign goods. This stimulates the demand for domestic traded
goods. Although a devaluation unambiguously improves the traded balance,
albeit temporarily, as a result of the "expenditure-switching" (substitution) effect
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in production toward traded goods, the "expenditure-reducing" effect which
reduces income and thus expenditure on domestic traded goods causes a
consumption away from traded goods.
Non-traded goods. The demand and supply of non-traded goods Nd =
Nd(RER, 1-3 G) = Ns(RER)
Where 6Nd/öRER> 0, 6Nd/6G >0 and 6NsThRER < 0
A devaluation in exchange rate results in both an increased demand for
non-traded goods, since traded goods have become more expensive, and, at
the same time, a decreased supply of non-traded goods as producers shift to
the more profitable sector (i.e., traded goods). A decline in government
spending is necessary to dampen the excess demand for non-traded goods (as
öNd/öG > 0). However, there are two tendencies involved: the tendency of an
"expenditure-switching" effect toward the consumption of non-traded goods and
the tendency of an "expenditure-reducing" effect away from the production of
non-traded goods, leading to a temporary slump in the price of non-traded
goods rather than a rise. These two effects are purely transitory, but they play a
crucial role during the adjustment to devaluation (Taylor and Connoly, 1976)
The preceding discussion arises from the fact that foreign exchange
receipts resulting from an export boom are spent partially or entirely on the
domestic economy. If the extra income resulting from an export boom is saved
internationally or invested abroad, the key feature is that oil revenue simply has
no feedback to the local economy. This implies that old exports and old imports
would continue as before with no change in the balance of trade. In other
words, there would be no added income received at home that would increase
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the price of non-traded goods or change the allocation of resources between
traded and non-traded goods. Hence, one can express this as:
OR = G + IR + If
where IR and If are the international reserve and investment abroad
respectively.
An incremental oil revenue would raise either international reserves or
investment abroad or both rather than government spending. The impact of this
policy can be illustrated by taking the total differentiation of the traded and non-
traded goods' equations as follows:
dTs = Ts/öRER dRER where Ts* =dTs/Ts and RER* =dRER/RER
and *indicates a percentage change. So, by substituting and dividing by Ts,
the equation can be rewritten as:
TsTs*= 6Ts/RER RER/T5RER*
Ts* = a RER* where a = Ts/6RER RER/Ts
Since the economy is still as it was in the pre-boom condition, the price
of non-traded goods and thus the real exchange rate remain unchanged. This
leads to:	 RER* = 0	 and thus Ts* = 0.
Using the same approach with the non-traded goods equation gives the
same conclusion. This policy of preventing the adverse side effects of the boom
on the domestic economy is termed by Corden as "exchange rate protection".
Clearly, this policy would lead to two results: (i) diminishing the fluctuation in
current absorption, reducing the present adverse effects of a resource boom
and slowing down the adjustment process; (ii) allowing the economy to store
some benefits of the resource boom to use during the slump periods.
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However, in practice, on one hand, the government allows all or part of
the extra income to spill over to the domestic economy, and on the other hand,
the government is urged to protect the traded goods sector or part of it from the
adverse effects of the boom. This policy can be implemented through
subsidising the traded goods sector or imposing tariffs on imported goods.
Hence, the price of traded goods will decline by units of subsidy:
Pt= Pd(1-S)
where S and Pd represent subsidy and domestic cost of the traded goods
respectively.
As the government chooses this option, it pays a certain subsidy per unit
of output of tradables, which lowers the cost and improves the profitability of the
subsidised sector. Accordingly, this sector expands its production since the
price of tradables falls further than or equal to the world price. Such an
expansion in the traded goods sector is attributed to two factors: a rise in
domestic demand for tradables as long as they are equal to or cheaper than
imported goods; the foreign demand for domestic goods may increase if their
prices are competitive with those in foreign countries.
The alternative method is to impose tariffs on imported goods. Hence,
the price of foreign goods (Pt) increases by the amount of tariff imposed (t). The
new price of foreign goods is:
Pf=Pd (1+t)
As a result, the demand for imported goods will deteriorate since they become
more expensive compared with domestic goods. This stimulates the production
of the traded goods sector. Whether it is worth mentioning the impact of two
such policies on the domestic economy in the long run is debatable. A detailed
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discussion of positive and negative effects and determinants of government
subsidies and tariffs is presented by Benedict et al (1998 and 1995) and Chu
and Hemming (1991). Finally, the policy response to oil revenue fluctuations
with respect to Saudi Arabia can be considered in more detail as follows:
4.7.1- To reduce the economy's absorDtive caracity by a reduction in the
expenditure in order to eliminate the excess demand. This may lead to the
reallocation of the domestic resources in favour of traded goods as a result of
the increase in the relative prices. Such a choice can be applied if the resource
movement effect is in operation, but since the oil sector is an enclave sector,
the spending effect is the only strong effect which influences the economy. The
cut in private and public demand can be through raising taxes, restricting credit
creation, cutting government spending and subsidies. The reduction of
expenditures can affect the domestic investment negatively and may lead to a
contractionary effect. Moreover, the economic growth rate may decline and be
accompanied with lower subsidies. The Saudi authorities had not used this
policy effectively prior to 1983. There were various plausible explanations for
the increase in spending during the boom period. First, the economy was in its
early stage of modernisation, which urged the government to expand their oil
earnings in order to accelerate the country's economic developments,
particularly those related to capital projects. Capital projects can be difficult to
terminate in mid course for technological and economic reasons. Second, the
Saudi government may have genuinely believed the oil boom to be temporary.
This may have induced them to expand or at least to moderate government
spending. On the other hand, the decline in government expenditure from 1983
onward was due to the reduction in its quota in OPEC. However, the incentives
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provided to the traditional sector were not completely cut as a result of a fall in
its oil revenues, rather they were reduced gradually. The possibility of
deterioration in the traditional sector as a result of a spending cut forced the
government to reject this choice, particularly in the first and second external oil
export booms.
4.7.2- To p romote expenditures toward the traditional sector (specifically the
manufacturin g sector) from non-tradables. With this option, policy-makers have
to decide to rely either on the devaluation of the domestic currency or on
adopting commercial policies or both.
Devaluation: It is worth noting that there is a subtle distinction between
devaluation and depreciation in terms of government intervention in the
exchange rate. Moreover, the devaluation is a discrete change, while
depreciation is a continuous change in the exchange rate. However,
devaluation reflects a deliberate government decision, while depreciation is an
outcome of the interaction between market forces and government decision
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997, p. 492). Devaluation is used as an instrument to
increase the foreign exchange earnings or to improve the balance of payments
and to protect the tradable sector. Since an oil export boom leads the output of
non-tradables to expand at the expense of the output of tradables through a
rise in the relative price of non-tradables, devaluation (e =Pd/Pf falls) would
increase the value of one unit of foreign currency measured by the amount of
local currency. At a constant interest rate (no changes in world and home price
levels in the short-term), an increase in the foreign exchange rate will raise the
price of foreign goods and services and reduce the price of domestic goods and
services relative to foreign ones. This implies a reduction in imports associated
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with an increase in exports (a rise in competitiveness). The higher the
elasticities of response of goods perfectly substituted, the stronger the influence
of devaluation. However, sometimes a devaluation is unfavourable due to its
effect on the balance of payments (if not sterilised) causing a rise in money
supply and thus inflation. Furthermore, the devaluation might not last for long
but its influence may continue for much longer. Warr (1986) realised that while
the Indonesian 50% devaluation in 1978 lasted three to five months, its effects
lasted for an average of sixteen months. According to the study by Reinhart,
Kiguel and Gheis (1995), the real effects of devaluation in low-inflation
economies with a fixed exchange rate may be experienced for longer than one
year. However, the results of that devaluation on non-oil traded goods is
debatable. Some analysts have attributed the rise in the non-oil traded sector to
devaluation and some to the unrelated world price increase (Woo, et al., 1994).
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the non-oil exports are unlikely to have been
significantly stimulated by devaluation, as they were mostly oil related products
which were sold in dollars. Furthermore, a devaluation could have set off an
inflationary spiral, a situation the government wanted to avoid at all costs
(Looney, 1990, p. 254). Devaluation can be a successful instrument if it is
associated with other macroeconomic policies. If not, it may lead to economic,
social and political pressures.
Commercial Policies (supply-side economy): the adverse effect resulting from a
boom is a fall in the output of the non-oil traded sector, notably, the
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. To avoid this, some strategies need to
be implemented to protect these sectors. One of these strategies is to adopt
commercial policies, which include a protection, or subsidising, of the
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production of tradables in order to survive and/or to compete with world trade.
Wijnbergin (1984, p.53) stressed that high temporary oil revenues should lead
to an increase in subsidies to the sector concerned during the boom period
rather than an accumulation of foreign assets. The Saudi Arabian government
has adopted a policy of production subsidy for the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors. The objective has been to lower the cost of such
sectors in order to experience a profit and thus allow them to expand. The
subsidy has been provided through establishing specialised agricultural and
industrial development banks. These banks provide long-term loans with
negative or at least zero interest rates. Moreover, other incentives have been
provided such as free or cheap rent for land, reduced energy, tariff waivers,
reduced import taxes, and the purchase of wheat and other products from
farmers. All of the government subsidies have been detailed in the previous
chapter.
4.7.3-The exchange rate protection. Taking into consideration the fact that high
oil revenue is temporary, a real appreciation of the exchange rate resulting from
the boom is one of the main causes of a fall in the output of the non-oil traded
goods sector. Therefore, it should be protected by government intervention,
which aims to avoid a real appreciation of exchange rate through the
sterilisation of the balance of payments. The term "exchange rate protection" is
used by Corden (1984) to describe the government strategy to reallocate
resources. This policy can be implemented by: (i) intervening in the foreign
exchange markets to prevent the nominal exchange rate from appreciation
through open market operations; or (ii) sterilising the domestic monetary effects
of the resulting balance of payments surplus. This can be done through saving
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extra income or investing it abroad (Corden and Warr, 1981, P. 344). The Saudi
Arabian government has, to some extent, selected the route of foreign assets
accumulation during the boom. The Saudi international reserves (excluding
gold) rose from $2.3 billion in 1972 to reach a peak of $32.2 billion in 1981 (The
World Bank, 1994, p. 562). The reasons behind this can be attributed either to
its low domestic absorptive capacity (Wijnbergen, 1984, p.53) or to the
involuntary political pressures to increase domestic spending through narrowing
the gaps between the increased value of oil exports and the value of imports
from developing counties (EL-Emam, 1984, p. 21).
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed theoretically the impact of the external shocks
of a particular export sector (i.e, oil) on the rest of a small open economy. The
impact of such shocks on the economy is reflected in the relative price of non-
traded goods to traded goods and thus the real exchange rates mechanism.
However, for the present study a theoretical model has been built based on
Corden's model with some important limitations, which take the local
circumstances of Saudi Arabia and the economic literature into consideration.
The main findings regarding the impact of an external shock can be
summarised in the case of the boom as: (i) a rise in the price of the non-traded
goods sector relative to the price of the traded good sector; (ii) as a result of (i),
an accompanying appreciation in the real exchange rate; (iii) an expansion in
the non-traded goods sector and a contraction in the traded goods sector. In
the case of the export slump, these results are reversed.
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From a policy maker's perspective, this chapter has presented many
alternative government policies. A government can choose one or more of the
options (devaluation, government expenditure-switching, government
expenditure-reducing, subsidies, restrictive commercial policies and exchange
protection) in order to mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks. These
policies have also been discussed with respect to Saudi Arabia. Here,
government expenditure control in the aftermath of an external shock might be
the best alternative remedy. This is due to the fact that government expenditure
plays a crucial role in Saudi Arabia through its influences on the economy,
directly through government involvement in consumption and investment, or
indirectly via the budgetary financial incentives and constraints.
It worth noting that, as in most developing countries, data may not be as
accurate or available as in developed countries. Therefore, the available data
have to be subject to particular care in order to select the most precise figures.
The data description is discussed in the following chapter.
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Notes
'See chapter two for more details on some of these studies.
2 For more details in models of the oil market, see Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991).
This also is known as the concentration ratio, which shows the endeavour of diversification.
' Jones (1986) discussed that a rise in price of the booming exportable sector confers gains to the
community as a whole, which helps to raise the price of non-tradables. If substitution effects are
relatively strong compared with income effects, the rise in Pn is kept below the rise in PB (price the
booming sector) and vice versa when substitution effects are weak.
These equations are based on Neary and Wijnbergen (1986).
6 Prove: dYn = YnIq dq and since Yn= dYnIY and q = dq/q . by substitution and dividing by Yn, one
can get Yn q
According to the Central Statistics Department, 1993.
For more details in the role of Saudi Arabian government in the economy, see Presley, (1984).
The correlation matrix shows that the correlation coefficient for the entire sample period is 0.40, while
the correlation coefficients for every three years prevails 0.99, -0.38 , 0.31, 0.05, 0.70, -0.13, -0.72 and
0.46 respectively.
'° See Chapter 7, for more details.
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Chapter Five
Data Description
5.1-Introduction
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is useful to review some
information concerning the data involved in this study, in order to give a clear
definition of the selected endogenous and exogenous variables employed in
the study's empirical model. This chapter is based on the need to explain
observed differences in the evolution of the relative price of non-tradables in
terms of tradables and of real exchange rate indicators. At the outset, it is
necessary to indicate that the estimation is based on annual data for thirty-
three years. The sample period is between 1965 and 1997. The selection of
such samples is due to the availability of data, particularly from the Saudi
Arabian sources. The data collected will be divided according to two time
periods or stages. Stage one begins in 1965 prior to the oil export revenues
boom and covers the period until the end of the two external oil boom shocks in
1981. The aim here isto test the impact of the oil export boom on the domestic
economy. Stage two deals with the period of the oil revenue deterioration,
which started in 1982 and was followed by dramatic fluctuations until the end of
1997. The latter period is selected due to the Saudi published available data.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
sources of data. Section 5.3 identifies some simple stylised facts concerning
the definitions of the traded and non-traded goods sectors. Price indices used
as proxies of the price of both categories of goods are provided in section 5.4.
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Section 5.5 throws tight on some other exogenous and endogenous variables
selected in the study. In section 5.6, descriptive statistics are presented, while
the summary is provided in section 5.7.
5.2 Sources of Data
Before proceeding to a discussion of some of the economic variables
used, it is useful to present the major sources of the data involved. The main
sources are the domestic Saudi Arabian statistical reports. These sources
include: the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), particularly the Annual
and Monthly Reports; the Ministry of Planning's Achievements of the
Development Plans; and the Ministry of Finance and the National Economy
Financial and Statistical Reports, especially those from the Central Department
of Statistics. In addition, secondary sources of data are derived from regional
and international sources such as the International Monetary Fund's (IMF)
Statistical Publications; the World Bank's World Tables; and OECD
Publications, particularly those of the Middle East Oil and Gas Reports on oil
prices, production and oil revenues and of the World and Industrial Countries'
Price Indices; OPEC and OAPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins. These sources
are not the only ones used, but other minor sources are cited either below the
tables or in the text.
5.3 Traded and Non-traded Goods
In order to understand the three-sector dependent economy model, a
distinction must be made between the traded and non-traded goodssectors.
The disaggregated data corresponding to such a division are not widely
available. Therefore, empirical studies generally designate different
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approaches to distinguish between them. The traded goods sector as defined
in the OECD National Account (ANA) publications comprises only
manufacturing, while the non-traded goods sector compasses the service
sectors comprising: (1) electricity, gas and water, (2) construction, (3)
wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels, (4) transport, storage and
communications, (5) financial services and insurance, (6) community, social
and personal services and (7) government services (Strauss, 1994). Micossi
and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), and De Gregorio et al., (1994) used the same
approach in their definition of tradability when they classified manufactured
goods, excluding construction, as tradables, and services as non-tradables.
Agriculture and mining were excluded the categorisation of tradables. The
authors attributed that to the fact that inter-country trade is partially hindered in
some economies by large tariffs and informal barriers.
Another approach used is to define tradables as all commodities except
construction, whereas non-tradables are all services including construction
(Kravis et al., 1978). However, most empirical studies label manufacturing and
agricultural goods as tradables and services as non-tradables. This definition is
the most comprehensive one since it includes and fully explains trade flows in a
wide class of traded goods (manufactured and agricultural) rather than just in
manufactured goods (Marsh, and Tokarick, 1994).
However, an important consideration concerning the usefulness of this
alternative approach is the amount of information contained in it and its
relevance for explaining the case concerned. As the objective of using a
specific approach is to provide information for an assessment of sectoral
changes in the economy, one can use the Saudi Arabian classification of
195
tradable/nontradable goods. The aim of following such a division is to facilitate
the analysis with the availability of domestic data. With regard to the Saudi
Arabian classification, all commodities and services are divided into oil and
non-oil sectors. The latter comprises agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
construction, transportation and communication, real estate and business
services, personal and other services. Accordingly, tradable goods can be
defined as all goods other than services and oil-related products, notably,
manufacturing and agricultural goods. The former includes all manufacturing
industries excluding the oil-related industries, while the latter contains food,
agricultural and animal products, forestry, and fishing. Mining is excluded from
the manufacturing industries due to its negligible portion in the Saudi Arabian
GDP during the sample period. However, the residual non-oil sub-sectors can
be aggregated and treated as non-tradable goods (services). Using such a
classification achieves our aim of having data divided properly and highlights
the impact of oil revenue fluctuations on the Saudi Arabian structural changes.
In addition, it may illuminate the government policies designed to lessen heavy
reliance on oil as the main source of the national income.
Accordingly, it is necessary to shed light on the trend in the output of the
traded goods sector during the sample period. As stated in the previous
chapter, in the context of a growing economy, the definition of de-
md ustrialisation and de-ag riculturalisation emerges from their slower-than-
normal growth rather than from their absolute values. In the absence of an oil
boom, one would expect manufacturing to grow faster than other sectors. In
Saudi Arabia, the growth of manufacturing and agricultural goods, during the
boom, has increased slightly, as shown in Figure 5.1. This outcome is likely to
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be related to the structure and nature of these sectors. They were, prior to the
boom, limited and underdeveloped, but the increase in oil prices may have
induced the output of both categories of goods to grow briskly.
Figure 5.1 Agricultural and Manufacturing Outputs
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Despite this tendency, their increasing outputs fell behind the non-tradable
output's growth. Figure 5.2 shows this outcome, which is highly consistent with
the impact of the oil export boom predictions in the latest definition of de-
industrialisation.
FIgure 5.2 Services and Tradables Outputs
With regard to the provision of services, Figure 5.2 indicates how value
added by the service sector expanded at an increasing rate until the economy
197
started to slow down in the mid-i 980s. The expansion in the service sector was
due to increased capital formation through investments in physical and human
programmes. From 1983 onward, services become more stable with little
fluctuation. The value added by services ceased to rise due to the completion
of the major development projects in the country. The exception to such
stability was in 1992-93 when aftermath of the Second Gulf Crisis in 1990-91
caused an increase in the value added of the service sector.
5.4 Price Indices
Based on the classification derived above, one can aggregate sectoral
deflators to obtain aggregate price indices for tradable and non-tradable goods.
For policy-makers concerned primarily with relative prices, real exchange rates
and resource allocation, it is necessary to use either between-country or local
measures as proxies to represent the price of tradable and non-tradable goods.
The aim of having such proxies is to demonstrate the movement of
tradable/nontradable prices, the real exchange rate and the reallocation of
resources. Various price indices are commonly used as deflators. The most
popular indices proxied for the price of non-tradable goods are the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, whereas
the indices for the price of tradable goods can be proxied either by domestic
price indices such as the Wholesale Price Index (WSPI), the Import Price Index
(MPI), or by foreign price indices such as the World Wholesale Price Index
(WWPI) or the Industrial Countries' Wholesale Price Index (IWPI). Marsh and
Tokarick (1994) and Kravis and Lipsey (1978) provide a survey of alternative
real exchange rate indices in current use.
Since there are different price indices used as proxies for the price of
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tradable and non-tradable goods, this seems to lead to different conclusions.
This sub-section aims to shed light on the major indices commonly used to
measure the relative prices and thus the real exchange rate both internationally
and in Saudi Arabia.
5.4.1 Consumer Price Index (CPI)
The CPI is traditionally treated as the most comprehensive measure of
the price of non-traded goods and it encompasses all sectors of the economy.
Zietz (1996), Edwards (1989), Harberger (1986) and Goldstein and Officer
(1979), among others, suggest the CPI as a proxy for the index of nontradable
prices, as the CPI is heavily influenced by services' activity. The CPI tends to
exhibit much volatility because it is sensitive to the position of the economy in
business cycles and is also subject to the influence of distortions, e.g. subsidy
or taxes.
In Saudi Arabia, the cost of living is measured by two principal indices:
the All Cities Index and the Middle Income Index. The overall item sample size
was raised from 150 to 220 items in 1988. The All Cities Index is the most
comprehensive indicator because it covers the largest percentage of
households in the country - both Saudi and non-Saudi. This index was
originally produced in 1979 and has been in a continuous monthly index series
since then. On the other hand, the Middle Income Index has changed from
covering Saudi households with a monthly expenditure of SR 3,000-11,000 to
Saudi households with SR 2,500-10,000. This index represents at least 50
percent of all Saudi households in the population (Ministry of Planning, Central
Department of Statistics, 1998)
Generally speaking, the CPI possesses some advantages such as the
199
following: (i) it is calculated on the basis of a basket of goods that is fairly
comparable across the country; (ii) it is readily available and published
frequently; (iii) it reflects factor costs since many production inputs, such as
labour, are priced in line with the CPI, and so it may provide a useful indicator
for the cost of production. However, despite these advantages, the CPI in
Saudi Arabia may not have a high enough degree of accuracy to represent the
price of non-tradables. This can be attributed to the following factors: (i) the
CPI contains both traded and non-traded goods.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that the shares of traded and non-traded
goods for the Middle Income Index are 62 and 38 percent respectively, while
for all cities, they are 60 and 40 percent respectively; (ii) the All Cities Price
Index was not available prior to 1979, which means the Middle Income Index
must be used prior to that date. The latter index does not include non-Saudi
households, it covers only five (and later ten) major cities (50 percent of the
Source: derted from Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arthia, 1998.
entire population); (iii) the CPI does not include the rate and prices of
intermediate inputs, capital goods and raw materials, which determine the final
price of goods.
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One can conclude that the Saudi CPI provides a partial rather than a
comprehensive measure of the price level in general and the price of non-
traded goods in particular. The GDP deflator can be used as an alternative
proxy for the movement of non-traded goods' prices.
5.4.2 The GOP Deflator
In the economic literature, the GDP implicit deflator is calculated as the
ratio of nominal GDP in a given year to real GDP of that year (Dornbusch and
Fischer, 1994). Since the GDP deflator is based on a calculation involving all
the goods produced in the economy, it is a widely based price index that is
frequently used to measure price changes. Kravis and Lipsey (1978) chose the
GDP deflator as the one with the strongest claim to represent a general
measure of a country's price level. They attributed this to the fact that it is
based on a conceptual framework that assigns an appropriate weight to each
category of goods, whatever the classification chosen, as, for example,
between traded and non-traded goods. Wood (1991), De Gregorio et at (1993),
and Micossi and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) have focused on the GDP deflator to
measure the real exchange rate changes and they consider it as the more
conventional measure.
In Saudi Arabia, the GDP deflator provides a precise measure for the
movement of price level in general and the price of non-traded goods in
particular. This outcome is derived from many factors: (i) it provides a
comprehensive measure of price level since it contains all goods produced
domestically, unlike the CPI, which covers between 150 and 220 items only for
50 percent of the Saudi population; (ii) since both GDP deflator and CPI
include a large portion of tradables, as Figure 5.5 suggests, there is a high
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correlation between GDP deflator movements and those of the domestic
economic trends, although the GDP deflator does not include prices of imports
but only prices of goods produced domestically. The upward trend in the early
and late 1970s and the downward trend in 1986 indicate the movement of the
GDP deflator as being more consistent with the trend of the economy than the
CPI does. Clark et al. (1994) argue that goods with too high a price may be
excluded from the CPI which may lead to a sampling bias; (iii) the basket of
goods included in the GDP deflator differs from year to year, depending on
what is produced in the economy each year, while the CPI measures the cost of
a given basket of goods, which is the same as in previous years.
Figure 5.5
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5.4.3 Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and Import Price Index (MPI)
The Wholesale Price Index is one of the price indices most widely used
to measure the cost of a given basket of goods. It differs from the CPI partly in
its coverage, which includes, for example, raw materials and semi-finished
goods. In addition, the WPI is designed to measure prices at an early stage of
the distribution system, while the CPI measures prices at the point where urban
households actually do their spending. At the retail level, the WPI is
constructed from prices at the point of the first significant commercial
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transactions. This makes the WPI a relatively flexible price index and one that
generally signals changes in the general price level. Since the occasional
movements of traded goods prices are presumably more similar in different
countries than those of non-tradables, the WPI is historically the index most
widely used as a proxy for prices of traded goods, due to its inclusion of a
higher proportion of traded goods than either the GDP deflator or the CPI
(Kravis and Lipsey, 1978)
Papell (1994) found in his empirical study on the effect of the exchange
rate on the price level on the Group Seven (7G) countries that the strongest
effect was on the UK, followed by the US and Canada when the prices are
measured by the WPI (Papell, 1994). Zietz (1996), Edwards (1989), and
Harberger (1986) among others, suggest using the WPI as a proxy for the price
of tradables since it contains heavily traded goods.
However, the Import Price Index (MPI) can be used as an alternative
measure of the price of tradables. With regard to the Saudi Arabian import
price index, Figure 5.6 shows that it contains 83 and 17 percent of tradables
and nontradables respectively. Nevertheless, the Saudi Import Price Index is
limited in scope as it only covers imported retail prices. This deficiency
emerges from the fact that the Saudi MPI does include imported military goods,
wholesale items and capital goods. In addition, there are many reasons not to
use the MPI as a precise proxy for representing tradable prices: (i) an import
price index should cover all imported goods rather than just retail imported
goods (ii) a retail import price does not use prices that are collected at the point
of entry and usually include C.I.F. (cost, insurance and freight); (iii) even with
respect to imported retail items, prices can vary substantially from what they
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were at the point of entry. This can be due to many factors such as tariffs,
changes in the margin of wholesalers or retailers and changes in the
transportation costs.
Source: Derhd from Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, 1998.
Accordingly, the Saudi WPI will be used as an indicator for the
movement of the price of tradables. It covers all major commercial transactions
carried out in the primary markets in the country. The Saudi WPI includes
transactions of domestic and imported goods, crude and processed materials,
and agricultural and manufactured goods. In addition, it includes government
purchases, except for military goods, and sales of goods. The sampling frame
in the WPI is drawn from lists of wholesalers in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam.
The calculation of the WPI is based on more than 160 items among ten SITC
(Standard International Trade Categories) sections (Central Department of
Statistics, 1998). Figure 5.7 indicates that both indices' (MPI and WPI)
movements are similar, but the WPI has a lower trend than the MPI. This can
be due to the fact that the retail MPI includes some factors that cause higher
prices, such as transportation costs, the wholesale and retail profit margin, and
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tariffs inclusion. In sum, the Saudi WPI will be chosen to represent the price of
tradables, while the Saudi GDP deflator will be used as a proxy for the price of
nontradables. These measures can show the movements of the domestic
relative prices and the movements of the real exchange rate over the sample
period. Therefore, these two indices will be used to represent the relative price
of nontraded goods with respect to traded goods.
Figure 5.7 Import and Wholesale Price Indices
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5.4.4 World and Industrial Wholesale Price Indices
Some empirical studies, have constructed different measures, such as
the World Price Index or the price index of the most common trading partner
countries, in order to represent the price of traded goods, rather than using a
domestic one. The aim of using the foreign index is to measure the movement
of the relative prices and the real exchange rate over time to assess a country's
export competitiveness. Figure 5.8 shows the sharp upward increase in
movement of the World Price Index following the mid-1980s. This might be
attributed to higher inflation rates in developing countries (for example, due to
the debit crisis of the 1980s) and/or the economic developments in the
economies in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
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Therefore, the World WPI is a relatively poor proxy to represent the
movements of the prices of traded goods.
Rgure 5.8 World and Industrial Countries WPI
1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
On the other hand, Figure 5.9 shows the similarly between the Saudi
and Industrial countries' WPI. The reason behind this is that the industrial
countries are the most common trading partners of Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, the industrial countries' WPI will be chosen to represent the
price of traded goods. In sum, the traded and nontraded goods' price proxies
are the industrial countries' WPI and the Saudi GDP deflator respectively. This
outcome allows a focus on the movements of the Saudi Arabian real exchange
rate.
5.4.5 The Relative Prices and Real Exchange Rate
The impact of the natural resource export revenues relies mainly on
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changes in the relative price of nontraded goods in terms of traded goods and
on changes in the real exchange rate. These two variables have a major
influence on an economy through their impacts on the reallocation of domestic
resources.
The importance of the relative price of nontraded and traded goods
comes from the equilibrium response to a shock originating in the real sector of
the economy and, as such, does not warrant monetary policy interventions and
exchange rate realignment. Figure 5.10 shows that the Saudi Arabian relative
price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods, measured by the ratio of
the Saudi GDP deflator to the Saudi WPI, had an upward trend in 1973-74. The
percentage increase in the relative price of the non-tradable with respect to the
tradable goods was 88.4 percent. This sharp increase indicates persistent
inflation differentials between the two categories of goods.
Figure 5.10 Saudi Relative Price, Exchange Rates and GOP Deflator
(Boom Period, Index, 1984=100)
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This phenomenon (a rise in the relative price of nontradables, i.e., a
real appreciation) may have been caused by a number of factors such as: (i) a
rise in oil price and oil production in the first oil shock and (ii) a temporary
increase in government purchases of nontradables, which led to a temporary
increase in total spending; (iii) the higher demand for nontradables by
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households and government, which caused bottlenecks in the economy
(because of limited capacity in physical infrastructure, shortages in housing
and construction). The relative price experienced a comparatively downward
trend between 1975 and 1978. This was due to the government tightening its
fiscal policy, implemented in order to mitigate the effect of the high inflation of
the previous years. The Iranian Revolution commenced in 1979, followed by
the Iranian-Iraqi war. This caused another oil price shock inducing a rise in the
relative price of nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods. The subsequent
increase in the relative price of the nontraded goods sector remained high until
the end of 1981, after which the Saudi Arabian oil revenues declined. The
cause of such a decline was related to a deterioration in the international oil
demand resulting from the world recession, and also due to the adoption of an
oil conservation policy in the Industrialised countries. Furthermore, the share of
the non-OPEC countries in the international market increased at the expense of
the OPEC countries' share. These factors, including the excess production of
some OPEC countries, led to a decline in the Saudi oil production since it was
practising as an oil swing producer in OPEC.
The Saudi Arabian economy has suffered from the effects of lower oil
prices since 1982. Figure 5.11 shows the decline in the relative prices until
1986 when the Saudi government ceased to practice swing production in the
world market. With regard to the Saudi nominal exchange rate, Figure 5.12
shows that it has two features. The first is that the Saudi Riyal (SR), vis-a vis
the US dollar, is relatively fixed as a matter of policy which was subject to a
slight depreciation occurring in 1973. The second is that the movement of the
Saudi Riyal followed closely the movement of the US dollar.
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However, one would expect the nominal exchange rate to have no
significant influence on the relative prices. Therefore, the nominal exchange
rate must be adjusted for the movement in prices to measure the country's
external competitiveness. This adjustment is known as the real exchange rate
(RER). As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two definitions of the
RER: (i) one is that it corresponds to the relative price of traded goods with
respect to nontraded goods; (ii) the other, and more conventional, definition is
that the measure of the RER is the ratio between the most common trading
partners' Wholesale Price Index and the domestic GDP deflator. An important
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difference between the two measures of the RER is that the first one measures
the relative price between two types of domestic goods and, in contrast, the
second one measures the relative price between domestic and foreign goods.
The latter definition is implemented here, since the former is adopted by
reversing it to measure the relative price of nontradable in terms of tradable
goods. Nevertheless, Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 show that the two measures
exhibit similar patterns since a sizeable portion of the change in domestic RER
may have been driven by changes in the domestic relative prices. The only
exception to the two trends occurred between 1975 and 1978. These
differences might be attributed to the rise in costs and prices in the industrial
countries, resulting from the first oil price shock, with regard to the Saudi price
levels.
On the other hand, depreciation started to take place in 1982 to reach its
peak of 19.1 percent, while it stood at 15 and 18.6 percent in 1983 and 1986
respectively. The annual average depreciation in the slump period (i.e.,
between 1982 to 1986) was 11.3 percent. This was followed by a slight
appreciation (1.3 percent) in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, prices of oil
increased and the Saudi Arabian government spending was raised to cover the
cost of the liberation of Kuwait. The average of the annual decline in the period
from 1982 to 1997 was 2.24 percent.
Overall, one can conclude that the movements of the real exchange rate
and the relative price of nontraded with respect to traded goods can be related
to the oil export boom and slump. These upward and downward trends are
illustrated in Figure 5.12.
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5.5 Selected Exogenous and Endogenous Variables
Having discussed the proxies used to represent the relative prices and
the real exchange rate, it is useful to provide some stylised facts about the
major variables used in this study, particularly those which need more attention
in terms of their calculations, such as the price of oil, or in terms of their
determinations, such as the real government expenditure, the real non-oil GDP
and the money supply.
5.5.1- Oil Prices and Oil Revenues
Since the oil prices are volatile on a daily basis and the data used in this
study are concerned with annual figures, one can adjust these prices to give a
clear picture of the oil price movements during the entire year. Therefore, the
data collected from the OPEC Statistical Bulletin are based on monthly figures
and have been adjusted by taking the average prices of the twelve months to
represent the whole year, whilst the data collected from the Saudi Achievement
Plans are based on quarterly figures, which have been similarly amended by
taking the average prices for the four quarters. Despite the differences in
sources of data, the prices of oil extracted are almost identical. In addition,
since the price of oil is denominated in US dollars, it is useful to use it as long
as the Saudi Riyal is pegged to the US dollar.
In the oil market, the pricing of oil depends upon a number of factors, the
most influential of which is the quality of oil determined by the index of the API
(American Petroleum Institute) gravity. Saudi Arabia produces a range of crude
oils. Historically, the four major grades produced have been Arab Bern (API
gravity of about 39°), Arab Light (API about 34°), Arab Medium (API about 300)
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and Arab Heavy (API about 28°). In addition, the secondary grades produced in
recent years have been Arab Extra Light (API about 37°) and Arab Super Light,
whose API between 39° and 52.9°) (Middle East Oil and Gas, 1994).
Since there are different oil qualities and thus prices, the price of oil
used in this study is the price representing the Arab Light crude oil only. The
reasons for choosing this kind of oil are related to two factors: its role in the
OPEC pricing system and its share in the total Saudi oil production. Regarding
the former, OPEC used the price of Arab Light as an indicator for all OPEC
members' crude oils from its birth to the early 1980s. Regarding the latter.
Table 5.1 shows that the Arab Light has been the dominant crude oil produced
in Saudi Arabia and sold on the world market from 1965 up to now. The highest
share of this oil was 81 percent, reached in 1975, while the lowest was 53
percent in 1985. Since 1995, the country has developed new fields (Hawtah,
Dilam, Raghib, Ghinah, and Hazmiyah) which contain light crude oil. As
production of the lighter grade increases, the output of Arab Heavy and Arab
Medium will be reduced (Middle East Oil and Gas, 1995).
Table 5.1 Shares of the Saudi Crude Oil by Grade*
Year Heavy 28.013.( Medium 30.312.4 Light 34.211,7 Extra Light 39.O1O.8
1965	 23.3	 8.0	 68.6	 0.0
1970	 22.3	 7.1	 69.4	 1.2
1975	 9.1	 4.0	 81.0	 5.9
1980	 16.4	 11.2	 66.9	 5.5
1985	 25.0	 15.3	 53.0	 6.6
1990	 13.4	 15.7	 61.4	 9.4
1994	 10.2	 12.1	 63.7	 14.0
* Numbers below crude names indicate the API gravity percentage of Sulphur by weight
Sources: Middle East Oil and Gas, OECD, 1995.
OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1997.
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Turning to fluctuations in oil prices and revenues, one should first focus
on both nominal (market) and real prices (adjusted by inflation rate and
exchange rate changes). Figure 5.13 shows that both real and nominal oil
prices have very similar trends reflecting an upward movement during the boom
period and a downward and during the rest of the sample period.
With regard to the trend of oil revenues, nominal and real oil revenues
are shown in Figure 5.14 as having the same trends. In comparison to oil prices
during the sample period, this shows that the both have followed the same
trend with the exception of 1990-91 when the Saudi government agreed to
increase its production to compensate for the shortage in the world oil market's
demand resulting from the invasion of Kuwait. However, the oil revenues
tended to decline at a faster rate than the oil prices did. This can be attributed,
as mentioned earlier, to the decline in the Saudi quota in OPEC and the World
market, particularly from 1982 to 1986, when its production fell from five million
barrels a day to about three million barrels a day. For this reason, the oil
revenue is included as an exogenous variable and it might have a similar
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or higher impact than oil price does.
5.5.2 Government Expenditures
As has been indicated in the previous chapters, government spending
plays a dominant role in the entire economy due to the fact that all oil and non-
oil revenues accrue directly to the government. Figure 5.15 shows the
government spending adjusted by the CPI and the GDP deflator. Although they
have to follow the same trend, government spending deflated by the CPI seems
to be more sensitive than if the GDP deflator measures it. Nevertheless, both
measures indicate that the government spending from 1965 to 1972 was
relatively constant, and thereafter, it increased continuously during the first and
second oil shocks.
Figure 5.15 Real Government Expenditures
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This outcome was not surprising since the Saudi Arabian economy was
limited and the acceleration of the pace of development requires government
spending in order to improve the human and physical infrastructures, and to
develop the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, this has
been associated with bottlenecks, which have caused inflationary pressures.
The completion of the major infrastructure and the existence of a higher
rate of inflation in the early and mid 1970s convinced the government to reduce
its spending temporarily between 1976 and 1978 (shown clearly by the
downward trend in government spending adjusted by the GDP deflator). The
reduction afterwards was straightforward due to the decline in oil price and/or
oil production. The sharp decline in the early 1990s was related to reallocation
of financial resources in favour of the liberation of Kuwait, and although high
expenses were paid, they were included in the government budget.
5.5.3 Industrial Commodity Price Index
Considering the spending effect, the core model of the Dutch disease
concludes that the increase in oil revenues raises the relative price of
nontraded goods (profitability) and expands their output at the expense of
traded goods. In fact, however, the traded goods sector expanded in most
developing countries following the oil boom. Neary and Wijinbergen (1986)
attributed the expansion of the traded goods to protection of this sector by the
tariffs and quotas imposed. Fardamanesh (1990) provides another explanation
for such an expansion: the rise in the world price of traded goods. He points out
that the rise in the world price of oil raised the world relative price of traded
goods through increases in the oil import cost and hence, the production cost
of traded goods in the developed-exporting countries. Since the Saudi Arabian
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economy was and still is an open economy, the expansion in traded goods
cannot be due to the adoption of prohibitive barriers, but may a result of other
factors such as the rise of the competitive trade countries and/or subsidies
provided by the government. As a result, the commodity price index of the most
commonly trading countries with Saudi Arabia has to be included as an
exogenous variable. The objective of doing so is to test the impact of such an
effect on the composition of the sectoral output in the domestic economy.
Figure 5.16 shows that there was a rise in the industrial countries' price index
during the period of the boom from 1973 to 1981, followed by a slight
fluctuation.
5.5.4 Money Supply
Money supply can be defined both narrowly and broadly. The former
definition covers currency outside banks and demand deposits (Ml), whereas
the broad definition includes Ml, time and savings deposits, and other quasi-
monetary deposits (i.e., residents' foreign currency deposits, marginal deposits
for letter credits, guarantees and outstanding remittances). It is useful to use
the broad money definition since it is a comprehensive indicator, which may
accurately be employed as a measurement of the spending effect. Therefore,
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focusing on the impact of export earning fluctuations requires the money supply
to be used in real terms. The domestic government spending exercises a
dominant influence on the money supply through being the major source of
liquidity. For instance, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 90 percent of the
gross liquidity came from the government cash flows. As just noted, when
inflationary pressures increase, the government shows some fiscal restraint.
There are strong links between government spending and the money supply,
and given the freedom of transferring foreign exchanges, the role of the
monetary policy becomes limited and major monetary expansion is brought
about through the regulation adopted by government spending via its budget.
Figure 5.17 shows the upward trend in nominal and real money supplies.
Figure 5.17 Real and Nominal Money Supply (M3)
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5.6 Descriptive Statistics
The standard descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model
are provided in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. These statistics include the mean,
medium, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera. The first two
descriptive statistics are used as the measures of the central tendency of the
data being studied, while the standard deviation shows how the data used are
dispersed around the central point (the mean and medium). The skewness
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itldicates any bias in the dispersion of the data. There are two forms of
skewness emerging from the symmetrical distribution. The latter indicates zero
skewness in the data, while other forms show either a negative skewness if the
distribution has a long tail to the left or a positive skewness if it has a long tail
to the right. Whereas the skewness indicates the degree of symmetry in the
frequency distribution, the kurtosis indicates the peakedness of that distribution
as being normal, peaked or flatter. (Watsham and, Parramore, 1997).
A test used for checking whether the series is normally distributed is the
Jarque-Bera test. It measures the difference between the skewness and
kurtosis of the series and those from the normal distribution (that is, with
values of zero for skewness and 3 for kurtosis), which follows the chi-square
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. Under the p-value (representing the
probability) method, one can accept the null hypothesis of the normal
distribution if the reported probability exceeds the designated level of
significance (that is, I or 5 percent). Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 represent the
descriptive statistics for the entire sample period (1 965-1 997), the boom period
(1965-1981) and the slump period (1982-1997). All probability values for the
real variables of the government spending (G), the money supply (Ms),
nontraded goods (S), traded goods (T), the real exchange rate (RER), relative
prices (RP), the industrial commodity price index (WP) oil revenues (REV) and
the price of oil (P0) are lead to the acceptance of the null hypothesis of the
normal distribution for all variables at a 1 percent level of significance as well
as at a 5 percent level of significance except for the relative price in the slump
period.
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5.7 Summary
The model's major component variables have been briefly described in
terms of their derivation, movement trends and references. Since the
fluctuations in the Saudi Arabian oil revenues and prices are temporary, the
value of variables is measured in real terms using the year 1984, the middle
year of the sample period as the base year in order to shed light on changes in
the real economy.
Furthermore, the traded and non-traded goods sectors have been
specified due to the division by the Saudi Arabian government of its non-oil
GDP components. The traded goods sector includes agriculture,
manufacturing, forestry, and fishery, while the residuals are defined as
representing the non-traded goods sectors.
With regard to the proxies used to represent the relative price of non-
traded in terms of traded goods, the domestic GDP deflator is used as an
indicator of the price of the non-traded goods sector, while the domestic
Wholesale Price Index is used as a proxy for the traded goods. However, the
real exchange rate is measured by the ratio of the Industrial Countries'
Wholesale Price Index to the domestic GDP deflator. The former represents the
price of traded goods in the most of the trading partner countries, while the
latter represents the domestic prices of non-traded goods.
Generally speaking, the movements of relative prices and the real
exchange rate are sensitive to changes taking place in some variables,
particularly, oil revenues and government expenditures. Not surprisingly, the
ecônôrnic fluctuations are associated with changes in oil revenues since the
economy operates procyclically according to oil market movements.
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Table 5.2 Test for Normality (1965-1 997)
Mean
Medium
Standard Deviation 0.986
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Observations
G	 Ms S
	
T	 RER RP WP REV P0
11.464 10.750 11.628 9.707	 4.788	 4.389	 4.379 11.136 2.476
11.966 11.690 12.088 9.795	 4.752	 4.265	 4.539 11.404 2.485
1.733	 0.660	 0.774	 0.399	 0.413	 0.415	 0.956 0.654
-0.829 -0.697 -0.725 -0.156 0.354	 0.226	 -0.865 -0.481 -0.152
1.996	 1.839	 1.826	 1.464	 2.122	 1.845	 2.156 2.293 2.124
5.172	 4.529	 4.787	 3.376	 1.747	 2.113	 5.093	 1.961 1.182
0.075	 0.104	 0.091	 0.184	 0.417	 0.347	 0.078 0.375 0.553
33	 33	 33	 33	 33	 33	 33	 33	 33
Computations were performed using EVIEWS 3.0.
Table 5.3 Test for Normality (1965-1 981)
4ean
4edium
tandard Deviation 1.048
kewness
:urtosis
arque-Bera
robability
U	 Ms	 S	 I	 KtK Kr	 wr KIV ru
10.855 9.428	 11.137 9.036	 4.834	 4.425	 4.115 10.899 2.274
10.504 9.075
	
10.981 8.974	 4.536	 4.709	 4.262 10.942 2.007
1.458	 0.584	 0.396 0.544	 0.550	 0.424 1.262 0.783
0.307	 0.255	 0.370	 0.415	 0.055	 -0.041 0.107 0.107 0.277
1.443	 1.462	 1.647	 2.060	 1.174	 1.153	 1.308	 1.373 1.582
1.984	 1.860	 1.685	 1.114	 2.369	 2.420	 2.060	 1.907 1.640
0.371	 0.394	 0.430	 0.573	 0.305	 0.3705 0.357 0.385 0.440
17	 11	 Il	 Il	 Il	 11	 11	 1'7	 11
Table 5.4 Test for Normality (1982-1 997)
G	 Ms S	 T	 RER RP WP REV P0
Mean	 12.111 12.156 12.150 10.149 4.739 	 4.351	 4.659 11.388 2.690
Medium	 12.119 12.124 12.138 10.527 4.762 	 4.264	 4.624 11.408 2.517
StandardDeviationO.188	 0.223	 0.049	 0.244	 0.136	 0.197	 0.113 0.345 0.404
Skewness	 0.246	 0.033	 0.852	 -0.955 -1.154 1.450	 0.115 0.210 0.973
Kurtosis	 2.343	 1.703	 2.580	 2.691	 4.010	 3.773	 1.901 3.147 2.219
Jarque-Bera	 0.449	 1.123	 2.056	 2.496	 4.236	 6.006	 0.840 0.133 2.932
Probability	 0.798	 0.570	 0.357	 0.287	 0.120	 0.050	 0.656 0.935 - 0.230
Observations	 16	 16	 16	 16	 16	 16	 16	 16	 16
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Chapter Six
The Empirical Results of the Oil Boom
6.1 Introduction
The sudden and sharp increases in oil prices and the new discovery of
oil in the North Sea in 1970s have contributed to a renewal of interests in the
economic impacts of the oil boom on a domestic economy. The oil boom
represents, on the one hand, opportunities for the accelerated development of
the domestic economy, rising standards of living, increasing economic welfare
and improving the balance of payments, and on the other hand, the traditional
traded goods sector can be adversely affected by the boom and may even lead
to 'de-industrialisation'. The squeeze in the non-oil traded goods sector in this
context is stigmatised as the 'Dutch disease phenomenon'.
This phenomenon has been the subject of many studies in developed
and developing countries. As previously pointed out in Chapter 2, theoretical
and empirical studies have been conducted in the developed countries, mainly
in the U.K and the Netherlands. Examples of such studies are these of Corden
and Neary (1980), Forsyth and Kay (1980), Eastwood and Venables (1982),
Buiter and Purvis (1982), Bruno and Sach (1982) and Wijnbergen (1984)
among others. However, there is a debate, especially in the U.K on the cause
of the decline in the manufacturing sector in the late 1970 and early 1980s.
Forsyth and Kay emphasise that the discovery of oil in the North Sea has led to
an appreciation in the sterling pound which negatively affected the relative size
of the traded goods sector. On the other hand, Bean (1986) argues that the
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decline in the manufacturing sector might be related to the adoption of
contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in 1979-81 by the Conservative
government, aimed at combating inflation and reducing the size of public
sector. Moreover, Eastwood and Venables (1982) pointed out that the
discovery of oil leads to an expansionary effect on the economy unless there is
a gap between the discovery of oil and the increased demand, while Buiter and
Purvis (1982) argue that the discovery of oil may lead to a contractionary effect.
Although most of the studies on the Dutch disease have referred to
developed countries, a great deal of studies has focused on the impact of
windfalls on the developing countries. These studies have taken into account
the characteristics of developing countries. Examples of such studies are: Al-
Gaeed (1991), Fardamensh (1991), Looney (1990), Warr (1986), Stevens
(1986), Pinto (1987), Usui (1996), Zind (1999) among others. Focusing on the
impact of oil price increases on Saudi Arabia and some oil-exporting countries,
there is a controversial issue about whether the oil price increase can lead to a
deterioration in the traded goods sector. AI-Gaeed (1991) empirically confirms
the presence of the classic Dutch disease in Saudi Arabia during the boom
period, while Stevens (1986) argues that the Gulf countries are highly unlikely
to be subject to such a phenomenon. The reason behind this is that the Gulf
countries had actually few directly productive activities before the discovery of
oil, and hence there was little to be damaged. Moreover, Davis (1995) reports
that developing economies with significant oil production recorded better growth
performance than other developing economies in the period of 1970 Ia 1990.
Fardamensh (1991) comes in between, arguing that the manufacturing sector
may expand, while agricultural output may contract in the Gulf countries as a
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result of energy price increases. He attributes such an outcome to the rise in
world prices of manufacturing goods, which raises the profitability of domestic
production. The main criticism of his argument is it omits the striking role of the
spending effect, which has an important impact on the local economies and
hence on the allocation of resources.
With regard to Al-Gaeed, his empirical results stem from his examination
of the impact of the oil boom during the period from 1970 to 1987. He includes
six observations of the oil slump period, which might have diverted the result of
his study toward a decline in the traded goods' output. Moreover, there are
signs of misspecification, which appeared clearly in the explosive behaviour of
some variables and the omission of the unit root test. However, Looney (1990)
emphasises only the impact of the real exchange rate as a proxy for the Dutch
disease on the manufacturing sector, and excludes the relative price of
nontraded goods to traded goods despite its importance. Furthermore, Looney
found that the manufacturing sector has expanded at about the same pace as
that experienced by the nontraded goods sector.
As a result of such a controversial issue, the main purpose of this
chapter is to examine empirically the consequences of the oil boom on the
Saudi Arabian economy during the period from 1965 to 1981, in the sense that
one should test for the existence of the Dutch disease during the sample
period, particularly the main objectives of this chapter are the answers to the
following questions:
. Did the oil boom represented by oil revenue, oil price and the
spending effect, positively affect the relative price of the nontraded
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goods sector relative to the traded goods sector? If so, to what extent
did the oil boom affect the relative price?
. Did the real exchange rate appreciate in response to the oil revenue,
the oil price and the spending effect? If so, to what extent was the
appreciation of the real exchange rate affected?
. Was the traded goods sector squeezed as a result of the oil boom? If
so, to what extent was it affected and what were the causes of such
an outcome?
. Did the oil boom bring about an expansion of the nontraded goods
sector? If so, how and to what extent did it do so?
The answers to these questions may not be adequate unless the policy
response to the boom is discussed. Therefore, the secondary purpose of this
chapter is to discuss the government policy response both within the context of
the analysis and also separately.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses briefly the
stationarity and cointegration and their impliáations for the econometric model.
In section 6.3, modelling approaches are reviewed. In section 6.4, the
specifications of each dependent variable's structural equation and estimation
in log terms, as well as the empirical results, are identified and discussed.
Section 6.5 is devoted to the government policy response adopted during the
boom period. The conclusion is provided in section 6.6.
6.2 Stationarity
Time series analysis assumes implicitly that the data being analysed are
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in fact stationary. This implies that the mean, the variance and the covariance
of a time series remain the same no matter at what time a series is measured.
However, in practice, most the time series are nonstationary since the value of
the variable in one period is an important factor in determining the variable's
value in the following period, and the error terms for successive observations
are autocorrelated (Maddala, 1992). So regressing a time series variable on
another time series variable, where both exhibit strong trend (sustained upward
and downward movement), will often exhibit a very high coefficient of
determination (i.e., R2) even though there is no meaningful relationship between
variables. This situation exemplifies the problem of spurious regression due to
the fact that the high R2 observed is due to the presence of the trend rather than
to the exhibition of the true relationship between variables involved in the model
(Gujarati, 1995).
To avoid spurious regression, it is necessary to test for stationary via the
unit root test, as the common approach in determining the order of integration
needed for obtaining stationarity. If the data shows stationarity at the level, it
will be integrated of order zero, denoted as 1(0). On the other hand, if a time
series is non-stationary, and needs to be made stationary, it must be
transformed in such a way that its moments of distribution are no longer time-
dependent. This can be carried out by taking the differences of that variable;
that is a difference stationarity process. If the first difference of non-stationary
variable is stationary, that the variable is said to be integrated of order one,
written as 1(1), while if second differences are required to achieve stationarity,
then the variable is integrated of order two and so on1.
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It is appropriate to use Dickey-Fuller (DF) approach for unit root test.
This approach is robust against reasonable degree of heteroscedasticity, but
autocorrelation causes problem. This problem of testing for stationarity when
there is autocorrelation in the residuals, is solved by using either the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) or Phillips and Perron (PP) tests. These
approachs incorporate lagged values of the dependent variable in the
regression equation, with the number of lags being chosen, simply to be
sufficient to remove the autocorrelation in the residuals (Watsham and
Parramore, 1998). Nevertheless, the ADF test yields spurious rejections of the
unit root null hypothesis. This result is due to the fact that the ADF test does not
take into account the broken linear trend, particularly when it comes relatively
early (Kim et al, 1999) as in the case under investigation. Consequently, the PP
test is used since the Saudi Arabian economy was subject to a significant oil
shock in the early 1970s2.
By using PP test to check if the variable selected has a unit root, the null
hypothesis of nonstationarity can be rejected if the test statistics exceeds the
critical value that relates to the 95 percent and 99 percent levels of confidence.
Table Al, postulates the unit root test for all variables at levels, first and second
differences at 5% and 1% levels of significance. All variables show
nonstationartiy at the levels and thus the null hypothesis is accepted as long as
the test statistics are smaller than the critical values. However, the first
difference series of the government expenditure (C), the price of oil (P0), the
real exchange rate (RER), the oil revenue (REV) and the world price index
(WP) exhibit stationarity, while the money supply (Ms), the relative price (RP),
traded goods (T), and nontraded goods (5), show stationarity at second
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difference since PP test statistics exceed the MacKinnon critical values.
However, both the constant and the trend are included in the test regression
because the data seem to contain trend as shown visually in chapter five.
Bearing in mind that all variables will be first differenced before being
estimated. The aim of such, as stated earlier, is to avoid any spurious and
misleading results.
6.3 Modelling Approaches
Although the main concern of this chapter is to estimate the formulated
model to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables, one should first elaborate on the two approaches used to arrive at
the final model.
Both approaches stem from the choice of independent variables based
on economic theory, other similar studies and previous experience. The two
approaches to model formulation differ considerably in terms of their
methodologies as follows:
General to specific modelling (Hendi'y'sILSE approach): this method starts with
a general unrestricted model, which includes more lags and variables than one
would normally start with. Then one can reduce the model by eliminating one at
time the variable with the least significant coefficient. Diagnostic tools,
frequently used are the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Wald tests to simplify the
model. The advantage of using this approach is that it increases the precision
of the estimates because of reduced multicollinearity. In addition, it increases
the degrees of freedom and makes the estimate more reliable and induced
greater power of test.
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Although this approach is preferable in principle, using it in its pure form
might be troublesome. This comes from the fact that adding variables with their
lags are likely to cause independent variables to have high correlation. This
high correlation often makes it difficult to measure separate impacts on
explanatory variables (Ramanathan, 1998). To overcome such a problem, one
can use alternative approach, namely Specific to general modelling: this
method starts with a basic specification about which an investigator has a great
deal of confidence, and then performs diagnostic tests that suggest whether
more variables should be added. A diagnostic tool frequently used in this
approach is the LM test as well as Likelihood Ratio (LR) and the Wald test.
Since both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages,
which are discussed in Kennedy (1999) in more details, one should use the
relevant method (that is due to the number of observations and the size of
available data), to select the appropriate model, in order to give robust results.
However, several criteria are used to choose the most suitable model. The
most commonly used criteria for model comparison are t-Statistics, F-Statistics,
DW, and unadjusted and adjusted R 2 as well as other criteria such as Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC), and Schwarz Criteria (SC) among others.
It is worth mentioning that the significant results in one or more
diagnostic test might be at the cost of one of the others. For example, the
increasing number of variables in a model causes the residual sum of squares
(ESS) to decline and R2 to rise, but at the cost of loss in degrees of freedom.
Adjusted R2 and the standard errors of the residuals take account of the trade-
off between the reduction in ESS and a loss of degrees of freedom.
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Accordingly, since the data used in our model are from a small-size
sample (i.e., 17 observations from 1965 to 1981) due to the unavailability, data
prior to 1965 and the end of the oil boom in 1981, simpler models seem to be
more appropriate for three reasons. First, the inclusion of too many variables is
highly likely to adversely affect the sign and magnitude of the coefficient of the
variables. This is due to the possibility of multicollinearity. Second, the resulting
loss of degrees of freedom is likely to reduce the power of the test preferred on
the coefficient. Thus, the probability of committing a type II error (i.e., accepting
a false hypothesis) increases as the degrees of freedom decrease. Third,
simpler models are easier to comprehend than the complex ones. As a result,
the general to specific approach is used in this study due to its advantages
expressed earlier. All potential variables used in previous studies, past
experience and in the economic literature are included. A sample of one model
containing all suggested variables is reported in table A2. An elimination of one
at time the variable with the least significant coefficient was used according to
the diagnostic results until the appropriate model is chosen.
6.4 The Model Specification and Empirical Results
Having discussed both the time series properties as well as the model
formulation approaches, it is now time to specify the model under investigation
and exhibit the regression results. But before proceeding with such an
objective, it is necessary to describe the model. It consists of four behavioural
equations. Thus, there are four endogenous variables: the supply of traded
goods (T), the supply of nontraded goods (NT), the relative price of nontraded
goods to traded goods (RP) and the real exchange rate (RER, and four
exogenous variables, notably, the oil revenue, the price of oil, the government
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expenditure and the broad money supply. All variables used are expressed in
real terms by deflating them by appropriate indices. In addition, the necessary
and order conditions of each equation are checked. It is found that all equation
are over-identified.
The method used to estimate the equations is the Two-Stage Least
Squares (TSLS) method. The right-hand side of the relative price and the real
exchange rate equations are not correlated with the residuals. Thus, they are
treated as exogenous with no simultaneity problem and thus OLS estimators
can produce a consistent and efficient estimator. However, on the right-hand
side of the traded and nontraded goods' equations, there are two endogenously
determined variables, which are included in these equations and are correlated
with the error terms. This result is tested, by using the Hausman specification
error test. The test exhibits the presence of simultaneity in the real exchange
rate and the relative prices variables by including them in the other two
equations. Therefore, one should use the TSLS method in order to give the
estimators consistency and efficiency.
However, in addition to the time series data properties, the correlation
matrix indicates that the correlation coefficients are highly likely to face a
problem of multicollinearity so long as the variables move together in underlying
trends. In our case, one should put emphasis on retaining the variable in the
model, even if the multicollinearity is present as long as two conditions are
satisfied. Firstly, there is a strong theoretical reason for including the variable,
even though it is not statistically significant. Secondly, when using al-value of
one as a guide to identify the candidate variable for elimination, if the t-value of
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such a variable is greater than one, one should retain the variable in the model.
This is because if one drops a variable whose t-value is greater than one, the
adjusted R2
 will be declined. In addition, handling the multicollinearity is not an
easy task since this is a problem with uncontrolled experimental data, rather
than with the model itself3.
Accordingly, the model used rests mainly on economic theory and
previous experience. Hence, the literature of the natural resource boom
predicts that the rise in oil price (equivalent to a new discovery) results in a
large transfer of wealth. This wealth spent partially or entirely on the national
economy leads to great public spending. This in turn brings about a
deterioration in tradables as a result of a rise in the relative price of nontradable
relative to tradable goods and thus an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
On the other hand, the supply of nontradable goods expands as a result of
such an outcome4. So, one can check these consequences separately, starting
first with the implication of a rise in oil price or the oil revenue associated with a
proxy of the spending effect, on the relative prices and real exchange rates.
This is followed by examining the impact of windfalls on structural changes,
through the expansion of the output of one sector at the expense of the output
of the other. Specification of the model is the first task followed by the statistical
results.
6.4.1 Specification of the Relative Price
As indicated in Chapter 4, the Dutch disease theory predicts that an
increase in oil revenues and/or an increase in oil prices may positively affect the
relative price of the non-traded goods sector. The justification for that is
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straighiforward. That is, as the oil revenue is spent partially or entirely on the
domestic economy, the demand for both traded and non-traded goods
increases. The high demand for the former is met by higher demand for
imported goods (i.e., the economy is assumed to be open), while the high
demand for the latter leads to an increase in the price of non-traded goods
since its price is determined domestically and thus the supply of nontraded
goods cannot increase immediately.
In order to trace this effect for Saudi Arabia, the first null hypothesis,
which needs to be checked, is that the rise in the price of oil or oil revenues
leads to an increase in the spending effect which is proxied by the government
spending and/or the money supply. Thus, the oil boom affects positively the
relative price of nontraded goods versus traded goods, in the sense that the
hypothesis can be written as follows:
Ho: 13 t and 1=	 null hypothesis
HI: Ftand ?> 0	 alternative hypothesis
Where f3 is the coefficients of the boom represented by the spending effect
proxied by government spending and money supply, while X represents either
the coefficient of oil revenue or oil price, The equations for the relative price of
non-traded goods can be written as follows:
rp = a + ,Bgm + 2pr + e
t	 t
Where gm represents either the government spending or the money supply,
while pr represents the oil revenue or the oil price and e is the error term. Then
the respecification of the equation of the relative price can be rewritten in the
6.1
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following forms:
rp, =a1 +fl1 g, +A1 or, +e1	 6.2
rp, = a2 + /32 g1 + )t2 po, +	 6.3
rp, = a3 + /33 ms1 + 23 OT + e3	 6.4
rp, = a4 + fl4 ms + 4 po1 + e4	 6.5
6.4.1.1 Statistical Results
Table 6.1 shows the result of regressing the relative price of nontraded goods
against the oil revenue and the government spending. The result for the former
is consistent with the theory predictions in terms of coefficient sign and
magnitude. A ten percent increase in the oil revenue causes the relative price
to rise by about 7.4 percent. The coefficient has the right sign and is highly
statistically significant. However, the proxy of the spending effect exhibits a
negative effect in the relative price via the role of the government expenditure.
A ten percent increase in the government spending brings about a 3.7 percent
fall in the relative price. The sign of the coefficient is contradictory to the theory
and is statistically significant at a one percent level. The reason behind this is
likely to be due to direct government intervention and/or the world price effect.
The government intervention took the form of consumers' and producers' price
subsidies on utilities and the large share of government in the total value added
in the services sector. The world price effect influences the price of domestic
traded goods through the increase in the world's price index of traded goods,
which reflected positively on the domestic price (Fardamensh, 1991).
However, other indicators show that these two variables are jointly
significant and explain 94 percent of the variation in the relative price. Thus,
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one can safely reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient of the oil revenue and
accept the alternative one, while one cannot accept the null hypothesis of the
government spending but instead would conclude that it is statistically
significant with a reverse coefficient sign.
Table 6.1
Estimation of the Relative Price
Equation 6.2	 Equation 6.3	 Equation 6.3	 Equation 6.4
Intercept
OR
0.322
(0.990)
0.746
(7.635)**
-0.371
(-3. 047)**
-.669
(-1.412)
0.387
(2.102)*
-0.464
(-1 0.958)**
- 1.174
(-4.319)
0.746
(7.804)**
1.043
(1.587)
0.304
(2.242)*
MS	 0.269
(3.042)**
R2
	0.950	 0.921	 0.952
Adj-R2
	0.940	 0.900	 0.940
F-test	 78.20	 43.89	 82.35
DW	 2.05	 2.07	 2.14
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability values)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.569	 0.555	 0.636
Serial Correl. LM 0.172
	 0.580	 0.242
Heteroscedasticity 0.070
	 0.727	 0.907
Values in parenthesis are t-ratio with N =17
* significant at 5%, significant at 1% and
	
significant at 10%
0.352
(3. 355)**
0.920
0.900
42.51
2.02
0.427
0.489
0.485
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Now, if the oil revenue is replaced by the price of oil, Table 6.1 indicates
that both variables, namely the government spending and the oil price, have the
same effects on the relative price as in the previous equation with oil revenue
and government spending. A ten percent increase in the government
expenditure leads to about a 4.6 percent decline in the relative price. The
coefficient has the wrong sign and is statistically significant at a one percent
level. On the other hand, the oil price is statistically significant at a one percent
level. A ten percent increase in oil price causes about 3.9 percent increase in
the relative price. Both variables are jointly significant and explain about 90
percent of the variation in the relative price. Hence, one can reject the null
hypothesis of the coefficient of the oil price as being positive, whereas the null
hypothesis of the coefficient sign of the government spending cannot be
accepted but instead one would conclude that it is statistically significant with
the opposite sign. Although the negative impact of the government spending is
unexpected in a boom in the developed countries and the developing countries
with a significant share of traded goods in the GDP such as Nigeria, some other
oil-exporting developing countries may experience such a result due to
government intervention. Jazayeri (1986) points out that Iran, during the 1970s,
had experienced a decline in the relative price of services due to the Iranian
government subsidies. On the other hand, Fardamensh (1991) argues that the
Gulf States including Saudi Arabia, can be subject to a decline in the relative
price, due to the rise in the world price index resulting from the oil price
increase, which in turn increases the domestic price of the traded goods sector.
Alternatively, if government expenditure and oil price are replaced by the
money supply as a proxy for the spending effect and oil revenue, one should
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check to see what happens to the relative price as a result of such changes.
With regard to the money supply, a ten percent here brings about a 2.7 percent
increases in the relative price. The coefficient has the expected positive sign
and is statistically significant at a one percent level. Similarly, the oil revenue is
functioning in the same direction with a highly significant level of its coefficient.
A ten percent rise in oil revenue causes about a 7.4 percent increase in the
relative price in. However, 94 percent changes in the relative price are
explained by variation in the money supply and oil revenue. Thus, the null
hypothesis of the oil revenue and the money supply are rejected in favour of the
alternative hypothesis.
Now, the relative price will be tested against the money supply and oil
price rather than oil revenue. However, Table 6.1 shows that both variables
have affected the relative price in the same manner as the money supply and
oil revenue have. The price of oil is statistically significant at a five percent level,
and a ten percent increase in the price of oil leads to about a three percent
increases in the relative price, while a ten percent increase in the money supply
leads to about a 3.5 percent increases in the relative prices and is statistically
significant at a one percent level. However, about a 90 percent variation in the
relative price is explained by the oil price and the money supply variables
together, which are individually and jointly statistically significant. So, the null
hypothesis of the coefficients of the oil price and the money supply can be
rejected and the alternative ones are accepted.
To sum up, although it is theoretically expected that the oil price, the oil
revenue, the government expenditure and the money supply positively affect
the relative price, the regression results provide the right signs with the money
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supply, oil revenues and oil prices. By contrast, the government spending
resulting from the boom influences the relative price negatively due to the
provision of subsidies and to the world price effect, in the sense that the
behaviour of the relative price is explained by four variables: oil price, oil
revenue, money supply and government spending. Two conclusions worth
mentioning due to their significance economically and statistically. First, the
magnitude of the coefficients of either the oil revenue or the price of oil, are
almost the same when regressed against either proxies of the spending effect.
This indicates that there are no statistical problems such as multicollinearity.
Second, the oil revenue has a stronger effect than the oil price. This outcome is
not surprising since the national income of Saudi Arabia mainly depends on oil
earnings rather than on oil prices, which differ according to its grade (i.e., Light,
Medium or Heavy) and oil price may fall but be compensated by increased oil
production. In addition, the price of oil may increase internationally, but it was
sold below the world standard domestically. Hence, the role of the oil revenue
in the national economy is crucial due to its control over both the fiscal and
monetary policies. At this stage, one can confirm the presence of one of the
predictions of the Dutch disease literature, which implies that the rise in the oil
price, oil revenue and the money supply has a positive effect on the relative
price, while the government spending has the reverse outcome on the relative
price. This leads to the need to check the second prediction of the impact of the
price of oil or oil revenues associated with a proxy of the spending effect on the
real exchange rate.
6.4.2 Specification of the Real Exchange Rate
The second prediction of the Dutch disease theory is that the increase in
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oil revenue or oil price and the spending effect may call for an appreciation of
the real exchange rate of the domestic currency, in the sense that there is a
negative impact of the influx of wealth on the real exchange rate. In the case of
Saudi Arabia, the local currency is fixed to the US dollar and thus the oil boom,
which occurred in the 1970s, is expected to have had a negative impact on the
real exchange rate rather than on the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the
proxy for the former is applied and defined as the ratio of the industrial
wholesale price index (the largest trade-partners) to the Saudi GDP deflator.
However, to test if the oil boom did negatively affect the Saudi real exchange
rate, the following hypothesis should be tested:
Ho: pand = 0	 null hypothesis
HI: tandA<O	 alternative hypothesis
Where 13 is the coefficient of the boom represented by the oil revenue or the oil
price and, while ? represents either the government spending or the money
supply. The equations for the real exchange rate can be written as follows:
rer = a + /3gm + ..%pr + e
t	 I t
Where gm represents either the government spending or the money supply,
while pr represents the oil revenue or the price of oil and e is the error term.
Then the respecification of the equation of the real exchange rate can be
rewritten in the following manner:
rer, =a1 + 181 g1 +A.1 or, +e1	 6.7
rer =a2 +/32 g1
 +22 op, +e2	 6.8
6.6
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rei = a3 + /33 ms, + 23
 Or, + e3	 6.9
rer, = a4 + /34 ms, + 24 po, + e	 6.10
6.4.2.1 Statistical Results
In equation 6.7, the regression of the real exchange rate against
the oil revenue confirms the literature prediction of the negative impact of the
increase in oil revenue on the real exchange rate. Table 6.2 shows that the oil
revenue has the right negative sign, and is very highly statistically significant. A
ten percent increase in the oil revenue causes about a 7.4 percent appreciation
in the real exchange rate of the Saudi Riyal.
On the other hand, the role of the spending effect resulting from the
wealth increases acts to reduce the price of nontraded goods since the
government spending as a proxy of the spending effect has the positive sign
and is statistically significant at a five percent level, It is found that a ten percent
increase in the government spending causes the real exchange rate to
depreciate by 3.7 percent. As repeatedly stressed, this can be explained by
the rise in the price of the traded goods sector due to the world price effect
and/or a fall in the price of nontradables due to subsidies provided to the
services sector. The statistical criteria show that 93 percent of the variation in
the real exchange rate is determined jointly by the oil revenue and the
government spending. Thus, one can reject the null hypothesis of the oil
revenue and accept the alternative hypothesis, while the null hypothesis of the
government spending is not accepted, but one should conclude that the
coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign. Using the price of oil
variable to replace the oil revenue with the government spending, the result for
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Figure 6.2
Estimation of the Real Exchange Rate
Equation 6.7	 Equation 6.8	 Equation 6.9	 Equation 6.10
Intercept	 8.944
	 9.749
	
10.157	 7.963
	
(24.881)	 (11.915)	 (46.855)	 (14.431)
OR	 -0.743	 -0.653
	
( 5.7l7)''
	 ( 8.894)'
P0	 -0.299
( 2.331)
G	 0.370
	 0.450
(2.320)*	 (6.166)**
MS	 0.190
(2.71 8)*
R2
	0.947	 0.932	 0.960
Adj-R2
	0.933	 0.914	 0.950
F-test	 74.18	 51.08	 92.07
DW	 2.04	 2.12	 1.92
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability's values)
Normality (J.B)
	 0.558	 0.191	 0.971
Serial Correl. LM 0.071
	 0.435	 0.255
Heteroscedasticity 0.557
	 0.720	 0.905
-0.276
( 2.136)"
0.328
(5.91 3)**
0.930
0.910
47.42
2.03
0.258
0.846
0.465
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N =17
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and	 significant at 10%
the price of oil is consistent with the economic theory prediction, whereas the
government spending is inconsistent with the literature prediction.
However, the oil price and the government spending are jointly and also
individually statistically significant at a one percent level for the latter and a five
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percent level for the former. The only minor difference is that the magnitude of
the oil price is relatively small in comparison with that of the oil revenue. This
outcome can be due to the fact that oil revenues accurately represent the
wealth, which accrues to the government, while the oil price selected in the
model refers only to Arabian Light oil, and ignores the other grades. Thus, since
the Arabian Light oil price only represents about 79 percent of all the oil grades,
it may not be very precise. Nevertheless, the statistical criteria indicate that the
model is an appropriate model due to the determination coefficient,
magnitudes, DW and t-statistics. A ten percent increase in the oil price calls for
about a 3.0 percent appreciation in the real exchange rate, while a ten percent
increase in the government spending leads to about a 4.5 percent depreciation
in the real exchange rate. Therefore, the null hypothesis for the oil price is
rejected and one can conclude that the price of oil has a predicted economic
impact on the Saudi real exchange rate. On the other hand, the null hypothesis
of the coefficient of the government spending cannot be accepted but instead
one would conclude that it is statistically significant with the opposite sign.
Turning to the impact of the oil revenue and the money supply on the
real exchange rate, the sign of the oil revenue coefficient is as expected in the
economic literature and is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten
percent increase in the oil revenue calls for a 6.5 percent appreciation in real
Saudi Riyals. Whereas the money supply is statistically significant at a five
percent level, the impact of the money supply is positive. A ten percent
increase in the money supply brings nearly a two percent depreciation in the
real exchange rate. Again, this is likely to be due to the role of government
intervention in form of subsidising the producer and consumer price of services.
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Nevertheless, both variables are jointly significant and they explain 95 percent
of the variation in the real exchange rate. Hence, one can reject the null
hypothesis of the oil revenue in favour of the alternative hypothesis. While the
null hypothesis of the money supply is not accepted, one can however
conclude that it is statistically significant with the opposite sign.
Regressing the real exchange rate against the price of oil and the money
supply indicates that the oil price acts as the theory predicts, while the money
supply does not. However, both of the coefficient signs are statistically
significant at a one percent level for the price of oil and a one percent level for
the money supply. A ten percent increase in the oil price causes an
appreciation of the real exchange rate by 2.7 percent. On the other hand, a ten
percent increase in the money supply causes a 3.3 depreciation of the real
exchange rate. In addition, the price of oil and the money supply explain about
91 percent of the variation in the real exchange rate. Thus, the alternative
hypothesis of the price of oil is accepted at the expense of the null hypothesis,
while the null hypothesis of the money supply cannot be accepted but one
would instead conclude that it is statistically significant with a different sign.
Finally, one can conclude that the oil revenue and government spending
have a stronger effect than the oil price and money supply. With regard to the
money supply, this can mainly be attributed to the role of the monetary policy in
Saudi Arabia, particularly during the period under study (i.e., 1965 to 1981).
The oil revenue accrues directly to the government rather than to private
citizens, in the sense that the domestic money supply will not increase unless
the government spends at home out of the increased oil earnings. Since the
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government has had massive oil revenues, it has increased its investments
abroad and its net foreign assets in the central bank. Consequently, the money
supply is mainly controlled by the government's fiscal policy. Moreover, the
interest rate as an important instrument in monetary policy is not effective due
to religious restrictions on usury 5. Therefore, the supply of money is mainly
determined by government spending rather than by traditional monetary
instruments.
The importance of analysing the impact of the boom on the relative price
and the real exchange rate stems from their vital role in the economic activities.
This outcome, theoretically, may lead to reallocation of resources. Therefore, it
is necessary to check the impact of the oil boom on the supply of both the
traded and nontraded good sectors.
6.4.3 Specification of the Traded Goods
The main two consequences of the preceding empirical results are: (i)
the increased wealth that accrued to the government had partially been
transmitted to the domestic economy. This was evident from the spending
effect of the boom through the government expenditure and/or the money
supply; (ii) this was followed by an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the
local currency as well as a rise in the relative price of the nontradable to
tradable goods. The importance of such a tendency is related to their impact on
the reallocation of resources in the economy. In the absence of any immediate
economic adjustment, the theory predicts that the output of the traded goods
sector may suffer from contraction during the boom period.
	 -
Here, one should determine empirically if the national economy had
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experienced such a negative side-effect, resulting from the boom and reflecting
the contraction of the output of the traded goods sector. Therefore, the supply
of traded goods will be tested with the price of oil, the money supply, the
relative price, the real exchange rate and the world price index. On the other
hand, the government spending and the oil revenue will be examined through
their impacts on the relative price and the real exchange rate alternatively.
Hence, the regression of the supply of traded goods will be tested against the
oil price, the money supply, the estimated relative price, the estimated real
exchange rate and the world price index 6, as shown in the following equation:
T =a +/ims +2po +q$rêp +ywp +e	 6.11
Where ms, po and wp are the money supply, the price of oil and the world price
index respectively, while Pep represents either the estimated relative price or the
real exchange rate.
Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses of the coefficients of the
supply of traded goods can be formulated as follows:
Ho:	 y and 6 = 0
HI: 13,?, t <O and 4and y>O
Where	 and are the coefficients of the money supply, the oil price and the
estimated relative price of nontraded goods versus traded goods respectively,
while j and y are the coefficients of the estimated real exchange rate and the
world price index respectively.
Accordingly, one can respecify this equation in the following manner:
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T=a +/3ms +Apo+8Pp+ywp+e	 6.121	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
T =a +/3 ms +A. 0 +q5rer +y wp+e	 6.131	 2	 2	 1	 2	 1	 1	 t	 2	 2
Where
p, = a3 + 183 g + 23 0r1 + e 3	 6.14
	
rêr =a +/i g +% or +e	 6.151	 4	 4i	 41	 4
6.4.3.1. Statistical Results
To test how the oil boom affects the output of traded goods, one should
regress the traded goods against a proxy of the spending effect (i.e., the money
supply), oil price and the estimated relative prices of nontraded goods to traded
goods or the real exchange rate. The role of oil revenue and government
spending on the output of tradables will be inferred through their influences on
the relative prices and the real exchange rate. Therefore, the empirical results
of the regression are divided into two parts as follows:
1. Impact of the Oil Price, Money Supply and Relative Prices
Table 6.3 shows that the oil price, the money supply and the relative prices
are individually and jointly statistically significant in affecting the supply of the
traded goods sector. About 96 percent of the variation in the traded goods
production is explained by the variation in the oil price, the money supply and
the relative prices. However, the coefficient of the oil price has the expected
negative sign and is statistically significant at a five percent level. A ten percent
increase in the oil price brings about a one percent fall in the output of traded
goods.
With regard to the money supply, it behaves inconsistently with the standard
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Table 6.3
Estimation of the Supply of Traded Goods
Equation 6.7
	 Equation 6.8
	 Estimated RP
	 Estimated RER
I Intercept
	
6.803
	
3.054
(33.027)	 (2.702)
OR	
-0.240	 -0.288
P0	
-0.100	 -0.199
(-2. 030)*	 ( 4.877)
G	 0.112	 0.143
MS	 0.406	 0.478
(8.859)**	 (7.572)**
-0.322
(-3.21 1)**
RER	 0.388
(3.072)**
LWP	 0.178	 0.221
(3 . 501)**	 (3.599)**
R2
	0.971	 0.970
Adj-R2
	0.960	 0.957
F-test	 86.47	 80.94
OW	 1.92	 2.00
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probabilities)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.267	 0.305
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.251	 0.132
Heteroscedasticity 0.165
	 0.173
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N =17
* Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and *** significant at 10%
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Dutch disease literature's prediction. A ten percent increase in the money
supply causes the output of the traded goods sector to rise by about four
percent and is statistically significant at less than a one percent level. This
outcome is likely to be related to government intervention in the form of
massive domestic subsidies to the local producers and/or to the rise in the
world price index resulting from the sharp rise in the oil price in the early and
late I 970s. On the other hand, the coefficient of the relative price is consistent
with the theory prediction. Thus, it has the right sign and is statistically
significant at a one percent level. A ten percent increase in the relative price of
nontradables to tradables brings about a 3.2 percent decline in the supply of
the traded goods sector. Accordingly, the oil revenue negatively affects the
supply of traded goods through the relative price, in the sense that the
coefficient of the oil revenue has the right sign and thus is consistent with the
literature prediction. Table 6.3 shows that a ten percent increase in the oil
revenue causes the supply of traded goods to fall by about 2.4 percent,
whereas the impact of the government spending on the traded goods'
production does not support the theory prediction. Hence, the sign of the
coefficient is positive. A ten percent increase in the government spending
brings about a 1.1 percent increase in the supply of traded goods.
The explanation of why the spending effect proxies (i.e., the money
supply and the government spending) act in contrast to the theory prediction is
likely to be due to the following reasons. Firstly, the Saudi Arabian economy, at
that time, was to some extent limited and the share of the traded goods sector
was very small. Hence, the government policy tended to protect and stimulate
the traded goods sector through two channels: imposing some trade restrictions
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such as low percentage of tariffs on imported commodities and providing some
incentives such as loans with a zero or negative interest rate, cheap energy
and free lands. Corden and Warr (1981) point out that the government could
adopt a policy of protecting the traded goods sector by imposing tariffs and
providing subsidies rather than using exchange rate controls. Moreover, Neary
and Wijnbergen (1986) attributed the expansion in the traded goods sector in
many oil-exporting countries to the imposition of some tariffs and quotas to
protect the squeezed sector. Secondly, the oil price boom also caused an
increase in world manufacturing goods, which in turn raised the price of foreign
traded goods and consequently the price of domestic traded goods which may
have risen causing an expansion effect on that sector.
Fardmanesh (1991) who identified the so-called "world-price effect" and
stated that the inclusion of this effect is warranted, on one hand by the fact that
oil price increases have been associated with increases in the world price of
manufactured relative to agricultural products and, on the other hand, by the
fact that oil-exporting countries experienced a significant increase in the
domestic relative price of manufactured goods as oil prices increased. As a
result, by adding the world price effect to the equation, the table 6.3 shows that
a rise in the world price index in those periods calls for a rise in the supply of
the traded goods sector by about 1.8 percent. This outcome confirms the
positive impact of the rise in the world price on the domestic traded goods
production.
It is worth mentioning that the government of Saudi Arabia did not
impose taxes and hence could not have depended on tax reduction to stimulate
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production. Instead it provided subsidies (direct and indirect) and incentives
(preference for domestic products in government projects) to investors in order
to avoid the adverse short-run effect of the boom 7. Thirdly, the resource
movement will not occur in the case of Saudi Arabia as long as the oil sector is
a capital-intensive sector, and thus mostly isolated, and the demand for labour
can be met by welcoming foreign labour rather than shifting labour from one
sector to another. Fourthly, although migrant labour (i.e., about one third of the
total population) has some negative impacts, such as massive remittances and
social problems, one can argue that the migrants, to a large extent, are likely to
dampen the role of the relative price through both a higher demand for
tradables and a low cost for nontradables (low-wage labour). Finally, there is no
pure separation between the traded and nontraded goods sectors since some
traded goods are treated as nontradables due to certain trade barriers such as
tariffs and quotas and hence traded goods are expected to expand. Roemer
(1985), in his study about Dutch disease in developing countries, found that five
major oil-exporting countries, namely, Indonesia, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria and
Saudi Arabia, have enjoyed an expansion in the traded goods sector in both
manufactured and agricultural sectors. The only exception was Nigeria, which
suffered from a decline in the agricultural sector alone. Roemer attributed such
an outcome to the existence of underemployment in the economies of over-
populated countries or to the influx of foreign labour in small countries. This
would mitigate the impact of the resource movement effect and stimulate the
production of the tradable sector.
Consequently, the null hypothesis of the coefficients of the oil price, the
oil revenue and the relative price are rejected, while the null hypothesis of the
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government spending and the money supply cannot be accepted but one would
instead conclude that the coefficients are statistically significant with opposite
signs.
2. Impact of the Oil Price, the Money Supply and the Real Exchange Rate
It is time now to replace the relative prices with the real exchange rate in
the preceding equations. As shown in table 6.3, the real exchange rate is acting
as the theory predicts. As the real exchange rate (RER) of the Saudi currency
appreciates (i.e., a decline in the RER, which is an inverse of the relative price),
the output of the traded goods sector contracts. A ten percent appreciation in
the real exchange rate causes about a 3.9 percent decline in the production of
traded goods. It is also statistically significant at a one percent level. The
appreciation of the Saudi Riyal can be related to the rise in the price of
nontradables and to the surplus in the balance of payments, which resulted
from the massive oil earnings accrued to the government during that period.
With respect to the price of oil, it has the right sign and is statistically
significant at a one percent level. A ten percent increase in the oil price leads to
about a two percent decline in the production of the traded goods sector. On
the other hand, using the money supply as an alternative representative of the
spending effect, shows that the rise in the money supply affects the supply of
traded goods positively which is in contrast to the economic theory prediction. A
ten percent increase in the money supply causes the supply of tradables to rise
by about 4.8 percent. However, the coefficient is statistically significant at a one
percent level. Similarly, the traded goods sector's production responds
positively to the government spending via its impact on the real exchange rate.
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A ten percent increase in the government spending leads the supply of
tradables to increase by about 1.4 percent. As repeatedly stressed this
outcome is likely to be due to government intervention and to world price effect.
Figure 6.3 shows that a ten percent increase in the world price index causes
the supply of tradables to increase by about 2.2 percent.
However, the final diagnosis of the impact of the oil boom determines
that oil revenue, oil price and the real exchange rate cause a deterioration in
the traditional traded sector. On the other hand, the proxies of the spending
effect raise the production of the traded goods sector according to the subsidies
provided and the rise in the world price index.
Consequently, the null hypothesis of the coefficients of the oil revenue,
the oil price and the real exchange rate are rejected, while the null hypothesis
of the coefficients of the spending effect's proxies cannot be accepted but one
would instead conclude that they are statistically significant with opposite signs.
The preceding results confirm that the impact of the oil boom on the
traded goods sector, for some oil-exporting countries which are characterised
by large revenues and small populations, is likely to have positive rather than
negative effects in contradiction with the boom literature. Al-Barazi (1987) and
Roemer (1985), among others, suggest in their studies of the impact of the oil
boom on the reallocation of resources that a discovery of oil might expand the
traded goods production due to the significant spending effect and/or the
weakness of the role of the resource movement effect. Furthermore, Bejamin et
a!, (1989) and Fardmanesh (1991) argue that the Dutch disease can be
reversed, in the sense that not all the traded goods sector will contract. Both
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studies reveal that the manufacturing sector may benefit from the boom, while
the agricultural sector is most likely to be badly affected. Bejamin et a! attributed
such an outcome to the government intervention to protect the traded sector,
while Fardmanesh ascribes this to the rise in the world price which positively
affects the supply of the domestic traded goods sector.
In contrast, Al-Gaeed (1991), in his study about the existence of the
Dutch disease in Saudi Arabia, reveals that the oil revenue and oil price affect
the supply of tradables positively, while the spending effect and the relative
price affect them negatively. These results can be argued with respect to three
aspects. Firstly, the oil price cannot be regarded as a good indicator of the
boom since the oil price is denominated in US dollars and the rise in the price
can be mitigated either by lowering the quantity of oil produced or by adjusting
the government spending in order to reduce the inflation pressures. Moreover,
the price of oil is sold domestically cheaper than the world price, which might
have negative consequences as is shown in this study. Secondly, the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors were very limited in terms of size and
development. This leads to the conclusion that these sectors cannot be
harmfully affected especially if one takes into consideration some variables that
may stimulate the production of tradables such as subsidies, protection and the
world price effect. Thirdly, the statistical tests of his study show that there is
some kind of model misspecification, which has led to spurious results. This
outcome was inferred from the explosive behaviour of some of the variables as
well as from the indication of the presence of serial correlation.
With regard to the impact of the oil boom on the traded goods sector in
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the advanced economies, there is a controversial explanation for so-called de-
industrialisation. For example, Forsyth (1986) argues that the cause of the
decline in the manufacturing sector in the UK is likely to be due to the discovery
of oil in the late 1970s, while others such as Purvis (1986) and Corden (1984)
aft ributed such an outcome to the tightening monetary policy that coincided with
the North Sea Oil discovery rather than to the oil discovery itself. Even for the
Netherlands, the cause of de-industrialisation might be related to the existence
of unemployment, which was exacerbated by the increase in social security
contributions and labour market regulations such as the minimum wage (Neary
and Wijnbergen, 1986). Moreover, Corden (1984) argues that the appreciation
of the guilder is due to the booming sector revenues used for social services
which it has been politically difficult to reduce (Corden, 1984).
To sum up, although some variables are not consistent with the theory
predictions due to government policies adopted in order to prevent the
shrinkage of the tradable sector, the most significant explanatory variables
affecting the supply of the traded goods sector are the oil revenue, the real
exchange rate and the government expenditure. However, can these variables
affect the supply of the non-traded goods sector as the literature predicts? This
is tested in the following section.
6.4.4 Specification of the Nontraded Goods Sector
Having discussed the consequences of the impact of the oil revenue, oil
prices, relative prices, the real exchange rate and the spending effect proxies
on the supply of the traded goods sector, it is now time to examine the fourth
symptom of the Dutch disease theory. The theory assumes that the oil boom
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may lead to a reallocation of resources in favour of an expansion of the
nontraded goods sector. There are three channels through which the increase
in the national income resulting from the boom can affect the supply of
nontradables. The first is the increase in the relative price emerging from the
high demand for nontraded goods. The short-run implication of such an
outcome is an increase in the profitability of nontraded goods as long as the
supply does not contemporaneously match the increase in the demand for this
sector. The second channel is a consequence of the first, and is a tendency to
overvaluation of the national currency (i. e., the real exchange rate, by
definition, is an inverse of the relative price). The impact of the real exchange
rate tends to substitute the demand for nontraded goods for that of traded
goods to encourage the former to expand. Finally, and most importantly, is the
spending effect channel, which has its effect through the government spending
and the money supply. Since the increased national wealth may enforce the
government to share the boom benefit with the citizens, the immediate
response of such high per capita income would be a high demand for
nontradables. One has to bear in mind that the government intervention has
been through the services subsidies or by a reduction in the government
spending to reduce the inflationary pressures that occurred during 1974 to
1977. This policy can affect negatively the supply of nontradables since the
government is the main supplier of such goods. In addition, it is necessary to
examine the impact of the world price index on the supply of nontradables
during that period, the aim of which, is to demonstrate whether the world price
index can have a negative effect as long as it seems to raise the price of traded
goods.
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In short, the supply of nontraded goods is expected to respond positively
to changes in the relative price and the spending effect, while it responds
negatively to changes in the real exchange rate and the world price index for
the period of higher inflation. Since the Saudi Riyal is fixed to the US dollar, the
impact of the boom will mainly be through the spending effect via the relative
price and the real exchange rate. Hence, the regression of the supply of
nontraded goods will be tested against the oil price, the money supply, the
estimated relative price, the real exchange rate and the world price index as
shown in the following equation:
S = a + fJms + 2po + q5rêp + ywp + e
	 6.16
Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses of the coefficients of the
supply of nontraded goods can be formulated as follows:
Ho: I3X , ö and y = 0
HI:	 and 6> 0 and ct and <0
Where 13 and are the coefficients of the money supply, the oil price and the
relative price of nontraded goods respectively, while and y are the coefficients
of the real exchange rate and the world price respectively. To examine such
hypotheses empirically, the equations should be formulated as follows:
S +a +fims+Zpo+8r+vwp+e	 6.17
1	 1	 1	 1
S =a +/Jms +1Zpo+ywp+çi5rêr+e	 6.18
1	 2	 2	 1	 2
Where
= a + /3 3 g + % 3 or +
1	 3
rêr = a +
	
+ .%or + e
1	 4
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6.4.4.1 Statistical Results
To test how the oil boom affects the output of nontraded goods, one
should regress the nontraded goods against the oil price, the proxy of the
spending effect, the oil revenue, the world price index and the estimated
relative prices or the real exchange rate. The role of oil revenue and
government spending on the output of tradables will be inferred through their
influence on the relative prices and the real exchange rate. Therefore, the
empirical results of the regression are divided into two parts as follows:
1. Impact of the Oil price, Money Supply and Relative Prices
The regression results of the impact of all the variables except the
government spending, on the supply of nontraded goods show that they are
consistent with the economic theory prediction in terms of the coefficient signs
and levels of significance. Table 6.4 demonstrates that the coefficient of the oil
price has a positive sign and is statistically significant at a ten percent level. A
ten percent increase in the price of oil causes an 1.28 percent increase in the
supply of nontradables. Similarly, the impact of the money supply is consistent
with the Dutch disease theory. Hence, its coefficient has the positive sign and is
statistically significant at even less than a one percent level. A ten percent
increase in the money supply leads to about a 3.7 percent increase in the
supply of nontradables.
With respect to the world price index, measures the reaction of the supply of
the nontraded goods sector to the rise in the world price index. It is found that
there is a negative relationship between them, in the sense that a ten percent
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0.240 0.245
I Intercept
OR
P0
6.245
(12.345)
0.128
(1 .980)***
8.799
(14.878)
0.002
(0.024)
-0.120 -0.122
Table 6.4
Estimation of the Supply of Non-Traded Goods
Equation 6.7	 Equation 6.8
	 Estimated RP
	 Estimated RER
G
MS
RP
0.368
(1 0.306)**
0.323
(2.520)*
0.444
(11.44 1)**
RER	
- 0.330
( 3.098)
LWP	
- 0.517	 - 0.504
(2. 944)*	 (2.791)*
R2
	0.991	 0.991
Adj-R2
	0.986	 0.990
F-test	 179.18	 313.84
DW	 1.95	 1.74
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probabilities)
Normality (J.B)
	 0.786	 0.601
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.296	 0.516
Heteroscedasticity 0.124
	 0.618
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N 17
* Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and
	 significant at 10%
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increase in the world price brings about a 5 percent decline in the production of
nontradables, and is statistically significant at a five percent level. However, the
coefficient of the estimated relative price has the right sign and is the
statistically significant at a five percent level. A ten percent increase in the
relative price calls for about a 3.2 percent increase in the supply of nontraded
goods. Accordingly, the impacts of the oil revenue and the government
spending are shown through their effects on the relative price. The oil revenue
positively affects the production of nontradables as the theory predicts,. Thus,
its coefficient sign is consistent with the economic theory. A ten percent rises in
the oil revenue increases the supply of the nontraded goods sector by about
2.4 percent.
On the other hand, the government expenditure behaves inconsistently
with the Dutch disease prediction, so the coefficient of the government
spending has a negative sign. A ten percent increase in the government
spending calls for a one percent decline in the supply of nontraded goods.
Justification of this outcome is likely to be related to the decline in spending in
the human and capital infrastructure during the mid-1970s in order to reduce
pressures of the domestic and foreign inflation rate. Hence, the share of capital
expenditure in the budget declined from 55.8 percent in 1974 to 46 percent in
1978 (SAMA, Annual report, 1997). Another explanation of the negative impact
of the government spending can be related to the reduction in the provision of
the services' subsidies during that period, the rise in the price of traded goods
due to the world price effect and to the treatment of some tradables as
nontradables due to certain restrictions imposed on them.
258
Consequently, all variables included in the equation are individually and
jointly significant and also their changes explain about 99 percent of the
variation in the nontraded goods sector. One can state that the null hypothesis
of the estimated relative price, the real exchange rate, the money supply, the oil
price and the oil revenue can be rejected, while the null hypothesis of the
government spending cannot be accepted but one instead would conclude that
its coefficient is statistically significant but its coefficient sign is opposite to that
predicted by the theory.
2. Impact of the Price of Oil, the Money Supply and the Real Exchange Rate
Table 6.4 illustrates that all the regressors except the government
spending operate as expected in the economic theory. With regard to the
impact of oil price, its coefficient has the right sign but is statistically
insignificant. This indicates that the oil price does not significantly affect the
production of the nontraded goods sector. This is likely to be due to the fact that
the oil price, particularly in the boom era, was not the main factor influencing
the domestic economic activity as long as it could be compensated by raising or
reducing the production quantities set by the OPEC quotas regardless of the oil
price being high or low. Furthermore, the government, internally, tended to
stabilise its revenues in order to precisely predict its spending and hence to
reduce the domestic inflation (i.e., due to its low absorptive capacity) and,
externally, to moderate the oil price (for the sake of the developing countries
and to minimise the usage of alternative sources) and to reduce the imported
inflation rate.
With regard to the money supply as an alternative proxy for the spending
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effect, the coefficient of the money supply has the expected right sign and is
highly statistically significant at even less than a one percent level. The
increase in the money supply by ten percent raises the production of the
nontraded goods sector by about 4.4 percent.
Table 6.4 shows that the real exchange rate behaves as the theory
predicts, in the sense that the appreciation in the real exchange rate leads to an
expansion in the nontradable production. As a result, the coefficient has the
correct sign and is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten percent
appreciation in the real exchange rate (i.e., a decline in index of the real
exchange rate) calls for about a 3.3 percent rise in the supply of the nontraded
goods sector.
The impact of the government expenditure and the oil revenue can be
referred to their effects on the nontraded goods sector through the real
exchange rate. The sign of the government spending variable's coefficient is
not as expected in the theory and thus is negative. A ten percent increase in
the government spending brings about a one percent decline in the supply of
the nontraded goods sector. Again, this outcome is likely to be due to the
reduction of the government expenditure during the high inflation period in the
mid-1970s. Furthermore, this result is likely reinforced by the impact of the
world price and/or the reduction of the budgetary spending in that period. Thus,
the world price index has a significant magnitude and is statistically significant
at a five percent level. A ten percent increase in the world price index calls for a
5 percent reduction in the production of the nontradable goods sector regarding
its role to raise the profitability of tradables.
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On the other hand, the oil revenue has the right coefficient sign. A ten
percent increase in the oil revenue raises the supply of nontradables by 2.4
percent. However, all regressors except the oil price are jointly and individually
statistically significant and explain about 99 percent of the variation in the
supply of the nontraded goods sector.
Finally, the null hypothesis of the oil revenue, the money supply, the
relative price, the real exchange and the world price index can easily be
rejected, while the null hypothesis of the price of oil can be accepted. On other
hand, the null hypothesis of the government spending cannot be rejected but
one would instead conclude that the coefficient is statistically significant but
with the opposite sign. The aforementioned results show the kind of
adjustments made by the government through its intervention in the domestic
economy activity in order to mitigate the adverse side-effect associated with the
oil boom. It is now necessary to examine the policies adopted by the
government during the boom period.
6.5 Government Policy Response
Since oil revenues accrue directly to the Saudi Arabian government, the
government itself having to make one of two extreme choices or one in
between these choices to deal with the increased oil wealth. Firstly, oil receipts
could be entirely spent on the domestic economy through a rise in public
consumption and investment. Secondly, in contrast to option one, the oil
earnings could all be saved through the accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves and/or invested abroad. Thirdly, adopting the in-between option would
mean part of the oil revenue would be converted into foreign assets and the
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rest of the income resulting from the oil boom spent domestically. The Saudi
government adopted the third option for three reasons. Firstly, the absorptive
capacity of the economy was and is still small, whereas the oil revenue was
extremely high. Secondly, the economy at that time was limited and less
developed, in the sense that the government had to provide broad strategic
goals for constructing a national infrastructure. Moreover, it had made a large
public investment in the basic industries with comprehensive support to
manufacturing and agriculture. Thirdly, it was stressed that the citizen would
share in the benefits from the oil bonanza. Statistically, therefore, the Saudi
foreign reserves and investments increased from SR 2.5 billion in 1973 to SR
42,8 billion in 1980, while recurrent and capital expenditures rose from SR
14.15 billion in 1973 to SR 22.1 billion in current prices (SAMA, Various Annual
Reports). The massive increase in the human and physical infrastructures
brought about a rise in the relative price of nontraded goods versus traded
goods (Pn/pt) and thus an appreciation in the real exchange rate. These results
are the key symptoms of the Dutch disease. Since the Saudi Riyal is fixed to
the US dollar, the higher demand resulting from the expansion in government
spending caused a domestic inflation at a rate greater than that of Saudi
Arabia's trading partners (e.g., the inflation rate reached its highest level in
1975 by 34.7 percent as shown in Chapter 3).
In attempting to mitigate the effect of the increase in the relative prices
and the overvaluation of the domestic currency which may have negatively
affected the supply of traded goods, the government had adopted many
policies to restore the profitability of the traded goods sectors.
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6.5.1 Subsidies
A subsidy can be defined as any government assistance, in cash or in kind,
to private sector producers and/or consumers for which the government
receives no equivalent compensation in return, although the assistance is
conditional on a certain level of performance by the recipients (Clements et a!,
1995). It includes government operations that result in producers receiving
higher returns than suggested by competitive market outcomes (producer
subsidies), and consumers obtaining goods or services below their economic
costs (consumer subsidies).
Since the Saudi Arabian government did not adopted the policy of
devaluation in order to mitigate the effect of the overvaluation of its local
currency during the boom period, the fiscal policy behind the budget had an
expansion in spending financing subsidies. The consumer subsidies included
utility prices, petrol, diesel, gas, air tickets, rice, cooking oil, sugar and meat.
The government also disbursed a large amount of money for agriculture,
industrial and services' enterprises through credit agencies. Middle and low-
income Saudi were given interest free housing loans of at least SR 300,000, of
which 25 percent was disregarded if payments occurred as scheduled (Wilson
and Graham, 1994).
Furthermore, a full range of investment incentives was provided to stimulate
domestic production. These incentives included: (i) availability of industrial
loans for soft loans up to 50 percent of their total cost; (ii) preferential treatment
for local products in government procurement over competing foreign products;
(iii) exemption from customs duties on raw materials, machinery, equipment
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and spare parts imported for industry; (iv) tariff protection from competing
imported goods for certain critical manufacturing products;(v) low-cost plots of
land and utilities for factories (Fagih, 1996). The aim of such incentives was not
to reduce demand, but rather to lower the cost of production to compete with
foreign products. Although these remedies seem to be costly from the
economic point of view, they are used even in industrialised countries, as
happened in the late 1970s when Norway fixed wages and subsidised old
industries and agricultural sectors (Enders and Herberger, 1983). However,
taking the total agricultural subsidies as an example of encouragement to Saudi
farmers to get highly involved in their sectors, the total subsidies in 1974 were
about SR 43 million, while in 1981, they reached about SR 1.lbillion in current
prices (SAMA, Annual Report, 1986).
6.5.2 Recruitment of Foreign Labour
The government tried to moderate its overvalued exchange rate by
welcoming more foreign labour. The non-Saudi working force grew on average
by 16.5 percent per annum between 1975 and 1980 from 0.494 million to 1.06
million. Almost 80 percent of the increase in the total civilian workforce in this
period, therefore, were accounted for in the growth of non-Saudi employment
(Presley, and Westaway, 1989). However, although this remedy to mitigate the
appreciation of the real exchange rate is associated with massive remittances
going abroad, it had two combined outcomes. Firstly, the recruitment of foreign
labour buffered the impact of the sharp increase in the relative price of non-
traded goods resulting from the oil boom, which in turn reduced the cost of
these kinds of products as long as wages were relatively low. Secondly, the
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large labour force, to some extent, brought about a higher demand for non-
traded goods and also contributed to lowering the cost of these products, which
stimulated, and led to an increase in profitability of, the production of traded
goods.
6.5.3 Reduction of Government Expenditure
It is obvious that the rise in the public expenditure in the human and
physical infrastructures had, to a very large extent, called for an increase in
inflation rate and thus the relative price of nontraded goods. The rise in the
energy prices in the early 1970s reinforced the domestic inflation with imported
inflation to reach its peak in 1974 of about 34 percent. However, in theory,
inflation is dependent on the growth in money, income and world inflation. In
Saudi Arabia, stimulative fiscal policy leads directly to an increase in the money
supply because most of the government expenditures are treated as transfer
and because the underlying structure of the country's financial markets is
underdeveloped, so money enters the economy largely through government
expenditure. The policy implication stemming from the Keynesian approach is
that the economy is best stimulated through changes in government
expenditure and/or oil revenues (Looney, 1990).
More specifically, given the obvious dependence of the money supply on
the government fiscal actions, the government simply attempted to stabilise the
economy through its control over public spending. Given the importance of
government expenditure as a driving force in the economy, one might expect
that the monetary expansion, would at most, play a secondary rolein inducing
expenditure. Hence, government expenditure was applied as a measure of
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direct control to influence the patterns of production, investment and
consumption.
Consequently, in order to reduce inflation, the government reduced
expenditure in its budget, particularly capital expenditure. Thus, the share of
capital in the budget declined from 55.8 percent in 1974 to 46 percent in 1978
(SAMA, Annual report, 1997). In contrast, the share of recurrent expenditure
increased from about 44 percent to 54 percent during the same period. This
was due to the continuation of subsidies and to the rise in wages and salaries
of low and middle-income citizens to mitigate the effect of inflation for
consumers, and to stimulate the production of traded goods for producers.
To sum up, one can say that higher oil revenues and thus higher
government expenditure led to a higher relative price of nontraded goods and
increased the inflation rate. This forced the government to intervene by
subsiding consumers and producers, importing foreign workers and reducing
the level of government spending. These measures were aimed at reducing
both the extent of the appreciation of the real exchange rate and also the
pressure of domestic price inflation. More specifically, the adopted policies may
have delayed or prevented the resource reallocation at the expense of the
traded goods sector that might have occurred as a result of the oil boom.
6.6- Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, aspects of economic theory and related findings
have been discussed. It is appropriate here to summarise and regroup what
has been discussed in the context of this chapter.
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6.6.1 The model
6.6.1.1. The model is estimated based on the TSLS method, It was found that
the majority of the behavioural equations produced coefficients that are
statistically significant and have the right signs according to economic theory
and past experience. The only exception is the impact of the spending effect,
mainly the government spending, on the output of the traded goods sector.
However, this outcome is justified as is explained below. Economically
speaking, the results are welcome considering the overwhelming obstacles
concerning the availability and reliability of data and the small sample size.
6.6.1.2. All variables are jointly and individually statistically significant with the
exception of the impact of the oil price on the supply of the non-traded goods
sector. Furthermore, the magnitude of some variables, particularly the oil price
and the money supply differ from one equation to another. This is attributed to
the dominance of the government spending effect and the oil revenue and is
likely to be due to the presence of multicollinearity. Although multicollinearity is
a common occurrence in most economic studies, it seems to be acceptable
when the variables need to be included in the equation because of their
importance or if economic theory and previous experience suggest they should
be.
6.6.1.3.	 In almost all equations, above 90 percent of variations in the
endogenous variables are explained by the changes in the exogenous
variables. Moreover, in the behavioural equations, it appears that most of them
are free of serial correlation.
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6.6.2 Empirical Findings
The increase in oil revenues and the simultaneous increase in the national
wealth affect the Saudi Arabian economy through the relative price, the real
exchange rate and the reallocation of resources as follows.
1. For the entire boom period, the oil revenue and oil price appreciated the
Saudi Arabian real exchange rate by an average of about 29 and 69 percent
respectively, while they positively affected the relative price of the nontraded
goods sector by an average of about 34 and 70 percent respectively.
2. The government spending effect impacts upon the relative price and the real
exchange rate inconsistently with the theory prediction. The government
spending reduces the relative price by an average of 40 percent, while the
money supply behaves as the economic literature expects. It raises the
relative price by an average of 31 percent and appreciates the real
exchange rate by an average of 26 percent.
3. A reallocation of resources in favour of the nontraded goods sector has
taken place. The traded goods sector, contrary to the theory predictions,
has expanded, but far below the level of the nontraded goods sector. The
money supply has expanded the traded goods sector by an average of 43
percent, whereas the government spending has affected the traded goods
sector through the estimated relative price causing an increase of an
average of 13 percent. Therefore, in the context of the growing economies,
the squeeze of the traded goods sector means it has had a slower-than-
normal growth rather than growth in absolute values. Accordingly, the Saudi
Arabian economy has experienced one of the key symptoms of the Dutch
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disease.
4. The nontraded goods sector responds positively to the increase in the oil
revenues, the money supply, and, relatively, to the oil price. Furthermore,
this sector is positively affected by the relative price, while the appreciation
in the real exchange rate raises the supply of nontradables. On the other
hand, the government spending has a negative impact and seems to reduce
the supply of nontradables by about 1.2 percent.
5. The spending effect is the key variable in determining the changes in all the
variables. This is due to two factors: firstly, the role of the government in
controlling the economy and thus the policies adopted in order to carry out
massive development projects, on one hand, and to protect the traditional
sector; on the other hand; secondly, the absence of the resource movement
effect due to the isolation of the oil sector (i.e., a capital-intensive sector with
highly skilled labour) and the influx of foreign labour have increased the
demand for tradables and relatively lowered the cost of nontraded goods
and thus, to some extent, have mitigated the harmful negative effect of the
boom. In addition, a considerable share of government finances have gone
on military expenses, some of which were spent abroad. The share of
defence expenditure during the Second Development Plan (1975-1980)
amounted to SR 78.16 billion or about 15.7 percent of the total expenditure
(Ministry of Planning, Second Development Plan). This is likely to hinder the
impact of the government spending on the domestic economy.
6. The impact of the rise in the world price resulting from the increases in the
oil price shocks in 1973-74 and 1979-1980 on the output of tradabtes and
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nontradables shows that it has a positive impact on the former and negative
effect on the latter.
Finally, one can conclude that the Saudi Arabian economy was subject
to a unique case of the standard Dutch disease during the period of the
boom from 1965 to 1981, where some of the symptoms of the Dutch
disease, notably the deterioration in the supply of tradables are not
applicable.
6.6.3 Policy Response
Attempts were made to mitigate the adverse side-effect of the oil boom
through adopting three policies:
. reduction in government expenditure on the nontraded goods sector during
the early 1970s to reduce the inflation pressures and to smooth the
bottlenecks in ports, transportation, communications and housing;
imported foreign labour to lessen the appreciation of the real exchange rate
and lower the cost of production of the traded goods sector as well as to
increase demand for that sector;
. subsidies for consumer and producer products aiming to lower the cost of
these products for the low-income citizens and to stimulate production of the
traded goods sector. The government adopted such policies regardless of
their cost in economic terms.
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Notes
1 For more details about stationarity and integration, see, Maddala, 1992, Gujarati, 1995 and
Mukherjee et al, 1998).
2 For more details about the structural breaks under the unit root hypothesis see, Kapetanios,
1999 and Kim, 1999.
The alternative methodology has been used to estimate the model specified in this chapter is
the method of cointegration. The results from this methodology confirm the results presented in
this chapter which are available upon request from the author.
See chapter Four for more details.
The interdependence of the Saudi Arabian monetary and fiscal policy is discussed in more
details in Looney, 1990, Chapter 4.
6 An attempt has been made to estimate the model without including a world price effect. It is
found that the empirical results of that model is inferior comparison to that with it.
See chapter Three for more details.
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Chapter Seven
The Empirical Results of the Oil Slump
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the empirical results of the impact of higher oil
prices and, in turn, oil revenues on the Saudi Arabian economy during the boom
period from 1965 to 1981 has been discussed, it is now time to move one step
forward to discuss the impact of the oil slump, starting firstly to demonstrate the
causes of the decline in oil prices, which began in 1982, and secondly, to
analyse how the deterioration in such prices affected the kingdom's economy.
There is an agreement among economists (Amuzegar, 1999; Stevens 1995;
1996, Al-Yousuf, 1990; Mabro, 1988; Attiga 1988, among others) professionals,
and, lately, politicians (Iranians, Algerians and Libyans), that the two oil shocks
significantly contributed to a continuing decline in the oil prices in the
subsequent years. This was, broadly speaking, due to emergence of new oil
suppliers, and renewed inducements for energy conservation and for availability
of alternative energy resources.
The fall in the spot price of oil began to decline from its peak of over $36
per barrel in 1979-80 to less than $10 in 1986. Accordingly, the oil earnings of
OPEC as the residual supplier of the world oil market fell from their peak of
$282.6 billion in 1980 to about $77 billion in 1986. Since Saudi Arabia is the
largest oil producer among OPEC members, it was obvious that it would be the
member most harmed by such a decline in oil receipts. Therefore, Saudi Arabia
agreed to cut its production as the residual supplier of OPEC in an attempt to fix
the oil prices in the world oil market. Thus, the kingdom's production dropped
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from an average of 9.9 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 1980 to less than 3
mbpd in 1985. The decline in oil production was accompanied with a fall in oil
prices, contributing to a sharp decline in its oil revenues from $119 billion in
1981 to $18 billion in 1986 (OPEC, 1997). As the oil revenues accrue directly to
the government, the consequences of such a decline caused deficits in both the
national budget and the balance of payments' current account that affected the
entire economy, particularly after the Kuwait invasion in 1990. The deterioration
in oil prices, which started in 1982 and exacerbated in 1986, has been termed
by some authors as the 'third oil shock', or the' oil-demand crisis', while others
may use more neutral terms, such as the 'crash', the 'plunge', the 'collapse' or
simply a 'sharp decline' (Ibrahim, 1988).
Although studies conducted into the economic implications of the fall in
oil prices are few, most of those which exist are either related to the developed
countries, namely the UK, or to some high absorptive developing oil-exporting
economies such as Nigeria and Indonesia. As previously pointed out in
Chapter two, Henry and Herbert (1986) focus mainly on the impact of the fall in
oil price on investment plans in the oil sector in the UK and its depletion policy
rather than analysing its impact on the entire economy. Whereas, Powell and
Horton (1985) explain how a sustained fall in oil prices affects aggregate
demand and supply in the world economy in general, and in a net oil exporter
like the UK in particular. This was discussed in terms of the expected degree of
change in a lower inflation rate, lower price levels, lower interest rates and
redistribution of income between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. With
regard to developing oil-exporting countries with a large absorptive capacity,
Afolab and Bladen-Hovell (1990) investigated the two-fold impact of oil price
reduction on the Nigerian economy. This impact corresponds firstly to the direct
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effect of price slump on the domestic economy, and relates primarily to changes
in both the balance of payments and government finances. Secondly, Nigeria as
an oil producer was also influenced indirectly by the impact of a fall in oil prices
on the level of world demand (redistribution of income) and the rate of inflation
(reduction in world price levels) in the world economy.
However, few studies have been conducted into the impact of the
collapse in oil prices and, in turn, oil revenues as a major source of income in
some developing oil-exporting countries with low absorptive capacities. Zind
(1999) in his study of oil price movements and the Arabian Gulf economies,
pointed out that the decline in oil revenues and the budget deficits affected
unequally the different sectors of the economy and thereby led to unequal
sectoral output growth rates. The sectoral responses to the oil shocks are
determined by a number of factors including the inter-sectoral linkages,
changes in quantities and prices of inputs, changes in output prices and in the
development priorities of policy makers. He found that the oil sector was the
major loser and the gains corresponding to this loss accrued mostly to the
government sector and, to a much lesser extent, to relatively slow-growth
sectors, namely the manufacturing, transportation and trade sectors.
Al-Yousuf (1990) investigated the impact of the collapse in oil revenues
on the economies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The structural changes that took
place in both economies following the fall in oil revenues were consistent with
theoretical predictions. There was a rise in the value added for traded goods
(mainly in the manufacturing sector, including petrochemical production) and a
decline in the value added of the private-sector's non-traded goods; particularly
in construction. It is worth noting that Al-Yousuf's computation analysis covered
the time period up to 1988. This implies that he did not analyse the dramatic
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changes, which took place in the early 1990s, when the liberation of Kuwait
severely affected both economies. Furthermore, he did not elaborate on the
determinants of economic changes leading to his findings, such as the
magnitude of changes in real exchange rates, relative prices and structural
changes.
Ibrahim (1987), Hammoudeh and Al-Barazi (1987), and Mabro (1985)
discussed how the decline in oil prices, to a large extent, affected the
economies of the majority of Arab countries through its effects on export
earnings, net remittances, income from factors of production, capital movement
and interest rates. They attributed the sharp deterioration in the Arab countries'
GDP growth rates and development between 1980 and 1985 to the collapse of
oil prices and thus oil revenues. The oil price collapse greatly influenced the
Arab countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. However, Saudi Arabia
was more severely affected during and after 1990, a period not covered by any
previous studies.
Consequently, the main objective of this chapter is to analyse the impact
of the dramatic fall in oil price and, in turn, oil revenues on the national Saudi
economy up to 1997. This sample period includes the second Gulf crisis which
one can term the 'fourth oil shock' due to its severe impact on the domestic
economy. The implications of the oil price collapse will be examined through its
impact on the price of nontradable relative to tradable goods, the real exchange
rate and the allocation of resources. Furthermore, the government policy
response will be discussed both within this context and separately.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews the
origins and causes of the third oil shock (a decline in the oil prices and oil
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revenues). In section 3, the empirical findings regarding the decline in oil prices
are demonstrated and discussed. The government policy response is
elaborated in section 4, and section 5 provides concluding remarks.
7.2 The Origins and Causes of the Third Oil Shock
The causes of the oil price increases in the early 1970s were a debatable
issue among economists, with some supporting the property right theory, others
cartel theory, the market theory and the absorptive capacity theory 1 . These
theories have been briefly discussed in Chapter 2. However, it can be argued,
firstly, that the successful attempts of some oil-exporting countries to exercise
their control over production levels, together with factors such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the Iranian Revolution, explained the dramatic increases in
oil prices. Other contributory factors include decreases in oil inventories, the
strike in Iran in 1978, and the depreciation in the US dollar. Secondly, it was
often concluded that high oil prices would bring about their own collapse. After
the second oil shock, there was a collective agreement that the rise in oil prices,
particularly in the early 1970s, was responsible for introducing fundamental
adjustments in energy consumption, production and pricing. Ali Attiga, the
secretary general of OAPEC, made the following important statement in the
preface to his book about the 1986 oil crisis:
"While the origin of the oil crisis was to be found in the energy policies of the
industrial oil-importing countries, the oil price collapse is due to the lack of
cohesive policies on the part of the developing countries. Their failure to
respond with a concrete policy to the well-known energy policies of the
industrial countries after 1974-75 was largely responsible for the oil price
collapse". (Attiga, 1987)
However, the decline in oil prices (the third oil shock) could be attributed,
broadly speaking, to three distinct factors:
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7.2.1 Slackness in world economic activity.
The common presumption is that the demand for energy is closely
related to changes in economic activity as measured by GDP (Jensen, 1987).
Hence, the reduction in global economic growth in general, and in the industrial
countries in particular, dampened the demand for oil as long as it constituted
the largest share in the world energy demand. Table 7.1 shows that there were
signs of recession in the OECD countries, such as a sharp decline in the
overall GDP in 1982 by -0.3 percent, while the highest inflation rate of 12.9
percent was in 1980, and the highest unemployment rate was 9.0 percent in
1983. Moreover, there were massive deficits in the industrialised countries'
balance of payments, reaching about $70 billion in 1980. Consequently, there
was some rebound in oil and energy demand as a result of the anticipated
stimulus to economic activity in the OECD countries and the expectation of
lower prices. Arnould (1992) attributes such changes to four external shocks:
the rise in raw material prices from 1976-1 977, the second oil shock in 1979-80,
the appreciation of the dollar between July 1980 and February 1985 and the
rise in interest rates between the second quarter of 1979 and the last quarter of
1981.
Table 7.1 Key Economic Indicators for the OECD Countries from 1979 to 1984
Year	 I	 GDP	 Inflation	 Unemployment	 Balance of Payments I
1978
	
3.9
	
7.9
	
5.2
	
9.5
1979
	
3.3
	
9.8
	
5.1	 -29.0
1980
	
1.2
	
12.9
	
6.2	 -70.1
1981
	
1.7
	
10.5
	
6.9	 -24.5
1982	 -0.3
	
7.8
	
8.4	 -27.5
1983
	
2.6
	
5.3
	
9.0	 -24.8
1984
	
4.75
	
5.0
	
8.5	 -70.5
Source: OAPEC, Statistical Annual Report, 1984.
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With respect to the developing countries, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that
all developing countries experienced a fall in their GDPs except the oil-exporting
countries, which maintained a sustainable growth rate till 1980, while the non-oil
exporting countries suffered negative growth rates from 1980 and massive
current account deficits during the remaining sample period. This was due
mainly to increases in their import costs due to the appreciation of the US dollar
accompanied by higher oil prices.
Table 7.2 Economic Growth for Developing Countries 1979-1984 (%)
Years
Countries	 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Non-Oil Exporting Countries	 6.4	 3.7	 -2.1	 -4.1	 -4.3	 -0.8	 3.8
Oil-Exporting Countries 	 2.3	 5.0	 5.0	 3.1	 1.7	 1.8	 3.7
All Developing Countries	 4.7	 4.3	 2.3	 0.7	 -0.1	 0.9	 3.7
Source: OAPEC, Statistical Annual Report, 1984.
Table 7.3 Current Account Position for Developing Countries 1979-1 984 (%)
Years
Countries	 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Non-Oil Exporting Countries 	 -42.9 -63.3 -88.7 -108.5 -85.9 -52.6 -45.0
Oil-Exporting Countries	 5.9	 62.3	 110.4	 53.1 -13.1	 -17.5	 -8.0
All Developing Countries 	 -37.3 -1.0
	 21.8	 -55.0 -99.0 -70.1	 -53.0
Source: OAPEC, Statistical Annual Report, 1984.
The economic implication of such consequences was a reduction in oil
consumption. Table 7.4 shows the strength of the downtrend of oil demand both
in the industrialised countries and in the non-communist world.
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Table 7.4 Consumption of the World and the Major Industrialised Countries (1978-1 984)
{ln Million Barrel Per Day (mbpd)}
Country
	 Years
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981 1982 1983	 1984
USA	 18.3	 17.9	 16.5	 15.6	 14.8	 14.75	 15.5
Japan	 5.4	 5.5	 4.9	 4.7	 4.4	 4.39	 4.55
OECD	 40.6	 40.78 37.6	 35.5	 33.68 33.26	 33.9
World	 63.1	 64.12 61.6	 59.9	 58.4	 58.04	 58.87
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1987.
:OAPEC, Annual Report, 1985.
For example, the US as the major consumer of oil (around one-fourth of the
world consumption) reduced its consumption from 18.3 mbpd in 1978 to about
14.8 mbpd in 1982, while the OECD consumption fell from 40.6 in 1978 to 33.26
mbpd in 1983. Amuzegar (1999) attributed 28 percent of the fall in oil demand
to the recession itself. This outcome led, to some extent, to an excess supply of
oil both from OPEC members and from other oil suppliers, which reinforced the
deterioration of oil prices.
722 Non-OPEC supplies.
There is no doubt that the dramatic oil price increases which generated high
revenues promoted investments from the mid-1970s in various oil recovery
methods in the existing oil fields (because of using new technology and/or
extracting oil from marginal fields and high cost areas such as the North Sea
and Alaska) and encouraged new investments in attempts to discover new oil
fields. Hence, there was a considerable expansion of non-OPEC oil supplies.
Table 7.5 shows that the share of non-OPEC oil producers increased from 51.5
percent of the total world oil production in 1979 to 71.6 percent in 1985. This
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substantial expansion was at the expense of OPEC in general and Saudi Arabia
in particular, whose share fell from 17.4 percent of total world oil production in
1981 to about 6 percent in 1985. The growth of the non-OPEC production was
partly due to the emergence of Mexico and to the development of the large
North Sea Oil reserves, and partly due to new smaller-scale oil suppliers
(Mabro, 1987). For example, Mexico increased its own production by an
average of 1.94 mbpd in 1980 to 2.78 mbpd in 1983, while the UK's production
rose from 1.62 mbpd to 2.23 mbpd in the same period (SAMA, 1984).
Table 7.5 Shares of Oil Production in Saudi Arabia, Non-OPEC and OPEC Countries
Country	 Years
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Saudi Arabia	 13.8 15.1 16.5 17.4 12.1	 8.56	 7.7	 6.04	 8.6
OPEC (Excluding S.A) 35	 33.4 28.2 22.6 22.9 23.14 22.4 22.36 23.2
Non-OPEC	 I 51.2 51.5 55.3 60	 65	 68.5 69.9 71.6	 68.2
Total World
	
100	 100 100 100 100 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: OPEC Statistical Annual Report, 1996.
As a result of such new discoveries, the UK and Norway cut their prices
by $3 in February 1983, which forced Nigeria, whose oil's gravity (Bonny) is
similar to that of North Sea Oil (Brent), to lower its prices by $5.5 per barrel. The
latter cut was 4 dollars less than OPEC's official base price. Furthermore, the
Russian oil (equivalent to Arab Light) also reportedly was reduced to as low as
$27.5 (Skeet 1988). The unity over oil pricing among OPEC members soon
disintegrated and the discipline among members seemed even more difficult to
maintain than before. Hence, the oil prices started to decline sharply over the
period from 1982 to the end of 1986. About 30 percent of the decline in oil price
is attributed to the oil supplies from non-OPEC sources (Amuzegar, 1999).
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However, there are other factors that contributed to the collapse of oil prices,
such as energy conservation and use of oil substitutes.
7.2.3 Energy alternatives and conse,vation.
Prior to the major oil price increase of 1973, the advanced oil-
importing countries gained the most benefits from the imports of cheap oil and
the preservation of their coal resources, which later became of great strategic
importance and economic value. Following the first oil shock, the industrialised
oil-consuming countries formulated their national economic policies through
establishing the International Energy Agency (lEA) early in 1974, which aimed
to govern and regulate oil and energy policy for its members. One of its main
objectives was to reduce dependence on oil through the implementation of oil
conservation programmes and the development of alternative sources of energy
such as natural gas, coal and nuclear power. This objective was, and is still,
being achieved by imposing excise taxes on refined fuels in order to raise local
incomes and reduce oil consumption (Hussein, 1998), as well as increasing
energy research and development spending on new sources of energy in lEA
countries (Attiga, 1987). However, Table 7.6 demonstrates that the energy
consumption began to decline from 1979 to reach its lowest level of 61.9 million
barrels of oil equivalent (mboe) by the end of 1983. Parallel to that, the coal and
natural gas shares of consumption showed upward trends till 1986, when these
began to fall (albeit their absolute values increased). This outcome was due to
the collapse of the oil price in that year, which increased the share of oil. The
nuclear power share increased gradually, while its absolute values declined
after 1987 due to the dangers and high costs associated with building new
reactors as well as opposition from anti- nuclear groups.
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4.0
4.0
4.2
4.7
5.2
5.5
5.8
6.2
6.5
56.6
55.2
52.9
50.8
50.2
49.6
48.8
47.3
48.7
19.9
20.7
22.2
23.5
24.1
24.5
24.6
25.8
25.1
19.5
20.0
20.6
21.0
20.6
20.3
20.8
20.7
19.8
67.7
69.7
67.1
64.5
62.0
61.9
63.9
64.6
64.7
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
The combination of reducing oil consumption (due to oil conservation and
substitution) and the increase in total oil production made it relatively easy for
the OECD countries to implement their policy by building up huge oil stocks.
According to the OAPEC report in 1984, the oil stocks in 1974 rose by 49 and
71 percent in 1978 and 1981 respectively, while the OECD consumption
increased by only 5.5 and 4.5 percent for the same period. This reflected an
excess demand for oil above the need for the OECD countries' consumption
during the boom period, which led, along with other factors, to the rise in the oil
prices. However, the main objective of building up such a stock of about 550
million barrels in 1980 was to be used for the dual purposes of security and
demand management (AlSahlawi, 1998).
Table 7.6 Demand for Energy in the OECD Countries by Sectors
Total Demand	 Sectors (%)
Year	 (mlbdoe)*	 Oil	 Coal	 Natural Gas	 Nuclear
*Indicates one million barrels of oil equivalent.
Source: OPEC Review, Vol.XVI, No.4, Table a, Winter, (1992)
It is fair to say that there are many other factors that, to some degree,
contributed to the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s. Mabro (1987) pointed
out that the virtual demise of the old concession system in the OPEC region in
1979-80 led the developing oil-exporting countries, major and minor oil
companies, independent refiners, oil traders and other trading houses to have
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control over trading in the oil market, thus replacing the dominant multinational
oil companies. In this context, before 1980, the major oil companies had
excellent information regarding supply and demand in the oil market due to the
integration of their vertical and horizontal operations through their joint
ownership of much of the oil supply. This information disappeared after the
second oil shock and hence the demand and the supply became uncertain.
With respect to the oil demand-side, the data were coming in late and were
constantly being subject to revision, while uncertainity of the supply-side data
reflected differences between the various secondary sources (Stevens, 1996).
Furthermore, the structural changes affecting the oil demand were
accelerated by the elimination of control over domestic oil consumption and
production in the United States in the early 1980s. This served to strengthen the
links between the vast domestic oil market in the United States and the world oil
market. So, changes in the conditions of the US oil market began to be
transmitted to the markets for African, Mediterranean and Gulf crude oils.
According to Mabro, this situation caused a huge imbalance between potential
supplies and actual demand for oil, exacerbated by the externalisation of the oil
trade in dynamic and competitive markets (Mabro, 1987).
To sum up, the fall in oil prices from 1982 onwards was generally
believed to be due to the world recession itself, reduction in commercial energy
consumption (through conservation and use of oil substitutes), emergence of
new sources in the oil market, turmoil in the world oil market (due to the
absence of cooperation between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries),
fluctuation in the US dollar's exchange rate and, finally, conflict of interests
among the oil producing countries. Since Saudi Arabia is the largest oil
producer and exporter, it is widely agreed that it has been affected economically
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and politically more than other oil producers. In the light of this, the next step is
to examine how the deterioration and fluctuation in oil prices during the period
from 1982 to 1997 affected the Saudi Arabian economy in terms of changes in
the relative prices, the real exchange rate, and allocation of resources.
7.3 The Model Specification and Empirical Results
Since the Saudi Arabian economy is characterised by the fact that it has
a single source of income (i.e., oil), the decline in oil prices results in a fall in oil
revenues and thus a reduction in the domestic public spending. The literature
on the oil slump predicts that deterioration in oil revenues brings about a fall in
the price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods and depreciation in the
real exchange rate. Accordingly, a structural change occurs through an
expansion of the supply of traded goods at the expense of the supply of
nontraded goods.
These theoretical consequences will be tested, starting first with the
implications of the fall in oil prices or oil revenues associated with one proxy of
the spending effect (i.e., the government spending and the money supply) on
the price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods and on the real exchange
rate. This is followed by the impact of such pitfalls on the structural changes via
changes in the expansion of the output of one sector at the expense of the
other. Specification of the relative prices will be the first task followed by its
statistical results.
7.3.1 Specification of the Relative Price
As already stated, the economic literature predicts that a decline in oil
revenues and/or oil prices may positively affect the relative price of the
284
nontraded goods sector. The justification for this outcome is related to the fact
that the fall in oil revenues, as the major source of income, reflects a decline in
the national and per capita incomes and thus the demand for both traded and
nontraded goods. A lower demand for the latter calls for a decline in the price of
nontraded goods since its price is determined domestically and thus the supply
of nontraded goods is likely to contract, while a lower demand for traded goods
is met by a reduction in imported goods rather than domestic production
(because of depreciation in the real exchange rate defined as the inverse ratio
of the relative price).
In order to trace this effect for Saudi Arabia, the first hypohtesis which
needs to be checked, is that the fall in the price of oil or oil revenues leads to a
decline in the spending effect which is proxied by the government spending
and/or the money supply. Thus, the oil slump is expected to affect positively the
relative price of nontraded goods versus traded goods, in the sense that the
hypothesis can be written as follows:
Ho: f3 and = 0	 null hypothesis
HI: t and A> 0	 alternative hypothesis
Where is the coefficient of the slump represented by the spending effect
proxied by government spending and money supply, while ?t represents either
the coefficient of oil revenue or oil price. The equations for the relative price of
non-traded goods can be written as follows:
rp = a + /3gm + 2pr + e	 7.1
Where gm represents either the government spending or the money supply,
while pr represents the oil revenue or the oil price and e is the error term. Then
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the respecification of the equation of the relative price can be rewritten in the
following forms:
rp, =a 1 +fl1 g, +Aor, +e1	 7.2
rp, = a2 + 182 g1 +22O1 +e2	 7.3
rp, = a3 + /33 ms, + )t3 0r, + e3	 7.4
rp, = a4 + /34 ms, + 24 O1 + e4	 7.5
7.3.1.1 Statistical Results
In Equation 7.2 as shown in Table 7.7, the relative price of nontraded
goods to traded goods behaves consistently, as the theory predicts, in relation
to changes in oil revenues and the government spending. A ten percent fall in
the oil revenue causes the relative price to decline by about three percent. The
coefficient has the right sign and is highly statistically significant. Similarly, the
coefficient of the government spending has the right sign and is statistically
significant at a one percent level. A ten percent decline in government spending
brings about a two percent fall in the relative price.
Furthermore, the two independent variables are jointly significant, and
explain 96 percent of the variation in the relative price. Thus, one can safely
reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient of the oil revenue and the
government spending and accept the alternative one.
Table 7.7 indicates that if the oil revenue is replaced by the oil price,
both variables, namely the government spending and the oil prices, affect the
relative price as expected from the economic literature. With regard to the oil
prices, the coefficient of the oil price has the right sign and is statistically
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significant at a five percent level. A ten percent fall in the oil price leads to a 1.4
percent decline in the relative price. Similarly, the coefficient of the government
Table 7.7
Estimation of the Relative Price
EquatIon 7.5
-0.266
(-0.145)
Equation 7.2	 Equation 7.3
Intercept	 -1.730	 .	 1.272
(-3.135)	 (0.966)
OR	 0.289
(8.747)**
Equation 7.4
-2.508
(-2.997)
0.313
(13.109)**
P0	 0.143
	
0.114
(2.555)*	 (1 .890)***
G	 0.210
	
0.217
(3.285)**	 (1 935)***
MS	 0.237
(2. 891
R2
	0.970	 0.964	 0.981
Adj-R2
	0.960	 0.955	 0.976
F-test	 100.21	 107.66	 202.50
DW	 1.74	 1.73	 2.12
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability's values)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.899	 0.625	 0.507
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.064	 0.261	 0.612
Heteroscedastjcity 0.490
	 0.112	 0.436
Values in parenthesis are t-ratio with N =17
* Significant at 5%,	 significant at 1% and * significant at 10%
0.357
(2.443)*
0.972
0.965
135.63
1.76
0.890
0.525
0.182
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spending also has the correct sign and is statistically significant at a ten percent
level. A ten percent decline in the government spending brings about a 2.2
percent fall in the relative price. However, other statistical indicators,
demonstrates that the oil price and the government spending are jointly
significant and they explain 95.5 percent of the variation in the relative price.
Thereby, one can reject the null hypothesis of the coefficients of the price of oil
and the government spending in favour of the alternative hypothesis.
By using the money supply instead of the government expenditure as the
proxy of the spending effect, one can check how the money supply
accompanied with either the oil revenue or the oil price affects the relative price
of nontraded goods. Starting first with the oil revenue, it is found that both the
money supply and the oil revenue affect the relative price as the economic
theory expects. The oil revenue has the right positive sign and is highly
statistically significant at even less than a one percent level. The empirical
results indicate that a ten percent decline in the oil revenue calls for about a
three percent fall in the relative price. Similarly, the money supply coefficient
has the correct positive sign and is statistically significant at a five percent level.
A ten percent fall in the money supply causes about a 2.3 percent decline in the
relative price. Furthermore, Table 7.7 shows that the variation in the money
supply and oil revenue explains about 98 percent of the variation in the relative
price and that these two variables are also jointly significant. Consequently, one
can safely reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the independent
and dependent variables and thus accept the alternative hypothesis of positive
relationship between them.
Alternatively, replacing the oil revenue with the price of oil, it is found that
the oil price as well the money supply behave as the economic literature
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predicts. Therefore, both variables' coefficients have the right positive signs and
are statistically significant at a ten percent level for the oil price and a five
percent level for the money supply. A ten percent decline in the oil price and the
money supply causes a fall in the relative price by about 1.1 percent and 3.5
percent respectively. These two variables are jointly significant and explain 96.5
percent of the variation in the relative price. Thus, the null hypothesis of the
coefficients of the money supply and the oil price can be safely rejected.
To sum up, the empirical results of the impact of oil prices, oil revenues
and the proxy of the spending effect support the theory predictions of a positive
relationship between these variables and the relative price of nontraded goods
to traded goods. At this stage, one can confirm the presence of one of the
predictions of the reverse Dutch disease literature. However, this leads to the
need to check the second prediction of the impact of the deterioration of oil
revenues, oil prices and the proxy of the spending effect on the real exchange
rate.
7.3.2 Specification of the Real Exchange Rate
One of the symptoms of the reverse Dutch disease is a depreciation of
the real exchange rate of the domestic currency resulting from an oil slump.
Since the Saudi Riyal is fixed to the US dollar, the oil revenue's slump which
started in 1982 is highly likely to have a negative impact on the real exchange
rate rather than on the nominal exchange rate due to the fact that the real
exchange rate is defined as the inverse ratio of the relative price. Thus, the null
and alternative hypothesis can be written as follows:
Ho: 13t and Xt= 0	 null hypothesis
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HI: PtandXt<O
Where t is the coefficient of the slump represented by the spending effect
proxied by government spending and money supply, while ? represents either
the coefficient of oil revenue or oil price. The equations for the real exchange
rate can be written as follows:
rer =a +fJgm+2pr+e	 7.6
t	 t
Where gm represents either the government spending or the money supply,
while pr represents the oil revenue or the price of oil and e is the error term.
Then the respecification of the equation of the real exchange rate can be
rewritten in the following manner:
rer1 =a1 + 181 g, +A 1 or, +e1	 7.7
re = a2 + /32 g, + A 2 op, + e2	 7.8
rer1 =a3 +/33 ms, +23 or1 +e3	 7.9
rer = a4 + /34 ms, +	 + e4	 7.10
Where f3 is the coefficient of either the government spending or the money
supply, while represents the oil revenue or the oil price.
7.3.2.1 Statistical Results
In Equation 7.7, the regression of the real exchange rate against the oil
revenue and the government spending confirms the literature prediction of the
negative impact of the decline in oil revenue and the government spending on
the real exchange rate. Table 7.8 shows that the oil revenue, has the right
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Intercept
OR
Table 7.8
Estimation of the Real Exchange Rate
	
Equation	 7.7	 Equation 7.8	 Equation 7.9	 Equation 7.10
	
12.363	 9.690	 11.264	 11.046
	
(13.398)	 (4.225)	 (9.999)	 (6.740)
	
- 0.230	 - 0.181
	
( 3.451)'	 ( 4.720)'
PO	 -0.110	 -0.136
( 2.070)'
	 ( 2.481y'
-0.413	 -0.382
(3.260)**	 (2.030)***
IMS	 -0.360	 -0.479
(3.476)**	 (-3.91 0)**
R2
	
0.915
	
0.920
	 0.971
	
0.960
Adj-R2	 0.894	 0.890	 0.963	 0.950
F-test	 47.32
	
31.72
	
125.43
	
88.24
DW
	
2.00
	
1.61
	
2.13
	
2.04
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability's values)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.978	 0.697	 0.875
	
0.907
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.654	 0.315	 0.566
	
0.771
Heteroscedasticity 0.436
	 0.221	 0.809
	
0.291
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N =17
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and * significant at 10%
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negative sign, and is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten percent
fall in the oil revenue causes about a 2.3 percent depreciation in the real
exchange rate of the Saudi Riyal. Similarly, the role of the spending effect
resulting from the wealth decreases, behaves to reduce the price of nontraded
goods, since the government spending as a proxy of the spending effect has
the negative sign and is statistically significant at a one percent level. It is found
that a ten percent decline in the government spending causes the real
exchange rate to depreciate by 4.1 percent. As stated before, this can be
explained by the fall in the price of the traded goods sector due to the reduction
in the government expenditure resulting from the decline in oil revenue as the
main source of national income. However, the statistical criteria show that 89.4
percent of the variation in the real exchange rate is determined jointly by the oil
revenue and the government spending. Therefore, one can reject the null
hypothesis of both coefficients of the oil revenue and the government spending
and accept the alternative hypothesis of the presence of a negative relationship
between these two variables and the real exchange rate.
Using the price of oil instead of the oil revenue with the government
spending, the empirical results of the impact of the oil price and the government
spending on the real exchange rate are consistent with the economic theory
prediction, in the sense that both have the right negative signs and are
statistically significant at a ten percent level. A ten percent fall in the oil price
and the government expenditure leads to a 1.1 and 3.8 percent depreciation in
the Saudi Riyal respectively. In addition, they are jointly statistically significant
and their variations explain 89 percent of the variation of the real exchange rate.
Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected.
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Turning to the impact of the oil revenue and the money supply on the real
exchange rate, the coefficient signs of the oil revenue and the money supply are
as expected in the economic literature and are statistically significant at a one
percent level. A ten percent decline in the oil revenue and the money supply
calls for a 1.8 and 3.6 percent depreciation in real Saudi Riyals respectively.
Both variables are jointly significant and they explain about 96 percent of the
variation in the real exchange rate. Hence, one can safely reject the null
hypothesis of the coefficients of the oil revenue and the money supply in favour
of the alternative one.
Similarly, regressing the real exchange rate against the price of oil and
the money supply indicates that the oil price and the money supply act as the
theory expects. This implies that the oil price and the money supply have the
right negative signs and are statistically significant at five and one percent levels
respectively. A ten percent decline in the price of oil and the money supply
brings nearly a 1.4 and 4.8 percent depreciation in the Saudi real exchange rate
respectively. The statistical indicators show that both independent variables are
individually and jointly statistically significant and their variations explain 95
percent of the variation of the Saudi real Riyal. Therefore, the null hypothesis of
no relationship between the dependent and independent variables is rejected
and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
To sum up, the empirical results of the impact of the deterioration in oil
revenue, the oil price and the proxy of the spending effect on the Saudi real
exchange rate support the theoretical prediction of the reverse Dutch disease of
a negative effect on the Saudi real exchange rate.
However, the importance of analysing the impact of the oil slump on the
relative price and the real exchange rate centres on their economic implications
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for the reallocation of resources. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the
impact of the oil slump on the supply of the traded and nontraded goods sectors
separately.
7.3.3 Specification of the Traded Goods Sector
The oil slump, especially for oil-dependent countries, has two main
consequences. The first is that a decline in the oil revenue would be transmitted
to the domestic economy through a decline in the spending effect proxied by the
government expenditure and/or the money supply, which in turn, positively
affect the relative price of nontraded goods to traded goods and negatively
affects the real exchange rate. The second outcome is related to the first one in
terms of the impact of the oil slump, in the absence of any immediate
adjustment, on the reallocation of resources in the domestic economy through
the expansion of the traded goods sector and the contraction of the nontraded
goods sector.
Accordingly, one should determine empirically whether the Saudi Arabian
economy had experienced a reallocation of resources during the sample slump
period from 1982 to 1997. On the one hand, the supply of traded goods will be
tested with the price of oil, the money supply, the real exchange rate and the
world price index. On the other, the government spending and the oil revenue
will be examined through their impacts on the relative price or the real exchange
rate. Hence, the supply of the traded goods will be regressed against the oil
price, the money supply, the estimated relative price, the estimated real
exchange rate and the world price index. Therefore, the null and alternative
hypotheses of the coefficients of the supply of traded goods can be formulated
as follows:
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7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
Ho: tXt, 4)t, yand t = 0	 null hypothesis
HI: f3 t, ? t, t<O and 4) and y>O
	
alternative hypothesis
Where t,Xt, and öt are the coefficients of the money supply, the oil price and the
estimated relative price of nontraded goods versus traded goods respectively,
while 4) and are the coefficients of the estimated real exchange rate and the
world price variables respectively. To examine such hypothesis empirically, the
equation of the supply of traded goods should be formulated as follows:
T =a +J3ms +2po +q$rêp +ywp +e	 7.11
Where ms, po and wp are the money supply, the price of oil and the world price
variables respectively, while Pep represents either the estimated relative price or
the real exchange rate. Hence, one can respecify this equation in the following
manner:
T=a+/3ms+.Zpo+SPp+y 1 wp +e
1	 1	 1	 I	 1
T=a +/3ms+2po+qiPer+ywp+eg	 2	 2	 I	 2	 t	 1	 g	 $	 2
Where
Pp =a +fl3g+2or+eI	 3
reT =a +fl4g+2or+eI	 4
7.3.3.1 Statistical Results
The empirical results of the impact of the oil slump on the supply of the
traded goods sector can be demonstrated by dividing the regression results into
two parts. The first part includes the impact of the oil slump on the traded
goods' production through regressing the latter against the price of oil, the proxy
of the spending effect (namely the money supply), the estimated relative price
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of nontradables to tradables goods and the world price index, while the second
part includes all the above-mentioned independent variables except the relative
price which will be replaced by the real exchange rate. With regard to the
impact the oil revenue and the government spending, this will be inferred
through their influences on the relative prices and the real exchange rate.
Therefore, the empirical results of the regression can be described as follows:
1- Impact of the Oil Price, Money Supply and Relative Prices
Table 7.9 shows that the oil price, the money supply, the estimated relative
price and the world price index are individually, except for the world price index,
and jointly statistically significant in affecting the supply of the traded goods
sector. About 89 percent of the change in the supply of the traded goods sector
is explained by the variation in the selected independent variables. However,
the coefficient of the oil price has the expected negative sign and is statistically
significant at a ten percent level. A ten percent decline in the oil price leads to
about a two percent increase in the supply of tradable goods. Therefore, one
can reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis.
With respect to the money supply, it is found that it behaves
inconsistently with the standard reverse Dutch disease literature prediction. A
ten percent decline in the money supply leads to about a five percent fall in the
output of traded goods and is statistically significant at a one percent level. The
justification of such an outcome is likely to be due to the role of government
intervention in the form of a reduction in the subsidies provided to the local
producers. Accordingly, one cannot accept the null hypothesis of the money
supply but instead would conclude that it is statistically significant with a reverse
coefficient's sign.
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Estimated RER
- 0.288
-0.166
Intercept
OR
P0
G
MS
RP
Table 7.9
Estimation of the Supply of Traded Goods
	
Equation 7.12
	 Equation 7.13
	 Estimated RP
7.094	 2.370
(3.189)	 (1.121)
- 0.240
-0.191	
-0.249
(-1 .874)***	 ( 2.250)
- 0.100
0.530	 0.632
	
(3 .436)**	 (3.857)**
-0.431
(-3.1 89)**
RER	 %flU S
(2.194)*
WP	
-0.157	 -0.191
(-1.690)	 (-1.536)
R2
	
0.922	 0.920
Adj-R2	 0.894	 0.890
F-test	 35.06	 32.87
DW	 1.87	 1.89
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability's values)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.968	 0.875
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.782	 0.827
Heteroscedasticity 0.662
	
0.634
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N =17
* Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and *** significant at 10%
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On the other hand, the coefficient of the estimated relative price is
consistent with the theory expectation. Thus, it has the right negative sign and
is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten percent decline in the
relative price of nontraded goods brings about a four percent increase in the
supply of tradable goods. Hence, one can safely reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between the relative price and the supply of traded goods and
accepts the alternative hypothesis of a negative relationship between them. In
the light of this result, the oil revenue and the government spending negatively
affect the supply of the traded goods sector through the relative price, in the
sense that the coefficients of the oil revenue and the government spending
have the correct signs and thus are consistent with the literature predictions.
Table 7.9 shows that a ten percent decrease in the oil revenue and the
government spending calls for about a 2.4 percent and a one percent increase
in the production of tradable goods respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis
of both variables' coefficients is rejected, which supports the theory prediction of
the negative relationship between the oil revenue, the government spending
and the supply of tradable goods.
Finally, the empirical results indicate that the coefficient of the world price
index has the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the
alternative hypothesis is rejected since the coefficient of the world price index is
statistically insignificant associated with a reverse coefficient sign.
One can conclude that the empirical results point to three main
consequences. Firstly, the money supply positively affects the supply of the
traded goods' production. It is evident that there is a strong link between the
size of subsidies provided by the government and the supply of the traded
goods sector. Secondly, the world price index has a weak impact on the supply
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of tradable goods. This is likely to be due to the fact that the world inflation
resulting from the oil boom has declined and made domestic production less
competitive than world production. Thirdly, the other independent variables,
namely the oil revenue, the government spending and the estimated relative
price, are consistent with the theory prediction.
2- Impact of the Oil Price, the Money Supply and the Real Exchange Rate
Now, it is time to examine the impact of the oil slump on the traded
goods sector by replacing the estimated relative price of nontraded goods with
the real exchange rate in the preceding equations. As shown in Table 7.9, the
real exchange rate (RER) is acting as the theory expects. Thus, the output of
the traded goods sector expands as the real Saudi currency depreciates (that
is, there is a rise in the RER, which is an inverse of the relative price), in the
sense that it has the right positive sign and is statistically significant at a five
percent level. The depreciation of the Saudi Riyal is due to the decline in the
price of nontraded goods resulting from the shrinkage in the demand for
nontraded goods, accompanied by a reduction in the national and per capita
incomes. Thus, one can accept the alternative hypothesis of the presence of a
positive relationship between the supply of tradable goods and the depreciation
of the real Saudi Riyal.
In the light of this result, the oil revenue and the government spending
negatively affect the supply of the traded goods sector through the real
exchange rate. This implies that the coefficients of the oil revenue and the
government spending have the correct negative signs and thus are consistent
with the literature predictions. Table 7.9 shows that a ten percent decrease in
the oil revenue and the government spending increase the production of
tradable goods by 1.0 percent for the former and 1.66 percent for the latter.
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Therefore, the null hypothesis of both variables' coefficients is rejected, which
supports the theory prediction of a negative relationship between the oil
revenue, the government spending and the supply of tradable goods.
With regard to the impact of the oil price on the supply of the traded
goods sector, it is found that it has the right sign and is statistically significant at
a five percent level. A ten percent fall in the oil price calls for about a 2.5
percent increase in the production of tradable goods. Hence, the null hypothesis
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis of the negative relationship between
the oil price and the supply of traded goods is accepted.
On the other hand, the money supply as another proxy of the spending
effect positively affects the supply of traded goods. This result contradicts the
economic literature prediction. A ten percent decrease in the money supply
causes the supply of tradable goods to fall by about six percent and is
statistically significant at a one percent level. This positive relationship can be
attributed to the link between government policy and the encouragement to
produce traded goods through subsidies and incentives; when the oil revenue
declines this is reflected negatively in the production of traded goods. So, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected but one would instead conclude that the
coefficient of the money supply is statistically significant but with a reverse
coefficient's sign.
Finally, the role of the world price index does not show any indication of
its influence on the supply of traded goods in terms of its sign, coefficient and
statistical significance.
However, the final diagnosis of the impact of the oil slump on the supply
of the traded goods sector indicates that the oil revenue, the oil price, the
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government spending and the real exchange rate are consistent with the
economic theory expectation, while the money supply has a strong positive
effect which is in contrast to the economic literature's prediction. Again, this can
be related to the reduction in the government subsidies and incentives provided
to that sector. These outcomes confirm that the reallocation of resources during
the slump period can lead to the expansion of traded goods' production. The
question now is: How is the supply of the nontraded goods sector affected by
such an oil slump? This will be examined in the following section.
7.3.4 Specification of the Nontraded Goods Sector
The fourth symptom of the standard reverse Dutch disease is the
shrinkage of the output of the nontraded goods sector. The theory assumes that
the reallocation of resources in favour of tradable goods at the expense of
nontradable goods resulting from the oil slump takes place through three
channels. The first is the decline in the relative price emerging from the lower
private and public demand for nontraded goods. The short-run economic
implication of the lower demand is a fall in the profitability of nontradable goods
since its supply cannot be reduced to match the fall in demand. The second
channel is related to the first, and is that of a potential depreciation in the
domestic currency (that is because the real exchange rate is defined as the
inverse ratio of the relative price). The impact of the depreciation of the currency
tends to be one where the demand for tradable goods is substituted for that of
nontradable goods to encourage the former at the expense of the latter. Finally,
and most importantly, is the spending effect channel, which has its impact
through the government spending and/or the money supply. Since the oil
revenue directly accrues to the government as the main agent in the economic
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7.17
7.18
activity, this transmits to a fall in the national income and thus the government
spending. Accordingly, the private and public expenditures will be reduced
through a reduction in capital expenditure and a provision of subsidies.
In short, the supply of nontraded goods is expected to respond positively
to changes in the relative price, the oil revenue, the oil price and the proxy of
the spending effect, while it is expected to respond negatively to the real
exchange rate and the world price index. Hence, the supply of nontraded goods
will be regressed against the oil price, the oil revenue, the proxy of the spending
effect and the world price index. Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses
of the coefficients of the supply of nontraded goods can be formulated as
follows:
Ho: Pt,Xt, 4t, t and y = 0
	
null hypothesis
HI: 3 ,Xand6t >O and and y<O	 alternative hypothesis
Hence, the regression of the supply of nontraded goods will be tested against
the money supply, the price of oil, the estimated relative price, the real
exchange rate and the world price as shown in the following equation:
S = a + Jims + 2po + Ørêp + ywp + e
	 7.16
Where ms, po and wp are the money supply, the price of oil and the world price
variables respectively, while Pep represents either the estimated relative price
or the real exchange rate. Hence, one can respecify this equation in the
following manner:
S +a +/3ms+2po +8r+ywp +e
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
5, =a2 +/32 ms , +22 po , + y 2 wp +q51 rêr, +e,
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Where
rj	 a 3 + /3 3 g +	 + e 3	 7.19
	
rêr = a + 8 g + A or + e	 7.201	 4	 4,	 4	 '	 4
Where 13t,?t and ö are the coefficients of the money supply, the oil price and the
relative price of nontraded goods respectively, while 4) and y are coefficients of
the real exchange rate and the world price index variable respectively.
7.3.4.1 Statistical Results
To test how the oil slump affects the output of nontraded goods, one
should regress the nontraded goods against the oil price, the proxy of the
spending effect (namely the money supply), the oil revenue, the world price
index and the estimated relative prices or the real exchange rate. The role of oil
revenue and government spending on the output of tradables will be inferred
through their influences on the relative prices and the real exchange rate.
Therefore, the empirical results of the regression can be divided into two parts
as follows:
1- Impact of the Oil price, Money Supply and Relative Prices
The regression results of the impact of all the variables, except for the world
price index, on the supply of nontraded goods show that they are consistent
with the economic theory prediction in terms of the coefficient signs and levels
of significance. Table 7.10 demonstrates that the coefficient of the oil price has
a positive sign and is statistically significant at a ten percent level. A ten percent
decrease in the price of oil causes about a two percent fall in the supply of
nontradables. Similarly, the impact of the money supply is consistent with the
reverse Dutch disease theory's prediction. Hence, its coefficient has the positive
right sign and is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten percent
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0.160 0.316G
MS
RP
0.652
(3.029)**
0.761
(4.230)**
0.440
(2.289)*
decline in the money supply leads to about a 6.5 percent decrease in the supply
of nontradables. So, the null hypothesis of the coefficients of the oil price and
the money supply can be rejected and the alternative one accepted.
Intercept
OR
P0
Table 7.10
Estimation of the Supply of Non-Traded Goods
Equation 7.17
	 Equation 7.18
	 Estimated RP Estimated RER
1.541	 10.684
(0.812)	 (4.566)
0.220	 0.176
0.217	 0.281
(2.08 1 )***	 (2.499)*
RER	
-0.766
( 3.253)'
wP	
-0.518	
-0.472
(-1.115)	 (-1.162)
R2
	
0.830	 0.855
Adj-R2	 0.770	 0.803
F-test	 14.20	 17.47
ow
	
1.83	 2.15
Diagnostic Tests: (Figures represent the probability's values)
Normality (J-B)
	 0.948	 0.659
Serial Correl. LM
	 0.73 9	 0.713
Heteroscedasticity 0.244	 0.085
Values in parenthesis are t-statistic with N =17
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% and *** significant at 10%
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With respect to the world price index, it is found that it has a right
negative coefficient sign but is statistically insignificant. This can be related to
the fact that the price of nontraded goods is determined domestically rather than
internationally as the influence of the decline in oil price may hamper the rise in
inflation internationally.
However, the coefficient of the estimated relative price has the right positive
sign and is statistically significant at a one percent level. A ten percent fall
in the relative price calls for about a 7.6 percent decrease in the supply of the
nontraded goods sector. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis of a positive
relationship between the relative price and the production of nontradable goods
is accepted. Since the impact of the oil revenue and the government spending
on the supply of nontradables can be deduced through their influence on the
relative price, the oil revenue and the government spending positively affect the
supply of nontraded goods as the economic theory expects. A ten percent
decrease in the oil revenue and the government spending causes the
production of nontraded goods to fall by 2.2 and 1.6 percent respectively. As a
result of such an outcome, one can reject the null hypothesis of no relationship
between the oil revenue and the government spending on the supply of
nontradables and thus accept the alternative hypothesis of a positive impact.
To sum up, all variables' coefficients, except for the world price index,
are individually and jointly significant. They explain 77 percent of the variation in
the supply of nontraded goods.
2- Impact of the Price of Oil, the Money Supply and Real Exchange Rate
The empirical results of regressing the supply of the nontraded goods sector
against all regressors included in Equation 7.18 show that they are jointly and
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individually (except for the world price index) significant and are consistent with
the economic theory predictions. Furthermore, the variation in all regressors
explains about 80 percent of the variation in the supply of nontraded goods.
With respect to the oil price, its coefficient has the right positive sign and
is statistically significant at a five percent level. A ten percent decline in the oil
price causes the supply of nontraded goods to fall by 2.8 percent. Accordingly,
one can accept the alternative hypothesis of the presence of a positive
relationship between the oil price and the supply of nontraded goods and in turn
reject the null hypothesis.
Similarly, the coefficient of the money supply as an alternative proxy for
the spending effect has the expected right sign and is statistically significant at a
five percent level. The reduction in the money supply by ten percent reduces
the production of nontraded goods by 4.4 percent. Therefore, one can reject the
null hypothesis and accept the alternative one, which implies a positive
relationship between the money supply and the production of nontraded goods.
Table 7.10 shows that the exchange rate affects the supply of the
nontraded goods sector as the economic literature predicts. Hence, the
depreciation in the real exchange rate leads to a contraction in production in
nontradable goods. Accordingly, the coefficient of the real exchange rate has
the right sign and is statistically significant at a one percent level and thus a ten
percent depreciation in the real exchange rate (i.e., a rise in the ratio of the
RER) induces a 7.66 percent decline in the supply of the nontradables goods.
So, one can safely reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative one.
The impact of the oil revenue and the government spending on the
supply of nontraded goods can be inferred from their impact on the real
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exchange rate. It is found that both the oil revenue and the government
spending are consistent with the theory prediction and have the right coefficient
signs. A ten percent decline in the oil revenue and the government spending
calls for a 1.76 and a 3.16 decrease respectively in the production of the
nontraded goods sector.
Finally, the coefficient of the world price index has the correct negative
sign but is statistically insignificant. This result is likely to be due to the
possibility of the weak impact of the low foreign inflation, which resulted from
lower oil prices after the collapse of the oil price beginning in the first year of the
sample period.
To sum up, all independent variables, excluding the world price index,
are individually statistically significant in their affect on the supply of the
nontraded goods sector as the economic theory of the reverse Dutch disease
predicts. It is necessary now to elaborate the policies adopted by the
government to mitigate the impact of the oil slump experienced during the
sample period from 1982 to 1997.
7.4 Government Policy Response
As the world market turned downward in 1982, a combination of slumping
oil prices and cuts in sales reduced the Saudi Arabian oil receipts. The
extremely sharp drop in government oil revenues was from over SR328 billion
in 1981 to SR42.5 billion in 1986. In addition, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990
exacerbated the problem and led the Kingdom to confront a series of persistent
current account and budget deficits, and rising internal and external debts. In
theory, a large current account deficit, which is often associated with losses of
foreign reserves and capital flight, signal the need for a policy response to
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restore financial stability. Stabilisation is pursued through a combination of
corrective fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy2.
Devaluation can be used as a theoretical option, and the Saudi exchange
rate was devalued in the mid-I 980s, which then fixed the US dollar at SR3.75.
However, despite the fact that the Saudi Riyal came under periodic selling
pressure in 1993 and 1994 because of concern about the Kingdom's structural
current account and fiscal deficits, the government was reluctant to devalue its
currency again. SAMA's strong support for a stable Riyal through its
intervention in the foreign exchange market has contributed to a stable currency
since then. Amuzegar (1999) attributed the government's decision to many
factors: firstly, the adverse impact of high-priced imports (i.e., the bulk of
household consumption); secondly, reduction of importers' profits as a result of
a cut in imports; thirdly, capital losses for Saudi citizens and others who had
repatriated their funds in search of higher Saudi returns; finally, the traditional
prestige associated with a strong and stable currency.
On the other hand, a tightening of monetary policy alone is potentially
damaging to the private sector as either the interest rate rises or, with interest
rate controls, credit is rationed. As a result, this policy used on its one has been
neglected by the Saudi authorities.
Since the Saudi Arabian government is the key force in the economic
activity through receiving and spending the bulk of the national income, the
fiscal developments strongly influence the domestic economy. Saudi public
expenditures encompass the following categories: the projects' budget, which
focuses largely on the capital and human infrastructure expenditures; the
recurrent expenditures including salaries and subsidies; social services,
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operation and maintenance of infrastructure, and others. When oil revenues
began to decline after 1982, the Saudi authorities began to tackle the deficits in
the current account and in the budget through implementing the following
measures:
7.4.1 Drawing Down from its Substantial Reserves.
As a result of the decline in both the volume of exports and prices, reduced
oil export revenues which in 1985 fell to less than one-quarter of their 1980 and
1981 levels, the government of Saudi Arabia has experienced deficits in the
budget and the current account every year since 1983. In that year export
revenues shrank by 41 percent, which was a greater decline rate than that of
imports (i.e., 2.8 percent). As a result, the current account balance shifted of a
deficit by SRI6.8 billion. The current account deficit was accompanied by the
actual budget deficits ranging from SR23.7 billion in 1983 to SR69.7 billion in
1987g. During that period, the initial drop in the government spending (i.e., 0.06
percent in 1983 and 0.25 percent in 1986) was slight, as the government
decided to draw down from its foreign reserves (estimated at $32.2 billion in
1981, faIling to $22.68 billion in 1987) rather than making stiff cutbacks in
programmes and projects.
The trend of drawing down from such reserves was accelerated during and
after the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990. Although, the Gulf War brought a sharp increase
in oil price and production, the cost of the war made the economic situation of
the Saudi Arabia economy worse. The IMF estimation was that about $65 billion
was spent on the war effort, ranging from payments to the members of the UN
Coalition to expenses for the Saudi military and refugees' housing (Cordesman,
1997) with another $20 billion in cash and grants or aid. It is not surprising that
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the foreign reserves reached their lowest level of $5.9 billion in 1992. According
to the Business Monitor International report issued in 1994, the Kingdom has
depleted its officially held foreign assets by the equivalent of 11 percent of
national GDP for each year since I 986g. The initial depletion of the government
foreign reserves was followed by other measures such as a reduction in the
government expenditure and/or an increase in non-oil revenues.
7.4.2 Reduction of Government Expenditure
The ample reserves enabled the Saudi Arabian government to postpone
adjustment till 1986, when the continuation of an extreme drop in government
oil revenues led the government to take further steps to reduce expenditures.
Consequently, the government instituted several cost-cutting measures. Firstly,
there was a suspension and/or cancellation of some costly projects such as two
new oil refineries, a lubricant base oil refinery, and several other infrastructure
projects6 . Furthermore, the government opened bidding on all new contracts
rather than determining that a particular contractor would achieve a specific
project, a move that reduced potential bid corruption and project costs by 50
percent (Wilson and Graham, 1994). Secondly, by increasing the import duties
from 12 to 20 percent, the government aimed to achieve the dual objective of
reducing imports as well as improving the balance of payments' current account
and increasing its own income. Furthermore, loans provided by the government
lending agencies, fell dramatically from SR 25.7 billion in 1982 to 5R3.7 billion
in i991 7. Thirdly, the government halved its advance payment to contractors
from 20 percent to 10 percent aiming to distribute payments to a larger number
of contractors. Because of the liquidity shortages, the contractors were forced to
finish older and existing projects in order to receive the remaining payments.
Fourthly, payments to contractors became subject to delay for months or years
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due to real or imagined shortcomings raised by the government inspectors.
Fifthly, the security and defence expenditure was reduced from SR92.9 billion to
SR47.9 billion in 19898. However, these measures were far from sufficient to
balance or even to reduce the deficit in the budget. These results can be
inferred by the continuation and increasing budget deficits, which rose from
SR6O.9 billion in1986 to SR69.7 billion in 1987.
Moreover, the liberation of Kuwait left the country with severe budget
deficits, which reached their highest level ever by about SRI6O.2 billion in the
combined budget of 1990-1991, and were SR67.2 billion and SR64.billion in
1992 and 1993 respectively 9 . The fall in oil prices in 1994, resulting from the
affirmation of the Saudi authorities that they would keep the oil output at the
same levels, led to the disappointing results for the 1994 budget deficit. The
estimated deficit of SR34.8 billion provided a catalyst for and an intensification
of the adjustment efforts in 1995. In a significant departure from the past policy,
domestic prices of petroleum products, electricity, water, telephones, visas and
work permits, and air travel were increased significantly 10 , with the intention of
reducing the reliance on oil revenues. These measures pushed up non-oil
revenue by 5R7.3, SR2.33, and SR2.4 billion in 1995, 1996 and 1997
respectively, to permit a reduction in the overall deficits by 21 percent, 31
percent and 17 percent for those years in order. On the other hand, the actual
expenditure for those years grew by 6.2 percent, 13.9 percent and 11.7 percent
respectively due to the increases in the total population and the need for
establishing new infrastructure projects and maintaining the old ones.
Although, there were considerable reductions in the overall deficits, the
Saudi Arabian budget still experiences a deficit every year, which reflects the
government's unwillingness to pursue additional cuts and increase revenues to
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offset the lower oil prices, which occurred particularly after the Asian Crisis in
1997. The economic consequence is a rise in government debts accumulated
over years.
7.4.3 Borrowing
Saudi Arabia found that the momentum of public spending was hard to
curb as oil revenues fell, particularly since an increased portion consisted of
recurrent expenditure to service the capital investments of earlier years and
subsidies to keep them in operation. The financial shortages had led the
government to rely on both local and foreign borrowing to fund a wide range of
spending and to reduce its deficits. The government's revenue-raising was
through the creation of 'development bonds'. the Kingdom's first public
borrowing in 25 years. SAMA issued SR3O, SR25, SR4I and SR5O billion in the
form of bonds in 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 respectively. However, it was
recognised that the bonds could not cover all the deficits, and the government
as early as 1989 borrowed $660 million from a consortium of Saudi Arabian
banks and from some government agencies, mainly pension funds11.
Moreover, the cost of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait made the situation much
worse. As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia had to spend nearly $65 billion on
the cost of the crisis. As a result, it had to borrow some $7.4 billion from
international syndicated loans12 and $2.5 billion from local banks by the end of
1992. According to the IMF and MEED, the total domestic debt rose from 53.3
percent of the GDP (equivalent to SR236.6 billion) at the end of 1992 to 83
percent (SR384 billion) at the end of 1995. Moreover, the IMF projected that
domestic debt would reach to 85 percent of the GDP in 1996. The actual
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domestic debts were SR422 and SR468 billion of 84 and 87 percent of the GDP
in 1996 and 1997 respectively13.
However, the ever-increasing interest-payment obligations would make
structural reform of the budget more and more difficult. The financial needs of
the public sector would increasingly crowd out those of the private sector,
putting greater pressure on foreign assets and threatening the stability of the
exchange rate14 . The reluctance to impose taxes and the downward inflexibility
of government spending because of internal political and social constraints
make deficits a serious problem facing the economy in the foreseeable future.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
The rise in oil prices, particularly in the 1970s was blamed for the collapse
in the oil prices in the mid-1980s, which is termed the 'third oil shock'. The
causes of such a collapse are attributed to many factors, some of which, are
major ones such as the rise in non-OPEC suppliers, the world economic
recession, energy conservation and improving energy alternatives. The first of
these has contributed to an increase in the supply of oil, while the decline in
world oil consumption is related to the other two factors.
Since Saudi Arabia in the largest oil producer and exporter, it has been
seriously affected by the decline in oil prices. The empirical findings of the model
built to test the impact of the oil slump on the Saudi Arabian economy indicate the
following:
1. The relative price of nontraded goods to traded goods is positively affected by
the oil revenue, the oil price and the proxy of the spending effect. The oil
revenue affects the relative prices by an average of about 30 percent, while the
oil price influences the relative prices by an average of almost 13 percent. The
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proxies of the spending effect have an impact on the relative prices by an
average of 30 percent and 21.5 percent for the money supply and the
government spending respectively.
2. The real Saudi Riyal has depreciated as a result of a decline by 20.5 percent,
12 percent and 40 percent in the oil revenue, oil prices and any proxy of the
spending effect respectively. The limited impact of the oil price changes can be
related to the fact that a fall in oil price can be compensated by a rise in the sales
of oil production.
3. The supply of the traded goods sector reacts to changes in the oil price, oil
revenues, government spending, relative prices and the real exchange rate as
predicted in economic theory, while the money supply does not. This confirms
the serious links between the decline of the subsidies provided and the fall in the
supply of traded goods. The drop in the oil revenue and the oil price reduces the
supply of tradables by 26.4 percent and 22 percent respectively, while the
government spending negatively affects it by 13.3 percent. On the other hand,
the money supply affects it positively by 58 percent. The difference in the
magnitude of the proxies of the spending effects, namely the government
spending and the money supply, are due to the channels through which they
affect the supply of tradables. The money supply has a significant impact due to
its direct effect on traded goods, while the government spending operates
through its impact on the relative prices and the real exchange rate rather than
by affecting the tradables directly. However, the supply of the traded goods
sector is affected by the Saudi real exchange rate and the relative prices
similarly by about 40 percent.
4. The decline in the supply of nontraded goods responds to the decline in the oil
revenue and the oil price by 20 percent and 25 percent respectively, while it
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responds to the fall in the government spending and the money supply by 24
percent and 55 percent respectively. The decline in the relative price causes a
fall in the supply of the nontraded goods sector by 76 percent, as it does with the
depreciation of the domestic real exchange rate.
As a result of the oil slump since 1982, the Saudi Arabian economy has
suffered and still suffers from persistent current account and budget deficits. To
cope with such a problem, the Saudi officials have tried to implement several
corrective measures including the first slight devaluation of the Saudi Riyal in the
mid-1980s, which was followed with an objection to any further devaluation.
Therefore, the Saudi government has adopted alternative policies such as
drawing down from its substantial foreign reserves, a reduction of government
spending, raising non-oil revenues and borrowing from local and international
financial agencies. Nevertheless, these measures have been far from sufficient
due to the continuation of the deficits, particularly in the government budget,
since 1983.
One can conclude that the given rise in interest-payment obligations, the
increase in the Saudi Arabian population 15 , and the need for new infrastructure
projects, the depletion of foreign assets would not only threaten the development
plans but also may hit the Saudi economy severely. Consequently, structural
reforms are needed to reduce reliance on one main source of income (i.e., oil).
These reforms can be implemented by imposing an effective tax system,
privatisation, rationalisation and reduction of the government expenditure,
political reforms, sound management and information transparency. The IMF
states that such continued deficits if not improved will, firstly, destabilise the
economy and, secondly, seriously impact on the sustainability of the Riyal
exchange rate16
315
Notes
1 For more details, see Reynolds, D. 1999 and Stournaras, Y. 1985.
2 For more details, see Chu and Hemming in "Public Expenditure Handbook", IMF, 1991
SAMA, Annual Report, 1999).
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 1994.
Business Monitor International Ltd, Saudi Arabia, 1994.
6 For more details, see MEED, March, 1994.
According to SAMA Annual Report, 1999, the five government credit institutions, namely the
Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi Credit Bank (SCB), the Real Estate Development Fund
(REDF), the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) and Saudi Agricultural Bank (SAB),
provide medium and short-term concessionary credit to vital development sectors and
individuals for satisfying investment and social needs.
8 SAMA, Annual Report, 1999.
SAMA, Annual Report, 1999
10 For more details about the measures used to increase the domestic revenues, see SAMA's
Annual Report, 1996
For more details, see Wilson and Graham, Chapter 5, 1994.
12 These loans are distributed by $4.5 billion led by J.P. Morgan and secured by the Ministry of
Finance in 1991, $2 billion borrowed by Saudi ARAMCO in March 1992 and Vela borrowed
another $0.9 billion in March 1992, totalled $7.4 billion.
13 For more details, see the Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Saudi Arabia, 1997-
1998 and see MEED, 24 March 2000.
14 According to the IMF, foreign assets, which include reserve money, central government
deposits and other items declined from its highest level of SR472.93 billion in 1982 to SR185.6
billion in 1994.
15 The growth rate of the population exceeds the average annual growth rates of Saudi GDP
from 1982 to 1997. For more details about this issue, see the Development Plans from 1985 to
2000 and SAMA Annual Report, 1999.
16 IMF, Staff Report for the 1994 Article IV Consultation, September 1994.
316
Chapter Eight
Summary and Conclusion
Despite the discovery of oil on March 16, 1938, the Saudi Arabian
economy remained very limited till 1970 when the Kingdom announced its First
Five-Year Plan. The plan laid the foundations for the country's future economic
development and diversification given the limited resources available at that
time. Three years later, political and economic events, notably the rise in oil
prices, made the plan entirely irrelevant. Historically, the domestic economy
passed two major stages through the period of 1973-1997, the first of which,
was the boom era, while the second was the slump stage.
8.1 The Oil Boom
The sharp and unprecedented increase in oil prices in 1973 was
attributed to different theoretical explanations. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia,
in common with other oil-exporting countries took control of the operating
companies. Johani (1980) proposed a property right theory (a low discount
theory), while Moran (1982) provided political explanations for the cause of the
1970s and 1980s oil price shocks. Other theories such as those of Pindyck
(1978) and Adelman (1982) theoretically showed how much cartel behaviour
could raise the oil prices. However, regardless of the underlying causes of the
oil price shocks, one could argue that the immediate causes were the oil
boycott, which was the subsequent of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the
Iranian oil workers strike in 1978 followed by the Iranian Revolution.
High oil price combined later with the rising volume of oil exports raised
oil revenues to unprecedented levels, allowing Saudi Arabia to record large
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external current account surpluses and to build up foreign reserves as well as
its sizeable government spending. Public sector spending was by far the most
significant determinant of development in the non-oil sector. The government
used its substantial oil revenues to finance a vast and continued programme of
infrastructure, agricultural and industrial development, while allocating
substantial funds for the modernisation of its educational and health facilities,
improving its welfare system and building up its armed forces (according to
SAMA, 1976, the budget of ministry of defence increased in current prices from
SR3.5 billion in 1972 to SR3I.9 billion in 1976, which the later consisted of
around 29% of the total budget)
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil
revenues may have been somewhat of a mixed blessing. Although Saudi
Arabia has enjoyed sustained, rapid GDP growth resulting from the oil boom,
the domestic economy was subject to some negative side-effects. The model
used to examine the impact of the oil boom is based on the core Dutch disease
model where the economy has three sectors: oil, tradable and nontradables.
The model is amended to be relevant to the characteristics of the Saudi Arabian
economy. Moreover, the model focuses exclusively on the short run (when the
capital stock is fixed) taking no account of oil depletion. However, unlike earlier
studies, the empirical findings of the impact of the oil boom in the short run,
based on well-specified models, showed the following:
1. The oil boom positively affected the relative price of nontraded goods to
traded goods through the oil price, oil revenue, money supply and the
government spending, while the Saudi Riyal was subject to an overvaluation
and thus the real exchange rate appreciated. These outcomes are consistent
with the economic theory predictions.
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2. The nontraded goods sector expanded during the boom period. This is not
surprising since the main thrust of Saudi development policies was toward
establishing and improving physical and human infrastructure associated with
providing generous subsidies for both domestic consumers and producers.
3. In contrary to the Dutch disease predication, it was found that the traded
goods sector expanded, but far below the nontraded goods sector. The
explanation lied firstly in pursuing policies to promote basic industries based on
kingdom's vast hydrocarbon resources and secondly in massive subsidies and
heavy protection for traditional traded goods through high tariffs and quotas,
which converted tradables into nontradables. However, in the context of the
growing economies, the squeeze of the traded goods sector means distorted
growth or slower-than-norma! growth rather than the growth in the absolute
values.
A large oil sector increased the public sector involvement in the domestic
economy. This is due to the government ownership of the oil sector and the
demand for the local population to share the benefits of increased oil revenues.
Moreover, the impact of the boom operated through the spending effect rather
than with the resource movement due to the nature of the oil sector as an
'enclave', which implies that the oil sector has no major linkages with the rest of
the economy. Therefore, the government initiated nearly all the domestic
development projects, and also it was the instigator of nearly all funds entering
the private sector.
In order to mitigate the adverse side-effects of the boom, the government
adopted several policies, one of which was subsidising consumer and producer
products in order to lower the cost of domestic products to the low-income
citizens as well as to stimulate the production of traded goods. Importing foreign
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labour was another policy executed in order to lessen the appreciation of the
real exchange rate and lower the relative price of nontraded goods to traded
goods. The third policy was adjustment in government expenditure, particularly
during the early period of the boom to contain inflationary pressures, resulting
from the existence of bottlenecks in domestic ports. Government expenditure
continued to rise but at a much slower rate. Finally, part of oil foreign exchanges
was saved or invested abroad, creating large financial reserves to be used as
strategic assets to finance future economic development.
Although the Saudi Arabian economy has experienced some negative
consequences of the Dutch disease, other ill-effects could be accompanied by
such a boom. Firstly, there was a general relaxation of discipline over all fiscal
matters, which moved increasingly toward large-scale, long-gestation projects.
These included not only projects undertaken for prestige reasons or to serve
conspicuous consumption, but included some projects executed in hurry without
carrying out rate of return analysis (Mabro, 1985). Secondly, a lack of skills in
managing large programmes led to wasteful and poorly conceived projects.
Thirdly, private investors became infected with rentier values, demanding short-
term high returns on investment, and concentrated on trade and urban property.
Finally, the large scale of influx of foreign labour resulted in the depletion of
Saudi foreign exchange earnings. According to the IMF, the recorded foreign
remittances in current terms increased from $888 million in 1973 to about $11
billion in 1981.
8.2. The Oil Slump
The oil boom was followed by a gradual, and then dramatic, decline in
the oil revenues. This occurred from 1982 as a consequence of a fall in world oil
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demand. The causes of such a fall can be attributed, broadly speaking, to three
distinct factors. The first was a sharp decline in global economic activity as a
result of recession, especially after the second oil shock. The second was the
adoption of successful conservation and fuel-switching policies by the
industrialised countries. The third was the considerable expansion of non-OPEC
oil suppliers, new oil discoveries and the development of the large North Sea oil
and Alaskan reserves.
Accordingly, the oil earnings of OPEC, as the residual supplier of the
world oil market, fell dramatically from their peak of $282.6 billion in 1980 to
about $77 billion in 1986. Since Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer among
OPEC members, it was obvious that it would be the member most harmed by
such a decline in oil receipts. Therefore, Saudi Arabia agreed to cut its
production as the residual supplier of OPEC in an attempt to put upward
pressure on oil prices in the world oil market. Thus, the kingdom's production
dropped sharply, but as it was accompanied with a fall in oil prices, this
exacerbated the sharp decline in its oil revenues from $119 billion in 1981 to
$18 billion in 1986. As the oil revenues accrue directly to the government, the
consequences of such a decline caused deficits in both the national budget and
the balance of payments' current account that severely affected the entire
economy, particularly after the Kuwait invasion in 1990.
Since the oil sector is the key driver of the domestic economy, any
instability in oil prices is transmitted immediately and in a strong way to the
government budget.
It is worth noting that the decline in the oil price and thus oil revenues
produced both positive and negative effects on the economy. Among the
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positive effects are: (i) a reduction in inappropriate investment and wasteful
current government expenditure; (ii) a fall in oil price, if it is associated with the
fall in oil production, enables the country to conserve its natural resource and to
bring extraction rates close to an optimum path, as oil itself represents an
implicit investment; (iii) some moves were also undertaken to save foreign
exchange. The Saudi government was quick to take action in support of the
private sector, by introducing open tendering on all government contracts, and
the 30 percent of the government contracts awarded to foreign companies were
to be provided by Saudi companies. Hence, a greater involvement of the private
sector in the overall GDP has taken place.
By using the amended Dutch model to examine the impact of the oil in
the Saudi Arabian economy, the empirical findings indicate some negative and
positive outcomes as follows:
1. The relative price of nontraded goods to traded goods is positively affected
by the oil slump proxies: the oil revenue, the oil price and the spending effect.
In other words, the decline in all variables has contributed to a fall in the
relative price of nontraded goods versus traded goods as expected in the
economic literature.
2. The real Saudi Riyal has depreciated as a result of a decline in the oil
revenue, oil prices and any proxy of the spending effect respectively. The
limited impact of the oil price changes can be related to the fact that a fall in
oil price can, to some extent, be compensated by a rise in the volume of
sales of oil production.
3. The supply of the traded goods sector reacts to changes in the oil price, oil
revenues, government spending, relative prices and the real exchange rate
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as predicted in economic theory, while the money supply does not. This
confirms the serious links between the decline of the subsidies provided and
the fall in the supply of traded goods. The difference in the magnitude of the
proxies of the spending effects, namely the government spending and the
money supply, are due to the channels through which they affect the supply
of tradables. The money supply has a significant impact due to its direct
effect on traded goods, while the government spending operates through its
impact on the relative prices and the real exchange rate rather than by
affecting the tradables directly.
4. The supply of nontraded goods contracted as a result of the decline in the oil
revenue, the oil price, the government spending and the money supply. This
outcome was expected in theory and in practice in Saudi Arabia since the
major infrastructure projects were completed or suspended, hence
government spending, as a dominant factor in the economy, was reduced.
However, the extremely sharp drop in government oil revenues and Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 exacerbated the situation, leading the kingdom to
confront a series of persistent current account and budget deficits, and rising
internal and external debts. A large current account deficit, which is often
associated with losses of foreign reserves and capital flight, signal the need for
a policy response to restore financial stability.
The last devaluation of the Saudi nominal exchange rate was used as a
corrective measure in the mid-1980s. However, despite the fact that the Saudi
Riyal came under periodic selling pressure in 1993 and 1994 due to high
current account and fiscal deficits, the government was reluctant to devalue the
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currency again. SAMA's strongly supported the local currency through its
intervention in the foreign exchange in order to a stabilise it.
Since the Saudi Arabian government is the key force in the economic
activity through receiving and spending the bulk of the national income, the
Saudi authorities began to tackle the deficits in the current account and in the
budget through implementing the following measures:
(i) Drawing down from its substantial reserves.
This due mainly to the Saudi authorities optimistic expectations towards the
rise in the oil prices in the early and middle years of 1980s. As a result of the
decline in both the volume of exports and prices, the government of Saudi
Arabia has experienced deficits in the budget and the current account every
year since 1983. In that year, export revenues shrank by 41 percent, while
imports were decline by 2.8 percent. The current account deficit was
accompanied by the actual budget deficits. Since the drop in the government
spending was slight (i.e., 0.06 percent in 1983 and 0.25 percent in 1986), the
government decided to draw down from its foreign reserves rather than making
stiff cutbacks in programmes and projects.
The trend of drawing down from such reserves was accelerated during and
after the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990. Although, the Gulf War brought a sharp increase
in oil price and production, the cost of the war made the economic situation of
the Saudi Arabia economy worse. The IMF estimation was that about $65 billion
was spent on the war effort. It is not surprising that the foreign reserves reached
their lowest level of $5.9 billion in 1992. According to a Business Monitor
International report issued in 1994, the Kingdom has depleted its officially held
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foreign assets by the equivalent of 11 percent of its national GDP for each year
since 1986.
(ii) A reduction in the government expenditure.
This resulted from the continuation of an extreme drop in government oil
revenues, which led the government to institute several cost-cutting measures
such as a suspension and/or cancellation of some costly projects, opening
bidding on all new contracts, a move that reduced potential bid corruption and
project costs by 50 percent (Wilson and Graham, 1994). Reducing loans
provided by the government lending agencies from SR 25.7 billion in 1982 to
SR3.7 billion in 1991, the government decreased its advance payment to
contractors from 20 percent to 10 percent aiming to distribute payments to a
larger number of contractors as well as to enforce them to finish older and
existing projects, and finally reducing the security and defence expenditure from
SR92.9 billion to SR47.9 billion in 1989. However, these measures were far
from sufficient to balance or even to reduce the deficit in the budget. These
results can be inferred by the continuation and increasing budget deficits, which
rose from SR6O.9 billion in1986 to SR69.7 billion in 1987.
Moreover, the liberation of Kuwait left the country with severe budget
deficits, which reached their highest level ever by about SRI 60.2 billion in the
combined budget of 1990-1991, and were SR67.2 billion and SR64.billion in
1992 and 1993 respectively. The fall in oil prices in 1994, resulting from the
affirmation of the Saudi authorities that they would keep the oil output at the
same levels, led to the disappointing results for the 1994 budget deficit. The
estimated deficit of SR34.8 billion provided a catalyst for and an intensification
of the adjustment efforts in 1995. In a significant departure from the past policy,
325
domestic prices of petroleum products, electricity, water, telephones, visas and
work permits, and air travel were increased significantly with the intention of
reducing the reliance on oil revenues. These measures pushed up non-oil
revenue by SR7.3, SR2.33, and SR2.4 billion in 1995, 1996 and 1997
respectively, to permit a reduction in the overall deficits by 21 percent, 31
percent and 17 percent for those years in order. On the other hand, the actual
expenditure for those years grew by 6.2 percent, 13.9 percent and 11.7 percent
respectively due to the increases in the total population and the need for
establishing new infrastructure projects and maintaining the old ones.
Although, there were considerable reductions in the overall deficits, the
Saudi Arabian budget still experiences a deficit every year, which reflects the
government's unwillingness to pursue additional cuts and increase revenues to
offset the lower oil prices, which occurred particularly after the Asian Crisis in
1997. The economic consequence is a rise in government debts accumulated
over many years.
(iii) Borrowing resulting from the continuos financial shortages.
This meant the government relied on both local and foreign borrowing to
fund a wide range of spending and to reduce its deficits. The government's
revenue-raising was through the creation of 'development bonds', which
amounted SR146 billion during the period from 1988 to1991. Furthermore, the
government as early as 1989 borrowed $660 million from a consortium of Saudi
Arabian banks and from some government agencies, mainly pension funds.
Moreover, the cost of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait made the situation much
worse. As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia had to spend nearly $65 billion on the
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cost of the crisis. As a result, the total domestic debt rose from 53.3 percent of
the GDP at the end of 1992 to 87 percent at the end of 1997.
However, the ever-increasing interest-payment obligations, which rose
from $13.8 billion in 1992 to $28 billion in 1997, made structural reform of the
budget more and more difficult. The financial needs of the public sector
increasingly crowded out those of the private sector, puffing greater pressure
on foreign assets and threatening the stability of the exchange rate. The
reluctance to impose taxes and the downward inflexibility of government
spending because of internal political and social constraints make deficits a
serious problem facing the economy in the foreseeable future.
One can conclude that the rise in interest-payment obligations, the increase
in the Saudi Arabian population, the need for new infrastructure projects and the
depletion of foreign assets has not only threatened long term development plans,
but has also affected the Saudi economy adversely in the short run. The IMF
stated that such continued deficits, if not improved, will firstly, destabilise the
economy and, secondly, seriously impact on the sustainability of the Riyal
exchange rate.
8.3 Structural Reforms
Structural reforms are urgently needed to eliminate or at least to reduce
deficits and to lessen reliance on the main source of income (i.e., oil). The
quality of economic reforms could be enhanced through the following
suggestions, which may pave the way to improve the current economic
situation:
1. Reducing unproductive expenditures, including military spending movement
toward market-based pricing of utilities and reducing subsidies to the minimal
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level consistent with political stability. Budgetary allocations for different
ministries or sectors in terms of expenditures may provide a poor distributive
mechanism. Relatively low current and capital expenditures, particularly in
education and health sectors in favour of other unproductive expenditure, are
indicative of inefficiency and an unsound management of the existing
resources.
2. Rationalisation of expenditure by giving the priority to the human resource
development would enhance productivity. Cuffing productive capital spending
and essential operations and maintenance spending are liable to be damaging
to growth. Unnecessary expenditures either recorded in the budget or off-
budget should be eliminated completely. In line with this strategy, serious
government support has to be given to the development of the manufacturing
sector in order to diversify the economy. Although the main objective of the
Sixth Development Plan is to increase the contribution of the private sector in
the national economy, privatisation was and is still very slow and it is time to
diversify the economy through increased private sector investment and
encouragement of foreign participation. The government owns a portion of 37
companies traded in the Saudi stock exchange with total value of $50 billion. It
can reduce its shares in these companies and privatise some other owned-state
agencies in order to rationalise its spending, increase its revenues from
privatised operations and create an economic environment that will encourage
investment and competition.
3. Imposing an equitable tax system that serves the low and medium income
citizens through a redistribution of the wealth. In addition, the elimination of
exemptions must be applied and reliance on non-tax revenues, such as fees
and charges should be limited, as an efficient tax system is preferable.
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Implementing an equitable tax system seems to be a helpful instrument to avoid
the pro-cyclical crude oil price and revenue fluctuations.
5. Lowering dependence on oil revenues by changing the structure of
revenues. This can be done through taking into account the comparative
advantage of some domestic products (e.g., natural gas, oil-related
products, and minerals specifically) and services such as religious tourism
(because of the presence of the Two Holy Mosques), traditional tourism for
ancient sites, desert, sailing and diving in the two sea ports. In the context of
such policies to increase the non-oil exports, devaluation is likely to be a
useful remedy. Devaluation has some advantages such as: (I) it immediately
increase the domestic purchasing power of oil revenues, perhaps enough to
eliminate deficits, without the need for a spending cut that might throw the
economy into recession; (ii) in terms of the income distribution
consequences of devaluation, cuthng the value of the Riyal may boost the
competitiveness of Saudi exports, while the price of imports would be driven
up which would stimulate the domestic demand for local products (a strong
Riyal makes it hard for local manufacturers to compete with foreign imports
and break into overseas markets). A generous system of industrial
incentives can offset at least part of the competitive disadvantage caused by
a hard Riyal. Lower imports can reduce the depletion of domestic hard
currency and improve the balance of payments' current account. On the
other hand, it is quite clear that the government remains bitterly opposed to
the devaluation and it is not imminent, due to its side-effects expectations
such as: (i) a reduction in living standards for the average Saudi citizens; (ii)
putting up the price of imports would hit the profits of the business
community, most of which is heavily dependent on income derived from
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importing foreign goods; (iii) investors who have repatriated capital since the
early 1990 as dollar interest rates fell would experience a substantial capital
loss.
In total, devaluation would benefit government and the Kingdom's trading
counterparts but at the expense of the income and savings of Saudi households
and businessmen. It cannot be ruled out at later stages if the financial problems
still exist and much will depend on whether the government can bring spending
under control.
These policies offer the possibility of reducing deficits by generating
additional income, reducing expenditure and altering the way the economy
operates.
5. Financial sector reform. The key element of the reform in the financial sector
includes a rationalisation the rate of return structure supporting the mobilisation
and the allocation of loanable funds. A particular feature of the nine Saudi
banks is the high volume of interest-free deposits, which helps these banks to
record solid annual profit increases, continuing the trend of recent years.
Despite the fact that the current growth in interest bearing accounts is far
greater than in non-interest bearing accounts, the net profits of the nine Saudi
banks rose from SR5.72 billion in 1996 to SR6.59 billion in 1997, an average of
15.8 percent, giving a return on assets of 1.71 percent, an extremely healthy
figure by international standards (MEED, Vol. 42. No. 24, 1998). On the other
hand, lending (loans and advances) accounts for more than one-third of the
total assets (that is SRI 30.9 billion to SR385.9 billion), and a high proportion of
loans was in the form of investment securities, namely government bonds (the
later is about SR 120.8 billion out of the total lending of SRI 30.9 billion).
330
Although there are persistent appeals from small-scale industries for
banks to take a more positive attitude to lend funds for new industrial ventures,
the commercial banks are still generally reluctant to finance such private sector
activity (i. e., SRIO.1 billion out of total lending of SRI3O.9 billion). Loans to
industry are very small proportion of commercial lending and the recent trend
has been downwards due to the government borrowing which crowds out the
loans to private sector. Other foreign banks should be allowed to enter the
Saudi market to compete with the domestic banks in terms of financial support
and banking services. It is now necessary to consolidate banks in face of new
globalisation trends and World Trade Organisation (WTO) demands for free
capital movements.
Finally, a package of economic reforms needs to move faster, with
encouragement at the very highest levels. In the light of the earlier suggestions,
it is recognised that Saudi Arabia needs to put greater emphasis on a serious
reduction in budget and current account deficits, with steps to reduce the
adverse short-term side effects associated with certain reform policies.
With regard to the policy implications, there are several policy lessons
that can be drawn from this study:
. Almost all economies of the developing oil-exporting countries are heavily
influenced by oil revenues, which are subject to exogenous world price
volatility. This study suggests that the governments need to have strong
commitments to diversify their sources of income, which can be achieved via
establishing industrial bases and/or adopting diversified primary exports.
. When massive public sector spending occurs during the period of an oil
boom, it is often difficult to reduce this when world oil prices decline. The
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policy makers should be aware of the "ratchet effect". Hence, the
governments need to stabilise their spending in the face of fluctuating oil
revenues. The investments and accumulation of foreign exchange assets
during the boom period can be a prudent policy. This approach would
maintain the quaUty of capital formation and avoid a severe recession as
well as losses in output and growth resulting from downward movements in
oil revenues.
. The oil windfall is often associated with unproductive and waste
expenditures. To avoid an unsustainable situation, the policy makers need to
pursue appropriate conservative fiscal policy based on the priority and size
of projects and transfer expenditure needed for enhancing the domestic
economy.
8.4 Further research
The research carried out in this thesis could indicate a number of areas
worthy of further investigation. These include the following:
the separation between the direct and indirect subsidies and how each of
them affects the supply of each sector in the economy;
a comparison between the impact of the subsidies and that of devaluation
on the supply and competitiveness of the traded goods sector;
. how to measure the impact of the foreign labour supply on the production of
both the traded and nontraded sectors in terms of wages, the demand for
both categories of goods and the role of remittances to mitigate and
exacerbate the spending effect in the boom and slump stages;
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the impact of military expenditure during both periods (the boom and the
slump) on the production of goods, employment rates, the surplus or deficit
on both the budget and the current account of the balance of payments;
. whether the technology can reduce the price of domestic traded goods to
compete with foreign goods through concentrating on the capital-intensive
industries to reduce the volume of foreign labour.
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G
Ms
Po
RP
RER
REV
S
T
wP
- 3.816*
- 1.940
5.542**
-3.470
3.700*
- 4.484**
-2.696
- 2.229
3.969*
- 9.037**
- 5.172**
9.702**
- 6.162**
- 6.648**
- 8.413**
- 7.002**
- 6.672**
7.144**
- 0.509
- 0.467
- 1.490
- 1.423
- 1.231
- 1.572
- 0.455
- 0.290
-2.943
Appendix (A)
Table Al. Unit Root Tests for all variables
Tables A2. The Estimation of the Traded Goods Equation, Including All Potential Independent
Variables as an Example.
Table Al
	 Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test, (trend and intercept)
Variable	 Level
	 First difference Second difference
* 5% significant level
** 1% significant level
I
Table A2
	
Estimation of the Supply of Traded Goods
Intercept
LREV
LG
LRP
LP0
LMs
LTOT
LWP
Coefficient
12.686
-0.110
- 0.161
-0.087
0.122
0.185
0.021
0.085
Standard Error
1.3580
0.0382
0.0697
0.0584
0.0355
0.0798
0.0411
0.5556
t-test
9.341
-2.882
-2.326
-1.499
3.455
2.326
0.515
1.531
Probability
0.000
0.008
0.029
0.147
0.002
0.029
0.610
0.139
R2
	
0.998
Adj. R2	 0.997
S. Error	 0.039
F-test
	
1377.5
D.W.	 1.821
These statistical results show the existence of multicollinearity due to the low values oft-Statistics
associated with relatively high R2 as well as reverse sign of some coefficients
II
Appendix (B)
Sources of Data
The data collected are drawn mainly from the following sources.
1. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), annual reports.
2. The Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, Achievements of the Development
Plans, (1970-1 996).
3. Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, Centeral Department of Statistics.
4. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Saudi Arabia, Statistical
Reports.
5. OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
6. OAPEC Annual Statistical Reports.
7. International Monetary Fund's Statistical Publications.
8. World Bank Statistical Publications
9. International Energy Agency, Middle East Oil and Gas, OECD.
